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ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation explores the functional purpose of imagination as it is enacted in 
the context of shaping large transitions in sociotechnical systems. Large sociotechnical 
systems undergoing profound transitions embody instantiations where societies 
experience profound changes in the ‘rules of the game’ that underpin the conduct of daily 
life. The forms of imagination that guide these transformations, known in the political 
theory literature as ‘imaginaries,’ play a profound yet undertheorized role in transition of 
sociotechnical systems from one configuration to another. Expanding on this relationship, 
the study draws on three case studies of energy systems change in the United States 
during 20th and 21st century. Each case study explores unique element of how actors at a 
variety of levels – transnational governance, regional electrification, and in-home energy 
marketing – define and the possibilities for ideal human and technological action and 
interaction through a transition. These actors defining the parameters of a new form of 
systems operation and configuration are as equally focused on defining how these new 
configurations shape fundamental ideas that underpin American democratic sensibility. 
Moreover, in the process of articulating a new configuration of energy and society – be 
that in terms of managing global resource flows or the automation of energy use in a 
residential home – questions of what makes an ideal member of a society are interlinked 
with new contractual relationships between energy producers and energy users. 
Transitions research could and should pay greater attention to the normative 
commitments emergent systems actors – as it is in these commitments we can chart 
pathways to redefine the parameters that underpin emergent transitions.  
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This research explores the relationship between collectively held visions of social 
progress and the transformation of large-scale energy systems. Specifically, I focus on 
how human beings construct the moral imperatives of deemed good technological 
transitions, and implement them through actionable changes in the ‘rules of the game’ 
that bound rational energy policy action. In this dissertation, I will explain why narratives 
that interweave human morality and technological materiality bridge a critical gap 
between the managerial and organization transformations industries experience during 
transitions, and the specific modifications of daily practice operators and members of the 
public encounter. I examine this question through a series of interlinked case studies of 
American society undergoing three large scale transformation of its energy systems 
during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Each case study emphasizes a different 
aspect of energy systems writ large – natural resources, electrification, and home energy 
management – but all explicate the value systems laden in the exercise of designing and 
charting transitions.  
My journey to this project was a complex one, albeit instigated with the same 
general spark provided by my electrical utility, Salt River Project. As a new resident and 
graduate student in the southeast valley of Phoenix, I entered the energy fray as a power 
customer with (like many) limited resources and an insufficiently high credit score. Salt 
River Project (SRP) gave me two options for how I could receive electricity: I could pay 
a rather large up front deposit and receive a wirelessly enabled “smart” meter, or pay a 
much smaller sum to join their pay as you go program. Naturally, I opted for the latter 
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option and quickly received a small innocuous box as a newly minted member of the M-
Power® program. As an in-home energy management system M-Power® puts the 
customer ‘in charge’ of their daily energy use. Rather than paying a regularly schedule 
bill for power consumed M-Power® customers monitor their own use and add money to 
their meter as needed during the year. M-Power® customers receive no other information 
from the utility in terms of their consumption patterns. What they do receive are a series 
of M-Power® customer monthly flyers with important information concerning 
responsible energy management and, ironically, water safety.  
Coming from other utility service areas where customers received monthly bills 
for power used, I found the M-Power® program a very new experience. I can still 
remember in detail the first night that my M-Power® box began beeping in the middle of 
the night after running below five dollars in funds available. I began to wonder “who was 
this program designed for, and to what end(s) does it serve?”1 My investigation led to a 
realization that M-Power® was a managerial and technological choice on the part of SRP 
repurposed to address the emergence a national discussion centered on the importance of 
cultivating a responsible energy user.  
Salt River Project is a wholly owned subsidiary of the State of Arizona and 
beholden to the Arizona Legislature for its financial stability. During the late 1990s 
concerns rose about the financial stresses imposed on SRP and Arizona by customers 
who were failing to pay their bills. SRP was directed to develop a program for 
minimizing these financial risks, and the result was M-Power®, a pay-as-you go system 
                                                
1 A full treatment of this case can be found in Richter et al. (2017).  
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that made customers deemed financial risks responsible for identifying when and how 
much power they needed to consume. Until the mid-2000s the program continued to 
develop along this line of application, instituting various rules and procedures to protect 
at-risk populations (the infirm, the elderly, children), off-business hours, and maintain the 
sanctity of safety during key holidays (Christmas). M-Power® was an effective tool for 
reducing financial risks, but also served the double purpose of minimizing energy 
consumption in the home. By making “energy visible” customers had to acknowledge 
that power was not given, but a product of a constant exchange of capital and electrons 
between the power company and the consumer. M-Power® customers became 
unexpected examples of what was possible through energy home visualization tools (“in-
home devices”). They represented an ideal kind of utility customer – the fiscally and 
technologically responsible user of the grid’s shared resources.  
Upon realizing the implications of this conclusion, I could not help but recognize 
the irony of thinking about M-Power® through the lens of technological innovation 
alone. M-Power® was a business choice initiated by policy discourse at the state level 
over the importance of fiscal responsibility that became a program of moralizing energy 
systems users’ behaviors. M-Power®’s transformation into a tool of energy efficiency 
and sustainability did not exhibit any large changes in terms of its design or management, 
customers used the same methods for acquiring power resources they had in the past. 
What did change is the larger system of shared understandings that bound customers, 
SRP, and the larger networks of energy policy related groups within the context of a 
moral imperative – the responsible management of our limited resources. It was without a 
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doubt this narrative, and others like it that make an appearance in this research project, 
that led me to study the role of narratives in technological transformations.  
Large scale changes in our technological systems, and more specifically our 
infrastructural networks, incur significant changes on the ways humans conceptualize 
space, work, play, right, and wrong. Energy systems are a particularly important type of 
infrastructure as they represent the exponential power humans have gained as 
geophysical agents in the age of the Anthropocene. No, they are more, energy systems as 
scholars have noted are the primary modality human beings leverage in the creation of 
their own form of history – human history. At the most extreme, thinkers such as Ian 
Morris argue energy defines how we bound morality itself (2015: 4):  
When we look at the entire planet across the last twenty thousand years, I argue, 
we see three broadly successive systems of human values. Each is associated with 
a particular way of organizing society, and each form of organization is dictated 
by a particular way of capturing energy from the world around us. 
 
Read through Paul Edwards’ work on infrastructures and society, Morris’ argument 
registers a claim that human beings are in fact as much a product of their energy 
infrastructures as the constituent artifacts are of human ingenuity.  
A more common refrain outlines high-energy consumption as a feature rather than 
driving force of “modern” societies advancing their tools and techniques of energy 
consumption (Smil 2005). Regardless, the undeniable fact is that humans build and use 
energy systems, sometimes define their daily experiences within the context of energy 
systems, and occasionally encounter new forms of energy use that disrupt established 
patterns. Take for example one innocuous technology of the twentieth century American 
home: the refrigerator. Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s (1983) study of technology and 
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homemaking provides a wonderful lens for examining our banal refrigerator in its 
formative stages. The electrically-operated compressor refrigerator as we know it is the 
product of a successful series of investments, compressor technical design changes, and 
marketing that pushed the alternative model – a gas-cooled refrigerator – to the margins 
of existing markets. The electric-powered compressor refrigerator was in no way a 
universally superior design to that of the gas-powered one; in fact gas refrigerators were 
routinely noted for their efficiency and quiet operation. Gas-powered refrigerators 
suffered from a mix of financial, technological, and social factors all embodied in the 
larger shift towards electrification as the basis of modern American living. The 
consequences of the refrigerator and other such household technologies basis on the 
presence and use of centrally-managed and distributed electrical energy can be felt today 
through the method I use to communicate this information to you. 
Cases such as the M-Power® meter and the gas-powered refrigerator represent 
moments in the development of energy systems where the individual norms and values 
within families intersect with larger visions of what makes for a desirable organization of 
people and technology. Within the literature on morality and energy systems these cases 
represent instances of homeowner’s “moral economies” – their shared sense of how daily 
life should be ordered (Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2010: 6112). As a matter of 
research design, these scholars are interested more in individual family reactions rather 
than the larger ecosystem in which said responses emerge. What is missing – and where 
this dissertation seeks to make an impact – is by decentering particular energy systems 
and technologies as the focus of research. Eschewing a social construction of technology 
framework for examining energy technologies and society, I am interested in explicating 
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how questions of what role(s) the state, the utility, and the public play in shaping a 
society’s progress are explicated in the configuration and operation of energy 
sociotechnical systems. To achieve this goal, my dissertation interfaces with two salient 
literatures in the study of moral economies of energy systems – technological transitions 
theory, typified by the Multi-Level Perspective model, and theories of imagination and 
social order. Theories of technological transitions recognize the important role moralizing 
visions of social life and order play in the shaping of new technologies and networks of 
actors vying to bring them to the fore. These authors recognize that political, economic, 
cultural, and epistemic shifts in a society’s raison d’être, its ‘sociotechnical landscape,’ 
create the possibilities that underpin colossal shifts in the operation and maintenance of 
incumbent sociotechnical systems like petroleum, electrification, and transportation.  
What has been missing, and that I propose to address here, is a functional 
approach for interfacing sociotechnical landscape elements with the behaviors and 
technologies of actors engaged in creating new sociotechnical system configurations. I 
argue that it is through the imaginative capacities of these actors—and specifically their 
ability to create discourses at a multitude of levels within a society, in policy, in business, 
and in domestic life—where it is possible to observe the contours of emerging visions of 
technology and social order. In the context of energy systems, this dissertation shows that 
above all else designing an energy system is a deeply moral exercise. Energy systems 
draw on just as many intellectual resources pertaining to the operations and maintenance 
of large technological systems as they do on from the practices actors leverage to 
interpret the core norms and values of the societies they build for.  
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Fantasy, Imaginaries, and Technological Change 
 
The complex systems of understanding that underpin how individuals and 
societies come to understand and describe new ways of framing right and wrong are 
interwoven with the production and maintenance of sociotechnical systems. These 
narratives are a form of modern day “fairy tales,” complete with their own heroes, 
villains, and landscapes of wonders both fair and frightful. Take, for example, the case of 
Richard Scarry’s books, specifically What Do People Do All Day? As Clark Miller, 
Jennifer Richter, and Jason O’Leary (2015) note, Scarry’s fun and fanciful images of 
daily life serve as an orienteering guide to modern life. A comfortable and modern 
society has fireman, police, homes replete with pipes and power lines running 
throughout, and, of course, those in society tasked with generating the power to make 
things go. We find in Scarry’s book good and bad characters aplenty, all engaged in the 
process of defining what makes a good society. The electrician wires the house and 
reminds us never to touch the fuse box, while the power company mice hook up the main 
power line to the utility pole. Farther up the power line we find our utility friends’ 
associates at the “Buried Sunlight Coal Mine” (Scarry, 1968: 71) working happily away 
blasting, drilling, and excavating fresh coal seams for the local power plant. Finally, we 
reach the power plant where coal is turned into electricity to light the homes, run the 
televisions, vacuums, and panoply of other appliances the people of Busytown use every 
day. Everyone in Busytown has an important role to play in life either as hero or villain, 
and all (including King Coal, the Beaver) have a place at the community picnic.2 
                                                
2 The one exception is Busytown’s lone “lazy fellow” – clearly a vagrant (pig) fallen 
asleep under the railroad tracks. This vagrant pig makes a momentary entrance in our 
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Narratives such as Scarry’s are an important type of “fantasy” that, as Bormann 
notes, serve a critical role in the organization of large-scale social interaction (Bormann, 
1985: 5): “The technical meaning for fantasy is the creative and imaginative 
interpretation of events that fulfills a psychological or rhetorical need.” Scarry’s rhetoric 
of a society that produces and works together is a good society has and continues to 
provide children a pre-ordained framework for binning what kinds of lives and things 
they should seek to do and be in life. Bormann calls these types of fantasies “life style 
rhetorical visions” and attributes their unique power to how widespread these fantasies 
are in a given society.  
Another related field of study on the role of fantasies in organizing societies is the 
burgeoning literature on “imaginaries” or “social imaginaries” and techonscience. 
Imaginaries like fantasies serve to make sense of the world, but unlike fantasies 
emphasize the importance of narratives for making what is unfamiliar seem rational 
(Volger, 2002: 625): “Crudely put, imaginaries are complex systems of presumption--
patterns of forgetfulness and attentiveness--that enter subjective experience as the 
expectation that things will make sense generally (i.e., in terms not wholly 
idiosyncratic).” Imaginaries are a shared framework for navigating moments of encounter 
between individuals, groups, and others be they political, social, or economic institutions, 
or others who do not share their same history. They are not false narratives insofar as 
imaginaries do not serve to intentionally mislead daily conduct – rather they are 
                                                
story of heroes and villains only to disappear just as quickly. Scarry clearly had less 
respect for those who do nothing than he did those who do wrong such as Wild Bill 
Hiccup, the stereotyped “Native American” raccoon that cannot drive.   
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interpretations of larger political and social commitments directed at specific kinds of 
interactions. A salient example stems from Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim’s 
explication of those imaginaries directed at the construction and maintenance of 
sociotechnical systems, what they refer to as ‘sociotechnical imaginaries’ (2009). In the 
post-World War II United States, policymakers leveraged the idea of containment as a 
metaphor for how to address emergent material, financial, and political risks surrounding 
the development and sustainment of a nuclear complex deemed necessary for maintaining 
global power. Jasanoff and Kim’s examination of imaginaries highlights an important 
distinction between imaginaries and fantasies; where the fantasy emphasizes a focus on 
creation and experience, the imaginary takes what is fantasized and translates it into a 
structure for knowing how to encounter new experiences in the world. Imaginaries thus 
possess power in the sense that they draw from the cultural reservoirs of the societies in 
which they emerge, and circulate throughout via the wider diffusion of technologies, be 
they techniques of calculating economic growth or the introduction of cellular phone 
technologies in sub-Saharan African states.   
Scarry’s books themselves are a form of fantasy – a creative exercise that frames 
what children learn about the world. The book on its own, however, is not an imaginary, 
as that would assume a nearly seamless interpretation of the book by children. Children 
who read Scarry’s books (myself included) learn to “see” the world through specific 
arrangements of his characters: police and firefighters do good, builders work together to 
make houses (and money), miners work hard, and everyone gets along. These patterns of 
reading, interpreting, forgetting, and improvising on given templates for social 
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organization are where imaginaries emerge and begin to shape the ways individuals 
encounter future life. 
In this project, I focus on the importance of thinking about how the stories we tell 
about a “better life” through science and technology are replete with instances where we 
can (and should) ask ourselves “is this what tomorrow should look like?”. Read though 
this lens, my dissertation is less an inquiry into energy systems transformations (“energy 
transitions”) per se and more a study in how societies make and make sense of their 
sociotechnical world(s).  
For those familiar with conversations in Science and Technology Studies on the 
intersection of ways of knowing the world and ways of living within it, my statement 
above certainly hints towards Sheila Jasanoff’s idiom of “co-production”. I fully admit 
this work is informed by Jasanoff’s emblematic (and enigmatic) claim that “the ways in 
which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from 
the ways in which we choose to live in it” (Jasanoff, 2004: 2). Yet, like Jasanoff’s turn to 
the imaginaries literature in Dreamscapes of Modernity (2015), I am more interested in 
understanding the function imaginaries play in shaping the coded ‘rational’ discourses 
surrounding advancements in science and technology. Echoing Jasanoff, stating 
knowledge and society are interlinked is not enough. As we enter the fifth decade since 
the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Science (Bloor 1991) asked us to question the 
social production and transmission of scientific knowledge, our examinations of the role 
humans play in their own technoscientific futures should seek to fill in the gaps in our 
own existent theories. Sociotechnical imaginaries played a formative role in the initial 
work I did on fantasy, imaginaries, and energy transitions (Tidwell and Smith 2015; 
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Smith and Tidwell 2016). Many pieces in that vein of work will reappear throughout this 
research project, and I am indebted to Jasanoff, Kim, and their associates for initiating 
this vein of inquiry.3 
My research, however, is not a study of sociotechnical imaginaries and energy 
systems. Rather, it is a study of the imaginaries that actors shape in the creation of 
alternative visions of energized social life and order. On first pass, this choice seems 
peculiar given this dissertation is about energy systems and the ordering of American 
society. As I explain below, my choice to focus on advancing theories of imaginaries as 
they pertain to the study of sociotechnical transitions as opposed to sociotechnical 
imaginaries is a direct response to the overemphasis in recent energy scholarship on the 
technologies being imagined, rather than their wider social and cultural context. Put 
bluntly, what is missing from many studies employing sociotechnical imaginaries today 
is an analysis of the social and political context(s) under which technological systems 
become representative of specific visions of societal advancement.  
Sociotechnical imaginaries as defined by Jasanoff and Kim emphasize the role of 
policymaking as their field of study on how visions of positive social change through 
science and technology manifest (Jasanoff 2015a: 4, emphasis added): 
[W]e redefine sociotechnical imaginaries in this book as collectively held, 
institutionally stabilized, and publically performed visions of desirable futures, 
animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order 
attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology. 
 
                                                
3 In particular, I want to thank my colleague Tess Doezema for riding out one too many 
conversations about this subject together. I hope you find some of my insights here useful 
for your work. 
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“[A]nimated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable 
through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology” (ibid). Since 
Dreamscapes came out, I have struggled with how to address, on one hand, Jasanoff and 
Kim’s revised definition, and on the other the burgeoning literature examining the 
imaginaries of energy transitions. Sociotechnical imaginaries is at its core an attempt to 
create an actionable framework for studying how exactly questions of social life and 
order are interwoven with questions of scientific advancement – what Jasanoff calls the 
idiom of “co-production” (Jasanoff, 2004). Imaginaries as tools for coordinating policy 
action and technoscientific advancement towards common goals represents an 
understanding of society consonant with the last five decades of advancements in the 
study of the sociology of scientific knowledge. Both Jasanoff, Kim, and the contributors 
to Dreamscapes acknowledge the wider societal context in which advancements in 
science and technology become encoded with larger political, social, and economic 
commitments. Recent energy research employing sociotechnical imaginaries as an 
analytical lens emphasizes the interface between technologies and their vision in the 
context of policymaking (Ballo 2015; Levidow and Papaioannou 2013; Kuchler 2014). 
What is missing in these and other studies is a careful examination of the context in 
which debates over the role of science and technology advancements in shaping future 
life emerge and become embedded in sociotechnical systems. 
I would posit this disconnect between the literature as it appears today and the 
vision of sociotechnical imaginaries in Dreamscapes has a great deal to do with the 
context in which Jasanoff and Kim’s sociotechnical imaginaries analysis is situated in the 
2009 paper versus the 2015 book. Jasanoff and Kim’s (2009) argument for sociotechnical 
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imaginaries in 2009 leveraged a cross-national comparison of visions surrounding the 
role of nuclear technology in the shaping of government priorities and government-
society interactions in the United States and South Korea, respectively. In the case of the 
United States, Jasanoff and Kim argue that the emergence of nuclear weapons at the 
conclusion of World War II was co-produced with a narrative of containment that, 
throughout the Cold War, came to encompass all facets of daily life, the conduct of 
policymaking, and the management of public engagement. What was missing from their 
analysis was a treatment of the larger shared understandings Americans possessed 
surrounding the idea of containing existential risks; for example, the containment of 
Japanese-Americans throughout World War II. Policy priorities surrounding containment 
within the United States did not emerge de novo in response to the development of 
nuclear weapons. The management of nuclear weapons shares a common social and 
political history with how Americans have addressed the ‘other’ in a variety of political, 
social, and economic contexts. An unintended consequence of this lack of context seems 
to be an expectation that the study of sociotechnical imaginaries should focus explicitly 
on the interaction between groups in society and technological advancements as opposed 
to the contexts in which they are arranged. As a network directed towards the future by a 
shared vision, an imaginary, for what the ‘good life’ should look like, sociotechnical 
imaginaries provides a starting point for addressing a serious weakness in the analytical 
effectiveness of co-production. Divested of these social and political contexts, however, 
the sociotechnical imaginaries literature as it stands says little about how groups in a 
society navigate shared values in the context of emergent new forms of living such as 
those encountered during a sociotechnical transition. It is at this intersection between 
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commonly held understandings of how a society understands its forms of daily life and 
the activities undertaken to envisage other forms of living, specifically in terms of energy 
systems in the United States, that my work seeks to make its impact.  
Technological Transitions 
 
I will approach this question of how to study the norms and values that intersect 
discussions of possible sociotechnical futures through bringing the imaginaries literature 
into conversation with soctechnological transitions theory. Building on the work of 
historians and sociologists of technology, in particular Thomas Hughes’ theory of 
“technological momentum”, and Wiebe Bijker and Trevor Pinch’s Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) theory, technological transitions research focuses on the multi-scalar 
co-evolution of large assemblages of technologies directed at specific types of material 
and social outcomes. This “multi-level perspective” (MLP) approach to technological 
transitions demarcates the world into three categories of interest: sociotechnical 
landscapes—the larger social, political, and increasingly ecological pressures on human 
societies; specific regimes of actors, institutions, technologies, and implicit “rules of the 
game” that bound the field of rational behavior (Geels 2002: 1260); and specific 
emergent technological “niches” where novel ideas and technologies are developed and 
emerge.  
Research in the MLP approach to transitions and transitions management 
emphasizes the role sociotechnical regimes play in shaping transitions (Fuenfschilling, 
Lea and Truffer, Bernhard 2014; Geels 2014; Sengers 2016). Regimes are where actor 
groups’ power is established and ossified into the obdurate features of society – its rules, 
its infrastructures, and constellation of actors. Emergent technological niches can and 
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have successfully uprooted previous regimes, but such change requires emergent groups 
to network together significant political power of their own. Moreover, these oppositional 
groups cannot rely on artifacts alone, as they need to draw on powerful narratives that 
allow agents of change to speak of and show what life could and should be like (Arranz 
2017). Through the process of articulating and constructing alternative visions and 
futures actors embody the new field of acceptable practices (Shove and Walker 2014): 
they experience what it means to live with different notions of comfort, health, and of 
course energy.  
 Frans Berkhout defines these narratives of alternative regimes, or future visions, 
as “collectively held and communicable schemata that represent future objectives and 
express the means by which these objectives will be realized” (Berkhout 2006: 302). 
Much like Jasanoff and Kim’s definition of sociotechnical imaginaries, Berkhout 
emphasizes the functional role of future visions and their moral valences in terms of how 
they organize the “rules of the game” that direct material action. Both approaches to the 
role of futures and sociotechnological change also emphasize the implementation of 
narratives/imaginaries as tools of power. What is lacking is an understanding of (1) what 
resources actors draw upon to construct imaginaries, and (2) how these imaginaries relate 
to larger social, political, economic, and epistemic shifts within a society. The fact that 
imaginaries shape the activities of governments, corporations, and individuals only 
captures the consequences of imaginaries, rather than examining the resources actors 
draw on to create imaginaries informed and informative to unique sociotechnical regimes. 
To redress this existing gap in our understanding of narratives/imaginaries and 
technological change, this dissertation shifts the focus of analysis away from the 
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sociotechnical regime and up towards the overarching sociotechnical landscape. 
Sociotechnical landscapes are currently conceptualized as the reservoir of exogenous 
factors that can drive technological change. Wars, environmental disaster, and political 
upheaval are some of the salient categories of world events that were it not for the 
sociotechnical landscape category would have little to no relationship to the MLP model 
of technological change. Following an understanding of social and technological change 
in the coproductionist vein, I argue that the sociotechnical landscape is less a reservoir of 
emergent social boundary conditions, as the milieu from which actors build their 
narratives and articulate visions of social and technological change. This distinction is 
necessary, as studies of sociotechnical transitions in the MLP model ascribe 
sociotechnical landscapes a secondary role to those of regimes and niches, rather than 
recognize that social and political context for innovations does not end beyond specific 
sociotechnical systems and actor-network groups.4 
Outline of the Research 
 
My dissertation posits that imaginaries and their moral and material dimensions 
are expressions of sociotechnological landscapes rooted in the pragmatic necessities of 
producing material transformations of sociotechnical regimes. Energy systems are 
conspicuous among other large technological systems in terms of the salience and 
persistence of the idea that they can and will be transitioned from one configuration to 
another over time. The empirical material for this dissertation draws on three instances 
                                                
4 For a more complete set of critiques pertaining to the under-theorization of 
sociotechnical landscapes see (Lawhon and Murphy 2011). 
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where monumental transformations in the ordering of American society led to the 
emergence of specific imaginaries pertaining to the role(s) novel energy systems would 
play in shaping new understandings of security, the public interest, and the home. My 
focus is on how ideas about these constitutive parts of American life and social order 
become articulated and materialized through the co-production of new imaginaries and 
configurations of energy systems.  
In Chapter Two, I provide a more in depth discussion of imaginaries/fantasy and 
technological transitions, and outline a project of studying the role of moralizing visions 
in defining what is technological and social advancement through a transition. This 
chapter should help anyone who is also interested in finding a way to discuss the role of 
imagination and fantasy from perspective that captures the larger body of work in this 
field.  
Chapter Three presents a previously published work “Morals Materials and 
Technoscience: The Energy Security Imaginary in the United States” (Tidwell and Smith 
2015) which examined the way mid-century U.S. policy makers constructed the problem 
of energy security within the context of geopolitical imperatives. This article 
demonstrates energy security as we understand it within the context of American 
policymaking depends as much on a material anchoring in 1960s and 1970 energy 
challenges as it does on the articulation of American political norms and values for a 
global stage. Considering “energy security” as a sociotechnical imaginary helps to situate 
our focus on how transitions between energy system configurations begin in the ways 
actors see the role of these new systems at the associated scales of impact. Situated within 
the context of a genealogy of security and American society, Chapter Three provides a 
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nation-state level account of how actors seeking to understand energy systems within the 
context of the emerging concept of global security articulate a vision of security that is 
uniquely networked through energy systems and their associated financial and political 
institutions. For those most familiar with the transnational and nation-state analyses 
common in the co-production scholarship vein, this chapter serves as a useful point of 
departure along the larger dissertation’s focus on the construction of imaginaries from the 
larger social and political reservoirs of a nation-state’s identity. 
Chapter Four focuses on the role of constructing the public in the articulation of a 
key early twentieth century transition: the emergence of electrification as the primary 
modality of illumination and motive power for manufacturing. Turning to the lectures of 
one of the industry’s most important business minds, Samuel Insull, I examine how Insull 
situated the emergence of electrification as a question of the moral standing of Illinois 
society. Emerging from the financial and technological instability of Chicago’s late 
nineteenth century energy infrastructure, Insull name has become synonymous with big 
utility power and greed. My analysis suggests that Insull was also concerned with how 
his industry was perceived to behave in relationship to its investors and the public writ 
large. Building on Thomas Hughes’s (1983) examination of Insull’s many technological 
and managerial advancements, I study Insull’s story from the perspective of his visions of 
what was an appropriate public-utility relationship. Insull emphasized throughout his 
career that electrification companies should be monopolies, and that the responsible 
regulation of the electrification industry was necessary from a fiscal and public relations 
perspective. This could only be achieved, Insull argued, by shifting regulatory oversight 
to a state policymaking body. Comprised of men of good moral standing, a state public 
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utility commission would act as a responsibilizing force, holding his company and others 
culpable for the public benefits they should ostensibly provide. 
Chapter Five looks at a more contemporary and emergent case of an energy 
system in transition, the emergence of the home as a site of energy production and 
management. Though early American homes produced their own energy through the 
burning of biomass or fossil fuels, few homes use these forms of energy today for 
illumination or motive power. In an almost ironic twist of history, contemporary calls for 
home owners to become active managers of their energy use have intersected with larger 
visions of what role the home serves in American society. What has resulted is a series of 
emergent sites where one can observe the moralization of energy consumption within the 
context of these larger home owning and homemaking discourses and practices.  
One important site where visions of the ideal home life intersect with energy 
efficiency and management discourses are the model homes builders develop for new 
home developments. New home development models, like museums, are sites where 
people and place are imagined and brought into a contextualized focus. Unlike museums, 
the intent of the new home model is to enroll the individual in a unique vision of what life 
could be like through alternative “modern” living. Drawing on a visual analysis of new 
home build sites in the Phoenix metropolitan area, I examine a subset of builders who 
have begun emphasizing the role self-energy management can play in “constructing” 
better lives through new homes. As I show, the moralizing visions that inflect on energy 
transitions in progress both draw on existent narratives and establish entirely unexpected 
ways of experiencing daily life. I argue the intersection of these two experiences within 
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the context of the model home is what gives us the perception of “innovativeness” so 
fundamental to our ability to situate it within the context of social progress.  
To conclude, I return to the question of how moralizing visions of society shape 
technological transformations and the story of ideal societies made cultural icon through 
Scarry’s work. Like Scarry I see the value narratives play in shaping the reservoir of 
images and metaphors bounding how we collectively see tomorrow. Yet, I see the limited 
potential they can play in a world dominated by the all-too-easy separation of innovations 
from their societal implications. At the intersection of these visions and the construction 
of scientific facts and technological artifacts lies a fruitful yet underexplored intersection 
for imaginaries research and the development of novel approaches to science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics education (STEM). Opening the pedagogy of STEM to 
examination from an imaginaries perspective affords several opportunities for 
imaginaries scholars to think and act towards understanding how transitions occur and 
might occur otherwise. As we consider the articulation of new visions of social life and 
order in response to environmental, social, political, and economic global change we 
must consider the role Science and Technology Studies can play in shaping how we both 
understand where and to what ends links between science, technology, and society 





Reflecting on Richard Scarry’s fantasies of American social life and order I am 
always struck by how little my own child will recognize the worlds he paints with words 
and drawings. The coal-fired power plant, for example fueled by the “Buried Gold Mine” 
represents a configuration of electrification systems in the United States built on shipping 
large amounts of raw energy resources—coal specifically—to centralized power stations 
to generate large sums of energy for distribution over large geographical territories. It is a 
system built on visions of social progress through electrification and illumination, of 
comfort and warmth in the home facilitated by an increasing number of technologies to 
ostensibly shift labor from women. Scarry’s books represent the kinds of lived 
experiences consonant with the communities, industrialists, and individuals explored by 
David Nye, Thomas Hughes, and Ruth Schwartz Cowan. Like Muncie, Indiana, 
Busytown is replete with the possibilities for comfort, safety, and modernity facilitated by 
the increasing power and influence of the Edison family of power and light companies 
who have in Busytown clearly pushed predecessor gas and biomass energy providers 
from the fore.  
My own child will grow up in a very similar, yet entirely different configuration 
of electrical power generation. She will know of a power sector supplied through a 
combination of resources—gas, wind, biomass, nuclear, and solar. As opposed to her 
father, who grew up on stories of life (and death) in the company towns of Appalachian 
coal production, she will hear from her mother and maternal grandfather about working 
and living as an expert tasked with producing safe and reliable energy from atomic 
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fission. Schoolwork will include references to carbon emissions and the importance of 
protecting our natural resources—made possible through a variety of games and exercises 
taught in teacher’s college programs today. Her parents will speak at home with friends 
and family alike about the challenges of producing a ‘safe, reliable, and environmentally 
responsible’ mix of energy sources, and she will see on her friend’s houses and garages 
the possibilities afforded to homes that choose to produce, store, and consume their own 
energy through photovoltaic solar.  
The shift between what my own personal experiences with energy as a child were, 
and what my daughter’s energetic life will likely be, are representative of the scale and 
power through which humans modify the sociotechnical systems that shape their worlds. 
Transitioning from one group of actors, technologies, rules, norms, and narratives— what 
scholars call a ‘sociotechnical system’—to another implies tremendous shifts in how 
individuals come to understand and act in the world. Emergent sociotechnical systems 
possess a great deal of uncertainty in their nascent years, as these new interlinked 
networks of technological artifacts, organizations, epistemologies, and ‘rules of the 
game’ have yet to reach an equilibrium with other existing sociotechnical systems (T. P. 
Hughes 1983; Meadowcroft 2009).  
At the level of individual technologies and technological artifacts, new 
sociotechnical systems are replete with various groups of actors—inventors, business 
professionals, market analysts, operators, and users—each of whom conceptualize the 
risks and benefits of artifacts within their larger understandings of the role of 
sociotechnical systems in society. Richard Kline and Trevor Pinch’s (1996) study of the 
introduction of automobiles into the rural American landscape are representative of how 
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specific social groups such as dandies joyriding, farmers with horse and buggy, and 
farmers needing higher concentrations of motive power (engines) understand, adapt, or 
resist specific artifacts in the process of meeting their needs. Exhibiting what Wiebe 
Bijker and Trevor Pinch (1984) called “interpretive flexibility”, rural user groups shaped 
the purpose, structure, and associated marketing models surrounding early vehicles, 
leading to the emergence of what we now know as the pickup truck.  
Similarly, actors engaged in the construction of electrical power systems 
accustomed to smaller generators for turning steam into electrical energy encountered 
and worked with power technology developers to design and implement large turbine 
generators, increasing the thermal efficiency of their central-station power facilities well 
above the ability of competitors (T. P. Hughes 1983). Actors, chief amongst these early 
power company operators such as Samuel Insull of Commonwealth Edison in Chicago 
(who will make an appearance later in this dissertation), were less concerned with their 
own social network groups’ needs and wants as they were with shaping how groups of 
artifacts, financial models, and policies made possible new models of generating capital 
with electrical power generation and distribution.  
Thomas Parke Hughes refers to these ‘systems builders’ as actors who “construct 
or to force unity from diversity, centralization in the face of pluralism, and coherence 
from chaos” (Hughes 2012: 47). A systems builder’s “story” of how successful or 
unsuccessful they were can be found in the strength of the network of knowledge, 
technologies, and people arrayed together (Latour 1988: 140): 
Understanding what facts and machines are is the same task as understanding 
who the people are. If you describe the controlling elements that have been 
gathered together you will understand the groups which are controlled. 
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Conversely, if you observe the new groups which are tied together, you will see 
how machines work and why facts are hard. The only question in common is to 
learn which associations are stronger and which weaker. 
 
The power to shape and bring about a sociotechnological transition is ensconced in the 
very individuals, technologies, and understandings of the world that make its existence 
possible.  
Bringing about new sociotechnical systems is a “co-evolutionary” process in the 
sense that, similar to how Jasanoff (2004) discusses the simultaneous emergence of ways 
of constructing knowledge and ways of living in the world, sociotechnical systems are 
inexorably linked to the emergence of the constituent parts which comprise their 
existence. Arie Rip and Frank Kemp (1998) refer to these constellations of actors, 
institutions, technologies, and guiding rules and norms as a “sociotechnical regime.” In 
both the literal and metaphorical sense, a sociotechnical regime is where the stuff of our 
technological society happens (such as writing a dissertation on a laptop) and where we 
turn our sense of how the world should work into what we do in it. Actors within a 
regime have the task of making sense out of what otherwise would appear to be a 
complex set of interacting individuals and technologies; their ability to shape the world to 
achieve specific goals thus depends upon creating narratives and practices that produce 
coherence in how the “game” should be played (Geels 2002: p. 1260).  
Not all actors have the same amount of power over the narratives that shape a 
given regime, and the relationship between actor groups and overarching institutions play 
a significant role in the coordination and subordination of dominant/non-dominant 
interpretations of given regimes (Fuenfschilling and Truffer, 2014). Dominant societal 
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institutions can exercise great power over deciding who and who does not matter within a 
given sociotechnical regime; for example, non-whites in South Africa exercised little to 
no influence over the country’s coal-based electricity systems while whites and other 
global development institutions inscribed a Euroamerican model of centralized 
distributed power onto a deeply divided cultural landscape (Baker, Newell, and Phillips 
2014). Deciding who and who does not coordinate the pattern of these rules requires 
examining both the scale(s) at which sociotechnical regimes act, where in the world we 
find them at work, and how they fit into larger sociocultural, economic, and 
environmental patterns. 
Geography and locality matter, whether those spaces are nation-states or 
individual urban settings. Where a regime resides is its “medium of action” (Raven, 
Schot, and Berkhout 2012), the material and social reservoir that directs the co-
evolutionary process between a society and its unique sociotechnical systems. What 
however exists beyond the medium and shapes the possibilities for a transition to occur? 
To return to systems builders, Hughes conceptualized the exogenous factors that 
influence the possibilities for new sociotechnical systems as the “environment” of 
innovations. The environment is a semi-stable set of one-way interactions between 
factors outside of a given sociotechnical system that directly affect system behaviors and 
those factors the system itself influences (Hughes 1983: 47). Recent scholarship seeking 
to operationalize Hughes’ concept of the environment refers to these exogenous factors as 
the “sociotechnical landscape” – the larger social, political, economic, and environmental 
changes and stabilities a sociotechnical regime must inevitably adapt to for survival (Rip 
and Kemp 1998).  
 26 
Hughes understanding of the environment opens a great deal of ambiguity as to 
where sociotechnical systems begin and end, a consequence of his model that has only 
increased in salience during the decades since he wrote Networks of Power. Much like 
my daughter confronted with her mother monitoring and scheduling power use via her 
smartphone delineating between large technological systems based on the characteristics 
of their constituent artifacts (smartphones versus transformers), let alone the multivalent 
interlaced political, social, and ecological implications of telecommunications enabled 
energy use are difficult at best.  
It is almost ironic that Hughes’ understanding of the interaction between systems 
and their environments appears quaint when confronting a multitude of new intersections 
between longstanding sociotechnical regimes such as telecommunications, energy and 
transportation, amongst others. Hughes posited that systems could develop a sort of 
“momentum”—becoming increasingly durable as they began to take on the qualities of 
an environment. As systems array larger and larger groups of individuals and 
technologies directed towards specific visions of the future these systems become 
massively influential (T. P. Hughes 2012). Some become so large that, like electrification 
systems, they become the conduits that direct our collective energy (metaphorical and 
literal) towards acting as geophysical agents. 
What then makes a transition, and more specifically an energy transition, 
possible? According to one dominant theory known as the Multi-Level Perspective, 
innovations in protected niches build larger and larger networks of supporters (human 
and technological artifact) until, usually through some significant change in the 
sociotechnical landscape, an opportunity emerges for radical transformations in the 
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dominant sociotechnical regime (Geels 2002). A sociotechnical transition is an 
evolutionary process by which competing niches adapt to new environmental pressures, 
and through building stronger and stronger networks can and do overthrow existent and 
even ossified regimes. Not all innovations succeed, most fail gloriously, and all must 
inevitably confront the latent institutional networks and modes of governance that define 
and re-inscribe through daily practice the “rules” defining appropriate living. As I outline 
in the next section, a model of sociotechnical change that starts from the perspective 
technology and society are simultaneously constructed offers a needed remedy to over a 
century of models positing energy as the driver of social change. Approaching energy 
systems as question of rules, norms, and practices emphasizes that my daughter may in 
the future have a materially more efficient and less polluting energy experience than I 
did, but that these changes are not the product of a naturally occurring march towards 
ever better (and efficient) forms of civilization.  
Energy as Society? 
 
During the Second World War the anthropologist Leslie White published what 
stands as one of the most interesting explorations of the intersection of energy, 
technology, and social change. Responding to World War II, “Energy and the Evolution 
of Culture” (White 1943) approaches the question of cultural change as a process of 
providing increased security for a society through the transformation and use of energy 
sources. Framing this idea within the context of the field of Cultural Anthropology writ 




Man, being the only animal capable of symbol-behavior, is the only creature to 
possess culture. Culture is a kind of behavior. And behavior, whether of man, 
mule, plant, comet or molecule, may be treated as a manifestation of energy. 
Thus, we see, on all levels of reality, that phenomena lend themselves to 
description and interpretation in terms of energy. Cultural anthropology is that 
branch of natural science which deals with matter-and-motion, i.e., energy, 
phenomena in cultural form, as biology deals with them in cellular, and physics in 
atomic, form. 
 
White was certainly not the only person to posit culture in terms of energy—as Anson 
Rabinbach explores in The Human Motor, early 20th century Euroamerican culture was 
obsessed with the idea of humans as engines of work, and the associated problem of 
human fatigue (1992). William Stanley Jevons (1865) would couch similar concerns 
about the energetic nature of a society in terms of its raw resources available. In The Coal 
Question, Jevons (1865) argued that a country’s energy resource supplies were part and 
parcel to its very identity as a nation.  
These and more recent interpretations of the role of energy in society continue to 
emphasize the role of energy as a factor in the organization of what kinds of ways of 
living are right and wrong. If they have changed in any ways from their forebears, these 
recent scholars of ‘energy as social order’ posit a society’s energy system regimes create 
and maintain social and political order (Morris 2015: xix):  
It is not that individuals are caused to adopt values by their society's mode of 
energy capture. Rather, over the course of long stretches of history, and as a result 
of innumerable social experiments by inventive humans, the societies that are best 
organized to exploit available modes of energy capture--by their social structures, 
economic and political institutions, culture and values--will tend to prevail over 
and displace other societies that are less well organized.  
 
Morris’s model of cultural progress as the co-evolution of advances in energy capture and 
institutional development appears, on first pass, much like the model of sociotechnical 
transitions discussed above. Yet there are flaws, not least of which pertain to the 
 29 
centrality of one sociotechnical system over all other possible ways of organizing humans 
and technologies.  
Energy systems are important facets of how societies become ordered to achieve 
specific industrial, social, and political outcomes, but these systems are not all 
encompassing. Take for example the problem of sustainability; viewed through the lens 
of energy systems as social order one could see the problem entirely as a matter of 
developing sustainable transportation and fuels. This could lead to changes in the 
material components that comprise specific sociotechnical regimes, but not a realignment 
of the ways actors approach energy problems. Miller et al. (2015) recognize this 
challenge when they acknowledge that even as global institutions and transnational 
energy organizations recognize the critical importance of “transitioning” to more 
sustainable forms of energy production and consumption, problems of energy in terms of 
policy (a form of ‘rules’ of the game) are entirely couched in techno-economic terms. 
Stirling (2014) takes this critique one step further to argue that speaking of transforming 
energy systems—nearly passé in global conversations obsessed with innovation and 
change—can and do routinely become subverted by existing power arrangements 
entrenched within dominant regimes.  
Sociotechnical regimes surrounding energy are, it would seem, much more 
complex than the glacial “march of history” early works of energy and social change 
would imply. Energy sociotechnical regimes, be they electrification, fuels, transportation, 
or mining, are deeply resistant to change as incumbent powers have tremendous 
embedded political and economic power. Incumbents have little reason to change from an 
economic perspective, and what change would benefit them can already be found in the 
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incremental improvements in the overall efficiency of energy extraction, production, and 
distribution during the latter part of the twentieth century.  
Change, as is no surprise, occurs when pressure is exerted from the outside of a 
dominant regime. Pressures are complex and multivalent, emerging from a variety of 
“landscape” level shifts in how a society understands itself and the world it inhabits. 
Energy systems due to their global reach and power are impacted by a large number of 
influences that vary in their size and scale of impact (Foxon 2011: 1205): 
Landscape factors include public awareness of climate change and willingness to 
accept and undertake changes in response, government commitments to meet 
national and international targets for emissions reductions and promotion of low 
carbon energy sources, ideological commitments to liberalized energy markets, 
concerns over security of primary energy supplies, external factors leading to high 
oil and gas prices—and concerns about energy affordability and fuel poverty, and 
factors which threaten physical disruption of external supplies (war, terrorism, 
foreign governments limiting supply, etc.), as well as changes in the international 
economic and financial situation. 
 
A common thread amongst these landscape factors is the importance of how individuals 
frame material and epistemic commitments to a given society’s way of living. Take for 
example the question of ideological commitments to liberalized energy markets: in the 
context of contemporary discussions of the role distributed energy sources such as 
photovoltaic solar can play in addressing carbon emissions and energy justice, the 
commitments a society has to implementing new energy systems through market means 
can and do have tremendous effects on system development and operation. One can 
hardly think of a model of rooftop energy analogous to that of Tesla/SolarCity outside of 
a commitment to the idea that financial models that create systems of debt/debtor 
relationships allow individuals to exercise their economic choice over what energy 
sources they utilize.  
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Does this mean our sociotechnical regimes are forever caught in ideological lock-
in, doomed to reproduce existing inequities in new and exciting ways? Likely not, if for 
no other reason than the distance between visions of governance and life within new 
energy regimes is quite significant. Narratives such as those arrayed in support of a Tesla 
vision of distributed energy provide the currency through which actors in emerging 
niches can articulate specific visions of what is and should be possible through their 
novel technologies. However, these visions are malleable and change as different groups 
of actors enter the conversation, increasing both the breadth of locales where change is 
imagined and the depth to which actors see the possibilities for structural change. 
In this respect, guiding visions and narratives are important tools of governance; 
they represent a key strategic approach towards arraying support behind alternative 
modes of arranging the relationship between people and technologies (Späth and 
Rohracher 2010). Visions and narratives oriented towards the future coordinate action at 
a variety of scales and in different organizations (Rosenbloom, Berton, and Meadowcroft 
2016). Actors close to a given novel technology see the relationship between it and larger 
social and political issues, while those farther away from the epicenter of development 
may conceptualize the innovation as disruptive, dangerous, or out of sync with the 
culture’s values. The visions of actors within specific sociotechnical niches become the 
conduits of exchange between communities of actors engaged in technoscientific 
development and their larger networks and communities (Borup et al. 2006: 286). 
Narrative structure matters a great deal, as visions completely detached from the material 
realties of the surrounding communities will come across more as fanciful dreams than 
viable future ways of living.  
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Frans Berkhout (2006) addresses the problem of imagining alternative futures via 
sociotechnical transitions by reframing the conversation in terms of the role and structure 
of future visions. Future visions are “collectively held and communicable schemata that 
represent future objectives and express the means by which these objectives will be 
realised” (302). For Berkhout not all expressions of what the future could be like are 
necessarily expected outcomes for society. Actors must commit to seeing the world and 
acting in it through the vision—their schemas for understanding what is and should be an 
appropriately organized society embody and perform this future vision. Future visions are 
‘bids’ in the process of building support from other actors—in doing so these actors 
modify the initial vision to suit other existing needs within the population of individuals 
who may uptake and spread the vision.  
Importantly, there are only a limited number of potential actors who can and will 
bid on a future vision—and all have their own understandings of how the world does and 
should work. Vision must be functional and pragmatic, and from a narrative structure 
perspective exhibit a moralized character (Berkhout 2006, p. 300). Like Scarry’s stories 
of an orderly society, effective future visions are clear expressions of utopic or dystopic 
societies entirely possible within the lifetimes of the actors engaged in existing 
sociotechnical regimes. A pertinent example is the idea of Moore’s Law—what was 
otherwise a prediction about transistors in memory chips has come to represent a 
collectively held belief that all computing technologies will exhibit exponential growth in 
capacities into the foreseeable future. The utopia of Moore’s Law is the very idea that 
society will do nothing but infinitely benefit from the continued reinvestment in 
semiconductor research, development, and mass consumption.  
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Where do actors draw their inspiration for the moral valences of specific future 
visions? Despite the work of scholars examining the role of narratives in 
sociotechnological transitions, there remain two significant flaws. First, the locus of 
narratives of what the future could or should hold is invariably within specific niches and 
sociotechnological regimes. Narratives are couched as instrumentally useful and 
theoretically relevant techniques actors array to communicate about how to shape a 
sociotechnological transition. Why and how these narratives emerge within discourse 
remains unclear. Second, despite the clear linkages between narratives of what the future 
should hold and our current understanding of the sociotechnical landscape as the 
reservoir of what constitutes a “good society” no scholars have actively sought to 
understand the relationship between narratives of the future, and how they are situated 
within larger social, political, economic, and environmental commitments to social life 
and order. 
To this end, I propose that a fruitful conversation venue for exploring these 
question lies at the intersection of sociotechnical transitions theory, specifically the multi-
level perspective (MLP) and the burgeoning work on social imaginaries. I choose the 
MLP as my focus of interest for this study due to the growing body of MLP-influenced 
scholarship shaping the theoretical and practical conversations surrounding energy 
sociotechnical system transitions and pathways towards sustainable living (Burnham et 
al. 2017; Lawhon 2012; Sengers 2016). These scholars have drawn on a multitude of 
resources, most recently ongoing conversations prompted by Sheila Jasanoff and Sang 
Hyun-Kim (2009, 2015) about the role of visions of technoscientific futures made real 
through policy actions—what they call “sociotechnical imaginaries”—and the shaping of 
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energy transition pathways. As this current body of literature explores, imaginaries like 
future visions impact how actors come to understand the worlds they inhabit, as well as 
those they could construct through material transformations to existent regimes. 
Imaginaries, however, function less like a currency and more like the system of monetary 
policies that underlie how members of a society come to understand the exchange of 
goods and services. The rules are implied in the ‘conduct of conduct’ – how members of 
a society come to understand what role(s) they should play in the pursuit of overarching 
societal goals such as security and growth.  
What these current interactions between transitions theory and imaginaries do not 
address is how actors’ imagined futures construct the highly moralized narratives they 
bring to bear in discourse. How we talk about and understand potential transitions—
especially energy transitions given their scale—have tremendous implications for society. 
Timothy Mitchell (2011) recognized the importance of asking ‘for whom does an energy 
system live and die’ when reflecting on the relationship between specific sociotechnical 
systems and the possibilities for a society (266-267): 
The lesson from Carbon Democracy is that one cannot predict democratic 
possibilities directly from the design of socio-technical systems - as the internet 
itself demonstrates, with its capacity for open communication always threatened 
by the monopolistic commercial powers of the largest software, computer and 
internet businesses. The point, rather, is that in battles over the shape of future 
energy systems the possibilities for democracy are at stake. 
 
It is these possibilities for how the moral, material, and technoscientific changes inflect 
on and inform what a society understands as the appropriate organization of institutions, 
markets, and the body politic writ large that a study of imaginaries in the context of 
sociotechnical regimes affords us. The final section of this chapter outlines the idea of 
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imaginaries, and the relationship between the technologies of imagination and how they 
reflect deep changes in the ways a society collectively sees right, wrong, friend, foe, 




A story of imaginaries starts, oddly enough, with a bedfellow category: the 
fantasy. How they relate tells us much about both the amazing power of imaginaries as 
techniques of social and sociotechnological change, and the serious limitations of current 
interpretations in the MLP literature. Fantasies in the broader vernacular sense imply 
things that are not real, fanciful, unbounded to the material accoutrements of daily life. If 
this simple definition were true, there would be no reason to assume that fantasies, 
visions of the future, or any sort of narrative directed towards answering the question 
‘what could life otherwise be like?’ would have any serious relationship to reality. Yet 
we know, almost intuitively, the fantastical is only distant from daily life so insofar as we 
situate it as a complex system of metaphors to explore the permeable boundaries between 
what we see as natural and orderly, and the uncanny expressions of what exists.  
Bormann (1985) explores this idea of fantasy as an agent of change from the 
perspective of how they create shared understandings accessible to a variety of actors. 
Like the images of Busytown in Richard Scarry’s books, fantasies provide a narrative 
structure comprehensible to many within a society that allow actors to understand their 
world in its terms. Fantasies, like future visions in Berkhout’s (2006) terms, explore a 
deeply moralized territory and find their strength in the breadth rather than depth of 
interpretation they allow: “Fantasy themes are always slanted, ordered, and interpreted; 
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they provide a rhetorical means for several communities of people to account for and 
explain the same experiences or the same events in different ways” (Bormann, 1985: 9-
10). Serving as a common currency, these fantasies allow individuals to exchange 
experiences, forge common understandings, and importantly meet problems that involve 
collective responsibility with a united sense of how the world could and should work. 
Sharing common understandings between individuals and larger groups, as these 
fantasies are uptaken by large institutions, increase the power and agency they have over 
societies. Achieving these scales of impact depend on more than individuals talking to 
each other. We rely on a system of complex and interlinked metaphors to describe that 
which is not necessarily rational nor easily bound to a system of quickly identifiable 
artifacts. While the metaphors themselves may describe complex intersections of human 
and non-human interaction, humans in specific social and cultural contexts leverage 
materiality as a modality for conveying metaphors en masse. Marina Warner’s (2008) 
exploration of the ‘logic of the imaginary’ manifest through a variety of medium—wax, 
shadow, film—shows the importance of these technologies of imagination as structurally 
necessary for building widely held and longstanding conceptualizations of fantasies. In 
reflecting on the role of these technologies of imagination, Warner (2008) highlights both 
how we intuitively understand what visions they represent, and the fact that we are not 
innately born with these frames of reference (12-13): “Nobody, except a child seeing a 
baroque angel for the first time, finds it strange that a naked boy could hurl himself sotto-
in-su from heaven’s ceiling on a swan’s white pinions, or that lost loved ones should 
return with their arms stiffly held by their sides and wrapped head to foot in the shroud in 
which they were buried.” Understanding how an individual wrapped in linen cloth, 
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gauze, or the occasional toilet paper roll represents the unstoppable march of those who 
have defied our mortal coil, or how its bedfellow the monstrous creature of Dr. 
Frankenstein is synonymous with the dangers of impure science, depends on the 
continued reinforcement of a frame of mind that situates these fantasies in material 
reality. 
Mummies and Frankenstein are not our concern here—yet these technologies of 
imagination highlight an important relationship between the future visions humans create 
and how they become manifest in our daily lives. Humans, almost intuitively, build 
systems for collective sense-making and to forge relationships amongst disparate groups. 
Nationhood, for example, depends as noted by Benedict Anderson (1991) on convincing 
large groups of humans spread across space and time that they share a common set of 
stories and values that make them distinct. The importance of distinguishing self and 
group from the “Other” is a critical technique upon which human power relations are 
forged, and by association the idea one can speak of an unbroken line of people stemming 
back to antiquity with a common identity is exponentially more effective at achieving the 
outcome. Building this sense of ‘nationness’ relied on certain advances in print-
capitalism, lexicography, time, and mapping during the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Techniques of conveying to large groups a unified sense of self make the idea of being a 
nation an “imaginary”—and like fantasies their imaginative capacities are linked to what 
they do in the world (Anderson 1991: 6): “It [the nation] is imagined because the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion.”  
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Communion and the intimacy that word implies emphasizes the power 
technologies of imagination have in creating a physically and psychologically close bond 
between individuals through shared understandings of what is and what could be 
tomorrow. Imaginaries have by association a personal feeling about them distinct from 
the shared fears and hopes of fantasies—a fact made real in moments of conflict and 
chaos between nation-states. Imaginaries framed in Anderson’s perspective take on 
distinct institutional characteristics; states become in their physical space and narratives a 
reflection of those identities, and what it implies for determining what serves the greater 
good. With institutional force, imaginaries become powerful agents for shaping the ‘rules 
of the game’ and the appropriate association of actors who, engaged in the practices of 
dominant sociotechnical regimes, redefine the governance of individual/collective 
behavior (Appadurai 1996: 31). 
Regimes are however comprised of more than the technologies of imagination 
Anderson describes. The majority of artifacts, power lines, turbogenerators, statistical 
analysis software packages, have in fact little to do with telling the story of why certain 
sociotechnical regimes should persist. Yet, we couch stories of how particular advances 
in science and technology should occur in terms of the larger narratives of which 
Anderson speaks, and the specific artifacts and systems that should grow and/or change.  
Jasanoff and Kim (2009) explore this peculiarity of the “technologies” in the 
technologies of imagination by looking at how metaphors of technological systems 
become themselves representative of larger narratives societal advancement. Looking at 
visions of nuclear technology in American and South Korean society, Jasanoff and Kim 
note how the American sociotechnical regime of regulated and monitored flows of 
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nuclear materials was represented through the technical and metaphorical idea of 
‘containment.’ Containment, on one hand, represents a commitment to American-led 
international diplomacy and oversight across the nuclear material fuel and weapons life 
cycles. On the other, it is a philosophy that states global security is best left in the hands 
of the nation-state that has the necessary value systems and technological advances to 
protect others from backwards and rogue nations. This intertwining of imagined futures 
and sociotechnical regimes is represented through the idea of “sociotechnical 
imaginaries,” or (Jasanoff and Kim 2009, p. 120): “collectively imagined forms of social 
life and order reflected in the design and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or 
technological projects.”  
Refining this idea, Jasanoff and Kim’s more recent definition recognizes that, 
much like Anderson’s technologies of imagination, sociotechnical imaginaries gain 
power through their authorization via specific acts of state power (Jasanoff 2015a: 4): 
[sociotechnical imaginaries are] collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and 
publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared 
understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and 
supportive of, advances in science and technology. 
 
Desirability and attainability oriented towards policy change—one of the key currencies 
that define the “rules of the game” within a sociotechnical regime—play a significant role 
in framing why Jasanoff and Kim argue imaginaries should be viewed within the context 
institutionally-oriented acts of political power. Broadly utilized techniques of 
communicating the system of metaphors that embody a future vision’s moral 
commitments do not explore the powerful roles science and technology play in shaping 
contemporary daily life. Like the medium of film in the reinterpretation of our most 
 40 
classic of Euroamerican monsters—vampires most of all—the large sociotechnological 
systems that shape daily life and moreover the emergence of new paradigms of science 
and technology are canvasses all their own.  
Sociotechnical imaginaries present an intriguing direction for considering the 
intersection of how actors engaged in large-scale discussions of sociotechnical regime 
change create the environment(s) where it is possible for new rules and norms to emerge 
and solidify. They share Berkhout’s emphasis on defining the objectives by which 
explicit visions of what society should be like through transitions, and the overarching 
rules by which it operates. What remains undertheorized, however, is how these visions 
fit within the larger political and social commitments of a society. Put more specifically, 
we lack a theoretical placement and understanding how societies develop the 
structuration of reasoning and cognition that as both Taylor and Anderson note implicitly 
shape a society’s dominant epistemologies. 
Imagination takes influence from material advances in science and technology. As 
Anson Rabinbach documents in The Human Motor (1992) engines and the 
thermodynamic limitations became a metaphor embodied through organized human 
action to represent the possibilities for humankind. If we look beyond the metaphors of 
machine and man, however, what we encounter is that questions of human organization, 
motive power, and efficiency link more broadly to questions of social organization. 
Rabinbach’s late 19th century subjects share a common story with those of Scottish and 
British scientists Thomson, Maxwell, and Joule situated within ongoing conversations of 
Christian free will and the finite nature of man. Shared between these two stories are a 
common larger transformation of energy systems and democratic institutions towards the 
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increasing centralization and utilization of denser energy resources at the expense of the 
strength of labor movements to organize against forms of oppression (Mitchell 2011: 
233). 
In this way, we can see that imagination plays a significant role in the shaping of 
sociotechnical transitions that extends beyond explicit moments of policy action or what 
Jasanoff and Kim call “active exercises of state power” (2009: 123). These transitions 
include deep changes in how political norms and values are interpreted through the 
material and discursive structuration of a society and its built environment(s) that are not 
in and of themselves exclusively representative of specific advances in science and 
technology. Yaron Ezrahi’s Imagined Democracies is particularly informative on this 
point, and it is here I wish to both embrace aspects of Jasanoff and Kim’s model of 
imaginaries and sociotechnical order, and revise on interpretations of the work. Ezrahi’s 
model of imagination and political order provides a much wider band interpretation of 
how visions of how a society should work become situated within the practices of 
generating knowledge and producing technologies.  
As Ezrahi and Jasanoff and Kim both note science and technology are powerful 
spaces for expressing and making real immaterial social commitments (Ezrahi 2012: 15): 
Precisely because religious and political beliefs depend largely on the habit or the 
willingness to regard as real objects and agents that lack a self-evident visual 
manifestation (or other direct stimuli of sense experience), religious and political 
authorities are always eager to use the cultural resources at their disposal to 
establish and indirectly sensualize, concretize, and generally enhance the reality 
or the presence of such entities and events as God, angels, revelation, incarnation, 
transfiguration, hell, paradise, prophecies, the people, the nation, the state, the 
promised land, the founding fathers, the free market, the individual. 
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The power of imagination in shaping societies can be found in the ability to make real 
and imbue with power representations or systems – be they institutional arrangements or 
power lines – that can shape daily life. Yet, as I have indicated earlier, both Ezrahi and 
Jasanoff and Kim recognize these imaginings as thoroughly social acts expressed through 
shared cultural resources. Though the authors may disagree as to what level and extent 
these resources become shared – can we like Ezrahi and Charles Taylor think of ‘western 
imaginings’ as a coherent group of ideas – a common understanding is that to the extent 
that science and technology matter as techniques for ordering society, questions of social 
and political order are paramount.  
Herein lies both the problem and the solution: advances in science and technology 
matter when considering the role of imagination in contemporary life and social order 
through all societies and cultures, but they are in and of themselves situated expressions 
of shared norms and values. Put within the context of the sociotechnical transitions model 
proposed by the Multi-Level Perspective theorists, imaginaries are expressions of how 
the larger sociotechnical landscape of a culture – through all its complex twists and turns 
– becomes both a fictionalized and material manifestation of idealized future life. This 
interpretation implies two key modifications that intersect both transitions and 
imaginaries research.  
First, transitions research should embrace cultural models of interpreting social 
and political values in the examination of how the larger cultural landscape of a society 
inflects on the emergence and contraction of existent sociotechnical systems. To a certain 
extent, Smith and Tidwell (2016) discussed this point through introducing the concept 
that imaginaries could ‘contract’ or not be uptaken when the overarching social and 
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political support for sociotechnical systems changes or disappears. I would take this 
further, and say that the contraction of imaginaries and sociotechnical transitions are one 
and the same phenomena.  
By linking the contours of imagination and specific sociotechnical systems, 
scholarship at the intersection of imaginaries and technoscience should attend more 
readily to the forms of imagining present during transitions than specific technologies. 
Scenes of complex transformations in society such as massive shifts in sociotechnical 
systems extend beyond specific technologies to embrace larger understandings of how 
individuals and communities work, find leisure, experience private and public spaces, and 
understand their positionality vis-à-vis others. The following chapters follow this 
approach, exploring how three key ideas in American society – security, the public 
interest, and the home are articulated and reshaped through the envisioning of alternate 
forms of energy geopolitics, regulation, and individual consumption. Each form 
represents a moment of historic or ongoing transition in the operation of energy systems 
in the United States, instantiations where as Volger (2002: 627) notes individuals array 
cultural resources to make sense of complex and shifting understandings of who they are 
and to what kind of society to they belong. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MORALS, MATERIALS, AND TECHNOSCIENCE: THE ENERGY SECURITY 
IMAGINARY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Reprinted with Permission from Science, Technology & Human Values. The original 
article can be found at: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0162243915577632  
 
Abstract 
This article advances recent scholarship on energy security by arguing that the 
concept is best understood as a sociotechnical imaginary, a collective vision for a ‘‘good 
society’’ realized through technoscientific-oriented policies. Focusing on the 1952 
Resources for Freedom report, the authors trace the genealogy of energy security, 
elucidating how it establishes a morality of efficiency that orients policy action under the 
guise of security toward the liberalizing of markets in resource states and a robust 
program of energy research and development in the United States. This evidence 
challenges the pervasive historical anchoring of the concept in the 1970s and illustrates 
the importance of the genealogical approach for the emerging literature on energy and 
sociotechnical imaginaries. Exploring the genealogy of energy security also unpacks key 
social, political, and economic undercurrents that disrupt the seeming universality of the 
language of energy, leading the authors to question whether energy security discourse is 






In 1961, Frank M. Porter, head of the American Petroleum Institute, the largest 
American oil and gas industry group, was testifying before a House committee on the 
matter of how growing petroleum imports, specifically from the burgeoning fields of the 
Middle East, were detrimental to American small business. Discussing the ever-growing 
problem of new reserve discovery, Porter argued, ‘‘[It] is an equally inescapable fact that 
the foundation of our future energy security is based upon the success of continuing 
exploration, a highly speculative venture’’ (United States House of Representatives 1961: 
143, emphasis added).  
Porter’s 1961 testimony stands as one of the earliest uses of ‘‘energy security’’ in 
American policy discourse. His use of the term challenges conventional wisdom on 
energy policy in the United States—in particular that ‘‘energy security’’ as part of 
American policy lexicon does not appear until the early 1970s (Smernoff 1973). One can 
see Porter’s appeals to continuing technoscientific advancement in energy production 
methods echoed today in the energy policy discourse of the Obama administration (The 
White House Office of the Press Secretary 2013): 
America’s scientists are a national treasure. Every day, idea by idea, innovation 
by innovation, they are developing new technology that will help secure our 
energy future. If we want to keep moving forward, we need scientists to keep 
inventing and innovating, to keep unlocking new solutions and pushing new 
breakthroughs. . .. The Energy Security Trust will invest in research that will 
make future technologies cheaper and better—it will fund the advances that will 
allow us to run cars and trucks on electricity or homegrown fuels, and on the 
technology that will enable us to drive from coast-to-coast without a drop of oil. 
 
Focusing on the Paley Commission’s Resources for Freedom report from 1952, we 
explore the fundamental values and assumptions underpinning energy security as they 
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appear in the early 1950s. Although largely overlooked in later analyses (Mitchell 2011; 
Vietor 1984), the Paley Commission’s ideas were, in the words of Senator George 
Malone, ‘‘[to be] regarded as an authoritative text and guide to United States mineral 
policy’’ (United States Senate 1954: 2). 
Tracing the genealogy of ‘‘energy security,’’ and in particular how it organizes 
the relationship between the state, natural resources, energy technoscience, and markets, 
leads us to argue that energy security is best understood as what Jasanoff and Kim (2009) 
call a ‘‘sociotechnical imaginary,’’ a form of social understanding embedded in policy 
action that elucidates how certain forms of technoscience and political order are 
coproduced (124). As a sociotechnical imaginary, energy security orients policy action by 
enrolling a well-ordered ‘‘moral’’ resource-efficient society within the overarching 
paradigm of unfettered economic growth as supplied through the state-aided 
advancement of energy technoscience. These moral and material issues are understood to 
be the underpinnings of US national security and the ‘‘freedom’’ of the world. Concern 
for the environment and the local and regional scales of energy security do not factor into 
these discourses; debates between various actors instead focus on federal policies 
supporting research and development and establishing efficient flows of raw materials 
from states where they are produced (either internal or external to the state) to where they 
are needed for efficient consumption. 
Approaching energy security as a sociotechnical imaginary advances research in 
the energy policy, resource economics, and geopolitics literatures that seek to establish 
‘‘definitional clarity’’ (Chester 2010: 893) in the process of theorizing what constitutes 
energy security. Focusing at a multitude of societal scales—community/regional, 
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national, and global, these scholars (e.g., Chester 2010; L. Hughes 2009; Luft and Korin 
2009; Sovacool and Mukherjee 2011; Sovacool et al. 2011; Sovacool 2011) argue that a 
variety of different factors such as cost of energy, physical security of pipelines and sea 
faring transport, distribution of ecological burdens from energy production, and overall 
access to energy can or should determine energy security. This article continues the 
process of clarification, and through examining the historical context of energy security 
in the United States, establishes the specific sociotechnical linkages that underlie the 
relationship between ‘‘energy’’ and ‘‘security.’’ Furthermore, this article seeks to 
emphasize the value of sociotechnical imaginaries as a process of challenging the basis 
for key concepts in policy discourse. Such an emphasis is doubly important for energy 
research, as the very ontological uncertainty of energy lends itself to discourses that reify 
the importance of energy consumption to human civilization (e.g., Basalla 1980; 
Hornborg 2013). 
Our article begins by outlining current research on energy security, highlighting 
major themes and recent scholarship focusing on the epistemological nature of energy 
security. We next briefly outline sociotechnical imaginaries to provide a basis for 
considering energy security as one, emphasizing the importance of an imaginary’s 
genealogy to understanding and thus challenging the histories that pervade energy 
security discourse (e.g., Yergin 2011). We then proceed to analyze the Paley 
Commission’s report, emphasizing the importance of efficiency, morality, and security 
throughout the document and the influence of these concepts on energy policy discourse 
into the 1970s. Finally, we outline the advantages of considering energy security as a 
sociotechnical imaginary and propose pathways for further research. Viewing energy 
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security as a sociotechnical imaginary with a particular history illuminates key features of 
the concept that go largely unspoken in current debates. Energy security is, at its core, a 
strategy for linking research on energy-producing resources (oil, coal, and uranium) and 
the basic science underlying each of these productive enterprises to the places of 
(implicitly domestic) resource consumption and, critically, to a ‘‘moral’’ sensibility of 
resource economics built on liberal economic principles. Such an underlying sensibility 
of what policy action is necessary presents serious questions in relation to sustainable 
development in resource-rich communities and the challenges posed by climate change. 
In concluding, we strongly question the value of continuing to theorize about energy 
security as though it is a necessary and attainable material aspect of our world. 
Conceptualizing Energy Security 
 
In paradoxical and often contradictory ways, since 2001, the boom in energy 
social science research has created a large body of work that addresses energy security. 
Most of this work attends to energy security as a static concept, invoking the term to 
justify certain policy actions or decision-making tools (e.g., Dhaka 2009; Ferguson 2009; 
Kumar Singh 2013; Margonelli 2009). Others, most notably Daniel Yergin, criticize the 
use of the concept itself as embedded in nationalistic resource grabs that attend more to 
‘‘energy independence’’ than ‘‘security’’ in a liberal economic sense of global 
interdependence and mutual growth (Mallaby 2006; Noël 2008; Yergin 2007, 2006a, 
2006b). A second set of critiques comes from the geopolitics realm of inquiry and 
examines the role of state exercises of power, namely, military action, in the securing of 
natural resources (namely, oil). These authors (e.g., Klare 2007; Toft and Duero 2010) 
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analyze the use of military force by the United States to exercise physical security—that 
is, the control of pipelines, refineries, and shipping channels—across the globe. While 
these scholars also treat energy security as a static concept, they focus on questions of 
power rather than consumptive economies. Finally, a small group of scholars rejects 
energy security outright as being too ‘‘vague’’ (Lomborg 2011) to initiate meaningful 
policy action on climate change in a world of increasing energy consumption. 
More recently, scholars have begun to examine the question of energy security 
from an epistemological perspective, collecting both qualitative and quantitative data to 
compile, criticize, and refine factors that pertain to energy security and its situatedness in 
society writ large. These critiques (Ciută 2010; Cherp 2012; Cherp and Jewell 2011; 
Chester 2010; Littlefield 2013; Toke and Vezirgiannidou 2013; Valentine 2011) note the 
‘‘polysemic’’ nature of energy security across policy research and analyze the 
epistemological methods used to determine what is and is not relevant to being ‘‘energy 
secure.’’ In combination, the authors highlight a number of key factors. First, energy 
security is not a ‘‘security’’ matter in the sense that it is bounded by an academic 
‘‘domain of meaning and practice’’ (Ciută 2010: 124) readily differentiated from other 
geopolitical issues. The only way in which energy security does fit this space is that it is 
primarily a nation-state situated discourse (Ciută 2010; Littlefield 2013; Toke and 
Vezirgiannidou 2013), which draws from security discourse embedded in 
conceptualizations of hegemony through technoscience (Falkner 2005; Jelly-Schapiro 
2013; Masco 2010). Second, energy security research currently focuses on examining the 
concept via quantitative or qualitative methodologies that start from the initial 
assumption that energy security is something nation-states (or the world) can and should 
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achieve. Finally, Toke and Vezirgiannidou (2013) note that through inductive analysis 
scholars can observe that action on climate change is incongruous with current energy 
security discourse. 
This final point is important, for it highlights the possibility that ‘‘energy 
security’’ is in some way embedded in a dialogue that is incongruous with policy 
discourses that recognize the ‘‘climate’’ as a site for policy action. Other scholars, 
notably Cox and Béland (2013), argue that through the framing of ‘‘sustainability’’ 
energy security can serve to build unlikely coalitions (such as between wind supporters 
and oil tycoon T. Boone Pickens) and enact policy change in support of alternate systems 
of energy production and consumption, but they fail to clearly define ‘‘energy security’’ 
nor explain the underlying political–economic consequences of sustainability to energy 
security discourse. Like Cox and Béland, Toke and Vezirgiannidou’s analysis touches on 
the question of climate discourse and energy security, but does not meaningfully ask (1) 
why ‘‘energy security’’ exists as a subject of debate in policy making and (2) where this 
interest comes from. Reorienting discussions surrounding energy security away from 
analyses concerned with definitions based on current research and policy discourse 
toward the examination of how energy technoscience, the state, and society writ large 
were discursively organized, such as is possible through treating energy security as a 
sociotechnical imaginary, provides an opportunity to reexamine the landscape of current 




Energy Security as Sociotechnical Imaginary 
 
As ‘‘collectively imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the 
design and fulfillment of nation-specific and/or technological projects’’ (Jasanoff and 
Kim 2009: 120), sociotechnical imaginaries provide lenses for understanding, valuing, 
and attempting to bring about a ‘‘good society’’ through particular technoscientific 
projects. Sociotechnical imaginaries are less explicit, issue-specific, goal directed, 
politically accountable, and instrumental than policy agendas, as they ‘‘reside in the 
reservoir of norms and discourses, metaphors and cultural meanings out of which actors 
build their policy preferences’’ (ibid.: 123). Like narratives and discourses, they guide 
interpretation and frame the boundaries of the thinkable, but sociotechnical imaginaries 
are more specifically associated with ‘‘active exercises of state power’’ (ibid.), such as 
through the selection of policy priorities, fund allocation, and infrastructure investment. 
Sociotechnical imaginaries induce the active exercise of state power, which 
means that they are situated within a discursive regime that coproduces perceptions of a 
good society and the forms of knowledge that organize it. Research demonstrates the 
influence of sociotechnical imaginaries over energy policy, including the concepts of 
growth and containment in nuclear energy (Jasanoff and Kim 2009, 2013) and localized 
bioenergy substitutions of non-mineral energy sources for oil imports (Eaton, Gasteyer, 
and Busch 2014; Levidow and Papaioannou 2013). Other studies use the framework of 
sociotechnical imaginaries to investigate the linking of national and regional identity with 
particular energy sources, most prominently in oil and gas (Bouzarovski and Bassin 
2011; Ruijven et al. 2014), with attention to the usefulness of the imaginaries concept for 
translating between local, regional, and national scales (Eaton, Gasteyer, and Busch 
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2014; Teschner and Paavola 2013). The scale of these political spaces varies from 
nongovernmental organizations and scientific advisory boards to corporations and entire 
states (Program on Science, Technology & Society 2014). The question of scale draws 
attention to the possibility of multiple and competing sociotechnical imaginaries being 
simultaneously at play in any one context, as actors can hold ‘‘different visions and 
goals’’ (Eaton, Gasteyer, and Busch 2014: 2; see also Jasanoff and Kim 2009, 123; 
Levidow and Papaioannou 2013). 
In addition to spatial situatedness, sociotechnical imaginaries invoke a temporal 
dimension by providing specific, policy intervention–oriented visions of the future. These 
imaginaries invoke what the world is and what the world should be, as they are ‘‘imbued 
with implicit understandings of what is good or desirable in the social world writ large’’ 
(Jasanoff and Kim 2009: 122; see also Eaton, Gasteyer, and Busch 2014, 4). Although the 
forward-looking orientation dominates Jasanoff and Kim’s (2009) original conception of 
sociotechnical imaginaries as well as much of the research it inspired, Eaton, Gasteyer, 
and Busch (2014) point to significance of the past, as ‘‘definitions and contestations are 
related not only to imagined futures but to different interpretations of environmental 
histories’’ (3). Varying interpretations of the past shape the visions for the future encoded 
in imaginaries. 
Sociotechnical imaginaries are profoundly real in the sense that they underlie the 
exercises of power and policy making through which actors produce concrete effects in 
the world (Eaton, Gasteyer, and Busch 2014: 6; Fairclough 2010: 480; Levidow and 
Papaioannou 2013: 38; Teschner and Paavola 2013; Tsing 2000). As such, they mediate 
the ‘‘understudied regions between imagination and action, between discourse and 
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decision, and between inchoate public opinion and instrumental state policy’’ (Jasanoff 
and Kim 2009: 123). Imaginaries are thus performative in the sense that they enact the 
world they describe, though this enactment is complicated by the messy sociotechnical 
discourses and systems with which they articulate (Weszkalnys 2011). 
This article builds on the emerging sociotechnical imaginaries literature by 
highlighting the importance of tracing the genealogies (Foucault 1984, 2008) of said 
imaginaries. With the exception of Jasanoff and Kim’s study of nuclear energy 
imaginaries in the United States and South Korea, few scholars have traced the genealogy 
of their imaginary within the greater context of the sociotechnical system they seek to 
analyze. The transactions between the state, knowledge production systems, and 
everyday lived experience that produce stable discourses around the characteristics of an 
‘‘energy secure’’ state are a fundamental part of understanding what types of societies are 
possible within this paradigm; ignoring them leaves the fundamental assumptions that 
underlie the ontological consequences of these imaginaries in political order 
unchallenged. Levidow’s study of biofuels policy in the European Union (EU) during the 
1990s provides an example of this. Focusing on the transnational level as opposed to the 
histories of individual EU-member states obfuscates how state-level biofuels policies, 
such as the transition from ethanol to petroleum-based vehicle fuels during the twentieth 
century in France (Carolan 2009) influence how actors decide to link technoscientific 
projects and political order. While we acknowledge the necessity of such constraints 
within publication, we argue that in the case of energy security, a concept we have 
already shown appears over fifty years ago, questioning the ‘‘naturalness’’ of energy 
security as an organizing principle for policy making is crucial for mapping out how this 
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sensibility of social order maps people, resources, and states. We argue that the 1952 
Paley Commission report serves as a valuable site to begin exploring the three elements 
brought together within energy security discourse— energy-centric technoscience and 
resources, ‘‘security’’ for the state as a product of resource extraction, and the ‘‘moral’’ 
underpinnings of a globalized energy market.1
1
Energy Technoscience and Liberalism as ‘‘Foundations for Growth and Security’’ 
 
The United States, once criticized as the creator of a crassly materialistic order of 
things, is today throwing its might into the task of keeping alive the spirit of Man . 
. . In defeating this barbarian violence, moral values will count most, but an ample 
materials base must support them. (The President’s Materials Policy Commission 
1952a) 
 
Indeed the strongest and most versatile single resource in the fight against 
scarcities of materials is technology. (The President’s Materials Policy 
Commission 1952b) 
 
In a 1951 letter to CBS Chairman William Paley, President Truman outlined a 
presidential committee to ‘‘make an objective inquiry into all major aspects of the 
problems of assuring an adequate supply of production materials for our long-range 
needs’’ (Truman 1951). Consisting of five volumes and covering questions of both 
                                                
1	In this way, our analysis parallels the work of Mitchell (2011) by focusing on the 
intersection of national security, ‘‘the economy’’ as a concept in liberal economics, and 
energy resources. This project goes further, however, in analyzing ‘‘energy security’’ 
rather than ‘‘energy crisis.’’ Although we acknowledge these as intertwined concepts, we 
argue that understanding the emergence of energy as an object of state intervention as it 
is coproduced through the techniques of ‘‘economentality’’ (Mitchell 2014) that are 
emerging at roughly the same time (1948-1953), requires attending to the object of 
energy security as used in policy discourse. Energy crisis may create a space for state 
intervention, but energy security is the imagined form of a suite of policy actions geared 
toward addressing the linkages between energy and society, both in the present and into 
the future.	
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domestic and foreign resources (bounded within the context of the ‘‘free world’’), the 
Paley Commission’s Resources for Freedom report would ‘‘put to rest’’ (Mitchell 2011: 
177n10) domestic concerns over material resources. In this section, we overview the 
context in which the Paley Commission’s (‘‘the Commission’’ hereon) report emerges to 
situate our argument for how energy security functions as a sociotechnical imaginary and 
what particular technologies of governance were imagined as appropriate to make this 
vision possible. The 1950s represent a pivotal moment in the history of American policy 
discourse where both ‘‘materiality’’ as the historicized pattern of mounting American 
natural resource consumption and ‘‘materialism’’ as a ‘‘barbarian’’ (and implicitly 
Communistic) political–economic philosophy are opposed to the ‘‘security’’ of the state. 
American overconsumption is viewed as a failure of cultural values— values which 
require the scientific rationalization of consumptive behaviors to correct. Rational 
management of consumption, however, does not explicitly provide any space for the role 
of the ‘‘market’’ as a site of truthmaking within society. Furthermore, a purely 
scientifically managed society is the exact type of ‘‘barbarian’’ political–economic suite 
of policy actions the Commission directly opposes. In this light, the key question the 
Commission must contend with is this: how does the state link new forms of sociality 
around energy resources, the necessity of ‘‘natural’’ activity within liberal economic 
society markets, and ‘‘national security’’? 
Expanding on Eli Jelly-Schapiro’s (2013) genealogy of ‘‘security’’ in Western 
society, we contend that the process of creating a notion within policy discourse of 
‘‘energy security’’ requires discursively constructing a space for market intervention, 
asserting the role of state-funded ‘‘energy technoscience’’ within this process of 
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marketization, and  articulating particular notions of what a good American society must 
behave like as the social fabric which will maintain this arrangement of disparate 
elements.1 Energy, as opposed to particular natural resources such as oil, coal, natural 
gas, and so on, is this site of intervention. Securitizing particular resources, such as oil, 
was a technique of governance prior to the 1950s; the management of domestic resources, 
the production of geographies of oil production in relation to the shoring up of military 
power (Shulman 2003), and imagined military action stemming from the loss of 
particular resources (New York Times 1927) assume state intervention at the sites of 
individual resource production and consumption. Intervening on ‘‘energy,’’ however, 
received only cursory attention prior to the Second World War (Energy Resources 
Committee 1939). The distinction between a particular resource and ‘‘energy’’ as a site 
of securitization is important— energy does not exist in the material world insofar as one 
cannot ‘‘bottle up’’ pure energy. It lacks a clear ontological basis (Mitcham and Smith 
Rolston 2013) and as a consequence one must produce a site for energy to intervene 
within a sociotechnical system if the concept is to have any practical meaning.2 To create 
                                                
1 We use the term ‘‘energy technoscience’’ here to designate how the Commission 
constructs a cogent body of research and development focused on the rational and 
efficient exploitation of natural resources toward the production of energy, in the form of 
transportation (cars, ships, nonelectric trains), heat, or electricity. Case in point: the 
structure of the volume Resources for Freedom devoted to ‘‘energy sources’’ addresses 
the energy found in oil, gas, coal, and electricity. Here, resources and technologies alike 
are subsumed, at least discursively, to the larger category of ‘‘energy’’ which, as the 
report notes, is the locus of state intervention. 
2 Energy has in many ways always carried a polymorphous set of meanings. As noted by 
Crosbie Smith (1998) in The Science of Energy, early energy technoscience was 
eminently concerned with the rationalization of all elements of Scottish life. Later 
political economists of natural resources, such as Stanley Jevons (1865), would 
acknowledge the ‘‘vast store of energy’’ within various combustible natural resources, 
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a site for the intervention of energy, one first needs to create a sensibility of a particular 
kind of technoscience devoted to the study and production of energy. Energy 
technoscience, as a realm of state intervention, draws on the linkages between science, 
technology, and society established through the Manhattan Project experience and 
articulated by Vannevar Bush in Science: The Endless Frontier. Energy security, by the 
very emphasis on the ‘‘interdependence of moral and material values’’ (The President’s 
Materials Policy Commission 1952a: 1), establishes certain expectations for what a good 
society should look like, the explicit role of energy technoscience in such a society, and 
the importance of well-directed social policies to bring it into existence. 
‘‘Lavish’’ versus ‘‘Efficient’’ Energy Societies 
 
  Summarizing the state of materials policy, the Commission notes Americans 
‘‘think about raw materials last, not first’’ (The President’s Materials Policy Commission 
1952b: 2) when considering questions of productivity and economic growth. History, 
from the Commission’s perspective, lends itself to this narrative, with all persons from 
the first Euro-American settlers to the present day citizenry misinformed that the United 
States was and is capable of supplying all of its raw material needs. Efficiency and 
interconnectivity of resource systems were the proposed solutions to this misguided 
culture of ‘‘lavish’’ waste (ibid.: 23): 
As prudent householders our first necessity is to use the remaining resources with 
the highest efficiency we can achieve, but only as fully as is permitted by the 
principle of buying materials at the least cost consistent with assuring supplies 
required by the national security. 
                                                





 Three elements stand out in this statement, each of which we will address in turn: the 
individual within society (as the atomized ‘‘householder’’), efficiency as a product of 
resources and technoscience, and material national security. First, consumption of 
materials and, as a consequence energy technoscience, is a matter for society as a whole. 
Morality, as mentioned earlier, is a fundamental part of the fight against the ‘‘crassly 
materialistic order of things’’—it is the duty of each individual to overcome the 
materialisms (consumptive and Communistic) mentioned earlier. Where, however, is this 
morality rooted? As described by liberal economist Wilhelm Röpke (1998, 125), each 
individual within society must exhibit these morals, lest the market and the state fall prey 
to materialistic influences: 
Self-discipline, a sense of justice, honesty, fairness, chivalry, moderation, public 
spirit, respect for human dignity, firm ethical norms—all of these are things which 
people must possess before they go to market and compete with each other. These 
are the indispensable supports which preserve both market and competition from 
degeneration. 
 
 Efficiency is, by definition, a form of self-discipline—one that emphasizes the 
rationalization of material consumptive practices and aims toward a linear relationship 
between consumption and productivity.3 
                                                
3 These are analogous to ‘‘technologies of subjectivity’’ and ‘‘self-government’’ as 
opposed to ‘‘technologies of subjection’’ that Aihwa Ong (Ong 2006; also see Smith 
Rolston 2010) discusses in relation to the organization of economies and states in 
Southeast and East Asia. The comparison between contemporary zones of economic 
development there and the state of American resource economics at the end of the Second 
World War is appropriate, given that these forms of managing populations toward the 




Noting that the rapid growth of productivity in terms of total economic output 
occurred at over three times the rate of population growth, however, the Commission 
argues that ‘‘the combination of increased energy and improved technology today 
provides the main promise of further economic growth within the physical limitations of 
natural resources’’ (The President’s Materials Policy Commission 1952b: 103). 
Contemporary resources (i.e., fossil fuels) solve immediate needs, but the finite nature of 
these resources meant that innovation held the keys to ‘‘civilization’s energy needs’’ 
(ibid.: 106). This process of innovation has, by and large, occurred outside of the purview 
of state policy; however, for technology to continue ‘‘dwarf[ing] all the previous 
accomplishments’’ of the twentieth century (The President’s Materials Policy 
Commission 1952a: 51), especially in relation to the material constraints on energy 
resources, the state must uptake the morality of energy technoscience innovation through 
policy action. 
To this end, the Commission advocates for a comprehensive energy policy, one 
that supports ‘‘awareness on the part of all those dealing with energy policy of the close 
relationship of energy to the broader problems of materials, economic growth, and 
national security’’ (The President’s Materials Policy Commission 1952b: 129). Drawing 
from Vannevar Bush’s emphasis on science as fundamental to ‘‘our health, prosperity, 
and security as a nation’’ (Bush 1945: 1), the Commission argues that ‘‘an intensive 
program of basic scientific research and technical development be undertaken on 
techniques and instruments of exploration for minerals’’ (The President’s Materials 
Policy Commission 1952b: 29) to tame the ‘‘headless’’ (ibid.: 144) force of 
uncoordinated research initiatives across multiple agencies and, to a lesser extent, outside 
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of government. Continuing the theme of linking individual material behaviors, energy 
technoscience, and state policy to the question of creating a moral and efficient energy 
technoscience-based economy, the Commission emphasizes the role policy must play in 
overcoming material deficiencies (ibid.: 18): 
Most Americans have been nurtured on the romantic notion that technology will 
always come to the rescue with a new miracle whenever the need arises . . . But 
isolated solutions of problems relating to individual materials are no substitute for 
the broad frontal attack which technology needs to make on the materials problem 
as a whole. 
 
 A moral energy economy, within the context of the United States alone, depends on both 
overcoming a naive sensibility about the ‘‘natural’’ abundance of resources consumed for 
energy and enrolling the necessary disparate elements of society via policy action into a 
visible system of production and consumption. There is, according to the Commission, 
nothing natural about the United States’ material consumption practices—they are a 
product of a materialistic culture that has so far prospered without consideration of these 
facts. Energy technoscience and the pursuit of technological innovation, unacknowledged 
until now, has made this possible. A new economy of energy must depend on both the 
rational individual consumption of energy producing resources and a necessary (but 
limited) intervention on the part of the state to support energy technoscientific research. 
By focusing policy actions on activities related to the development of new knowledge 
pertaining to the production and consumption of energy, and the physical production of 
objects of energy technoscience (on a limited scale), the state will facilitate the necessary 
conditions for new, efficient, ‘‘moral,’’ realms of social behavior and market activity. 
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Energy, Liberalism, and Global Security 
 
A morally efficient, market-based society, however, is not necessarily a secure 
one. What the Commission has to say explicitly about ‘‘national security’’ pertains to 
questions of wartime mobilization and reserves capacity. In relation to energy policy, this 
is the easiest to observe in what the Commission has to say about oil and national 
security. Following along the lines of ‘‘oil security’’ as conceptualized throughout the 
early twentieth century (e.g., Sheldon 1948), security pertains directly to questions of 
supply lines, modes of transportation, and nation-state actors. However, while these 
issues are ostensibly nationally oriented with an eye toward production during wartime, 
the Commission notes that ‘‘the problem of wartime supply and consumption for which 
preparation must be made is, therefore, a single comprehensive pattern for the entire free 
world’’ (The President’s Materials Policy Commission 1952c: 10). National security (or 
what we can now call security more generally) in this sense is much like the question of 
energy efficiency, morally situated and embedded in the rhetoric of the Cold War. 
Understanding how the relationship between morality, security, and efficiency 
works in relation to energy technoscience means stepping back for a moment to take in a 
larger perspective on the nature of the Cold War as it pertains to economic growth and 
industry. Sovietologist and economist Peter Wiles (1953: 566), in a piece contemporary 
to the Commission’s report, notes the centrality of economic competition as ‘‘the most 
important thing, for in the end the country that grows most becomes biggest, and every 
economic advantage belongs to it.’’ It follows that the Commission’s analysis should also 
focus on facilitating the ‘‘efficient flow of energy supplies between surplus and deficit 
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areas in order to contribute to general economic growth and to bolster the security of all 
nations’’ (The President’s Materials Policy Commission 1952b: 122). Emphasizing the 
centrality of morals and materials to defeating Communism (The President’s Materials 
Policy Commission 1952a: 1), the task of global security as it pertains to materials 
becomes a question of liberalizing global markets, removing trade barriers, and 
facilitating an efficient flow of resources from producer to consumer states. This is 
doubly so for energy materials, where the complexity of global networks for resources, 
and in particular oil, posed one of the ‘‘gravest problems’’ (The President’s Materials 
Policy Commission 1952c: 10) in terms of wartime security during the Second World 
War for the United States and its allies in western Europe. Within this network of 
liberalized trade, the Commission notes, ‘‘the United States is in a particularly effective 
position to lead in the removal of barriers and to stimulate the flow of raw materials’’ 
(The President’s Materials Policy Commission 1952b: 77). 
The case of Venezuela in the report is indicative of the spoke-hub model 
employed by the Commission in its appreciation of the role of resource producer states. 
Openly rejecting the desire of producer states to opt for economic diversification, the 
Commission regards natural (energy) resource production (via American energy 
technoscientific innovations) as an acceptable modality for development, since 
‘‘[w]idening the use of modern technology and skills in materials production and 
processing provides technical training and experience essential to progress in other areas 
of the economy’’ (The President’s Materials Policy Commission 1952b: 73). In the 
Commission’s assessment, the overarching conclusion that ‘‘the security interests of the 
free world requires expansion of materials output’’ (ibid.: 62) means the primary role of 
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US foreign policy is to improve business opportunities in these states through 
liberalization of trade policy and the facilitation of capital and technical expertise to 
develop the economy of the producer state.  Producer states that facilitate the transfer of 
raw materials to consumers (i.e., the United States) will see the benefits of imported 
technologies and bolster global security (The President’s Materials Policy Commission 
1952d: 99, emphasis added): 
By developing her [Venezuela’s] rich material resources, mainly with the aid of 
private investment capital and technical know-how supplied by the United States, 
Venezuela has achieved in a short span of years an almost unparalleled record of 
economic and social advancement . . . Not only have rising Venezuelan materials 
exports stimulated world trade, but the security of all free nations has been 
increased by Venezuela’s immense and growing capacity to produce oil—an 
essential for peaceful production and defense. 
 
 As such, energy (via oil) production, facilitated by the United States through capital and 
energy technoscience transfer, increases the overall ‘‘security’’ of the free world by 
ensuring that the necessary raw materials for peacetime and wartime production and 
defense reach where they are needed in the developed ‘‘free’’ world. This is not simply a 
question of economics, but of morals, as the ‘‘materialistic’’ threat of Communism 
demands that both the United States and the rest of the ‘‘free world’’ maintain economic 
growth and development. Economic growth, via efficient flows of resources and capital, 
supplemented by American government funded energy technoscience at home and 
abroad, are the moral and material underpinnings on which global security and 




After Resources for Freedom 
 
  The Resources for Freedom report functioned as a site of policy discourse in 
government, academia, and the wider public from its publication in 1952 through the 
mid-1970s. Resources for the Future (RFF), a think-tank Paley would establish the next 
year, carried the conversations initiated by the Commission into the Eisenhower 
Administration (The Washington Post 1953), continuing to emphasize the necessity of a 
system of energy policy making rooted in energy technoscience research, liberalized 
markets, and a morally ‘‘efficient’’ society (Resources for the Future 1954: 251): 
So as we progress, our energy needs increase by leaps and bounds. Everything 
about our industrial civilization tends to higher and higher consumption of energy. 
All we can do in the way of conservation is to see that energy is used as 
efficiently as can be to accomplish the results that we are after. 
 
Although many respected energy scientists and business leaders were present during the 
inaugural RFF conference in 1953, many of the New Deal era cooperative utilities 
organizations elected to boycott the proceedings, accusing the organizers of stacking the 
meeting with anti-public/ anti-cooperative private corporations (Graves 1953). This shift 
away from New Deal politics, in particular centralized planning of infrastructure, 
suggests one of the essential tensions arising from the Commission’s report. With the rise 
of neoliberal economic theory in the United States and the erosion of planned economies 
in western Europe over the next twenty years, the extent of the state’s role in facilitating 
what we can now call nascent ‘‘energy security’’ is problematic at best. As an imaginary, 
the policymaking power of energy security is in the emphasis on adjusting energy 
consumption through technoscience. Placing the onus on government to facilitate basic 
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research and social policy toward the efficient use of energy today and new technologies 
tomorrow leaves the government’s role in market regulation a matter open to 
interpretation. 
Consequently, while the Commission’s report waned in terms of dictating specific 
energy policies during the late 1950s (Vietor 1984), it did facilitate a space for dialogue 
concerning the importance of energy technoscience to ‘‘contribute to economic progress 
and national security for the foreseeable future’’ (United States Congress 1959: 150). 
Similarly, contemporary coal advocates refer directly to ‘‘Energy and National Security’’ 
(ibid.: 240) writ large (as opposed to particular resources) and the centrality of ‘‘energy 
security’’ in global economic competition (ibid.: 242, emphasis added): 
Now [during this hearing] we’re discussing the immediate problem of our energy 
resources and how they can help America surmount the Soviet challenge. For the 
basic necessity for winning an emonomic [sic] race is a greatly expanded output 
of energy fuels, the very heart of industrial production. 
 
Winning here, much like the Obama Administration’s claim of using energy security as a 
justification to ‘‘build a 21st century clean energy economy and win the future’’ (The 
White House Office of the Press Secretary 2011, emphasis added), puts the emphasis on 
competition. Porter’s 1961 statement concerning energy security mirrors this; energy 
security is a product of a system of policies that support energy technoscience toward 
resource production while facilitating a competitive market that supports enterprise (such 
as through the many small producers Porter represented). Richard Nixon would some ten 
years later reiterate these points, calling for another study of the United States’ energy 
resources position and policy (Nixon 1971): 
For most of our history, a plentiful supply of energy is something the American 
people have taken very much for granted. In the past twenty years alone, we have 
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been able to double our consumption of energy without exhausting the supply. 
But the assumption that sufficient energy will always be readily available has 
been brought sharply into question within the last year . . . 
 
A sufficient supply of clean energy is essential if we are to sustain healthy 
economic growth and improve the quality of our national life. I am therefore 
announcing today a broad range of actions to ensure an adequate supply of clean 
energy for the years ahead. Private industry, of course, will still play the major 
role in providing our energy, but government can do a great deal to help in 
meeting this challenge. 
 
 One can observe the same general themes outlined here as were brought up in the Paley 
Commission report—Americans’ consumptive materialism is rooted in a false ‘‘history’’ 
of plenty. Energy consumption patterns are a product of innovation and economic 
growth—facilitating a continuation of this pattern of consumption means government 
must play a part in supporting economic growth by fostering the necessary social 
policies, especially around energy technoscience research, which will provide the market 
the tools to continue to meet consumer demand. If morality is missing from Nixon’s 
speech, it is because it has become internalized within the conception of the energy 
technoscientific research itself—the very rationalization of consumptive behavior through 
technological means and marketization. The attempted realization of this moral vision 
through policy making places energy security squarely in the realm of a sociotechnical 
imaginary. 
Conclusion: Implications of Energy Security as a Sociotechnical Imaginary 
 
Based on our analysis of the Paley Commission’s report, we argue that the energy 
security imaginary is, as noted by Maass (1953: 208) ‘‘a highly nationalistic drama,’’ 
whereby energy policy action that facilitates global free markets and energy 
technoscience performs the doctrine of national security. The energy security imaginary 
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posits economic growth—achieved through the government’s facilitation of markets for 
private industry and sponsorship of research and development—as the primary mode of 
‘‘security’’ against Communist, Middle Eastern, and other ‘‘non-free world’’ actors. 
Our research fundamentally questions the ontological basis of energy security, as 
it is conventionally used, by shifting the conversation to attend to the language and moral 
visions that underlie policy action. Tracing the genealogy of an imaginary is a crucial but 
overlooked element in recent scholarship analyzing sociotechnical imaginaries. 
Genealogies elucidate the complex and conflicting labyrinth by which ways of knowing 
about the world and human nature become policy action. Although operating at many 
levels and in a multitude of contexts, sociotechnical imaginaries do not simply drive state 
exercises of power but produce order in the world. Containment and energy security, both 
critical imaginaries for understanding the global technoscientific order surrounding 
energy in the twenty-first century, persist because they are embedded not only in policies 
but also in how the social body of experts and policy makers enmeshed in these 
sociotechnical systems construct the world. Thus, analyzing sociotechnical imaginaries 
should go beyond exposure to consciously recognize the emergence of such ways of 
knowing and challenge the political order(s) they produce. Genealogical analyses, such as 
we have provided in the case of energy security, illuminate tenacious formations of state–
market–technoscience networks, as Obama’s statement on the Energy Security Trust in 
the introduction makes clear. 
Nowhere is this more important than in the case of energy policy discourse, as the 
ontological ‘‘mystery’’ (Mitcham and Smith Rolston 2013) of energy lends itself to a 
‘‘moral’’ economy at the base of neoliberal economic policies. In attending to energy 
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security through the evaluation of various factors relating to the state of being ‘‘energy 
secure,’’ scholars have (whether intending to or not) facilitated the ontological grounding 
of energy security by ascribing theoretical heft to the concept. Approaching energy 
security and other energy-related policy terminology (energy justice, energy ethics, 
sustainable energy, renewable energy, and the like) through an emphasis on the 
genealogies of these ‘‘imaginaries’’ would emphasize the social, political, and cultural 
contexts of energy policy discourses. All too often ‘‘energy’’ is taken at face value, as a 
term that emphasizes the same physical science meanings regardless of context. As such, 
our emphasis is not on categorization, but disruption of the boundaries between ‘‘energy 
security’’ policy problems and the larger questions of market construction and state-
funded technoscience. Such an approach to the current debates in energy security 
scholarship challenges efforts to ‘‘imagine’’ consensus on the governance of global 
environmental problems and problematizes international cooperation on energy resource 
management. 
Tracing the genealogy of energy security also raises implications for grappling 
with energy security in relation to current questions of social justice. First, if we take two 
key components of the establishment of climate and environmental issues within the 
national consciousness—Rachel Carson’s (1962) Silent Spring and the 1965 Presidential 
Science Advisory Committee report on climate change—as markers of the introduction 
of global environmental issues, we must confront the possibility that ‘‘the environment’’ 
as an object in energy policy has no bearing on being ‘‘energy secure.’’ Despite Nixon’s 
protestations for environment-friendly energy in 1971, the consensus was that energy 
security is national security through energy market means. Nixon (1973) seems to have 
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had little will to enforce the former point, as after the 1973 Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries oil embargo it disappears from his ‘‘Project Independence’’ energy 
policy campaign. Likewise, we can also agree with Toke and Vezirgiannidou’s (2013) 
assessment and say there is little space in the energy security imaginary for sustainability 
decoupled from liberal economies. 
Second, energy security privileges national scales and state-level actors, making it 
difficult to attend to local dimensions of energy security and regional geographical 
differences in the energy mix. Contemporaries of Resources for Freedom also noted the 
‘‘Commission’s failure to consider problems of materials production and use in their 
regional setting’’ (Ackerman 1953: 174). For the Commission, integration of energy and 
material systems across the country would deal with the problems of energy access. This 
approach also obscures salient issues pertaining to the equity of community development 
around and through energy resources and procedural and distributive justice as it applies 
to knowledge about energy systems. 
In our constructive criticism, we hope to facilitate the conversations Valentine 
(2011) sees as valuable to further articulating energy security. Future research along the 
path of energy security as a sociotechnical imaginary should take the lead established by 
Jasanoff and Kim and expand our approach to the nascent energy security conversations 
in other parts of the world, paying attention to the similarities and differences between 
American discourse and those in other places that are animated by different visions of a 
good and ‘‘secure’’ society. Other projects should seek to further explore how these 
large-scale imaginaries work at the regional/community level, as Eaton, Gasteyer, and 
Busch (2014) have begun for bioenergy in Michigan. Understanding the interface 
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between sociotechnical imaginaries and lived experience will provide valuable insights 
into how these imaginaries shape social order.  
As a sociotechnical imaginary, energy security has influenced the exercising of 
vast amounts of state power and capital toward global resource integration and energy 
technology development. Furthermore, it is rooted in a particular, Western, sensibility of 
the moral behaviors of individuals and states—sensibilities that are by no means 
universal. Stepping back to observe the genealogy of energy security forces us to ask the 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE VALUES OF ELECTRIFICATION: SAMUEL INSULL AND THE VISION FOR 
A RESPONSIBLE ENERGY PROVIDER 
The public interest is an oft quoted term within the context of the regulation of 
electrification utilities. Certainly, it use can be read as organizations engaged in economic 
self-interest within the context of a contentious debate over who has the right to engage 
in the generation from electrification regulation. This belies, however, the fundamental 
role speaking to the public interest plays in identifying the core norms, beliefs, and 
visions of the future that are made durable and authorized through the exercise of policy 
action, namely the setting of utility rates and structuring cost models. But what are these 
core norms and values that make “speaking to the public interest” structurally critical to 
the organization of electrification systems? Put more simply, what do we mean when we 
talk about the public interest in the context of charting the future of our electrification 
systems?  
As I demonstrate in this chapter, imaginaries in the context of the public interest 
in regulation represent the intersection of larger norms and values concerning the 
idealized organization of society and its sociotechnical systems. Within the context of an 
energy transition, the authorized regulation of electrification systems in the public interest 
highlights a key scale of interaction that embodies a specific historical and material 
context through which these values and systems are co-produced and achieve 
contemporary salience. To establish an understanding of how energy transitions represent 
alternative value-system propositions, we must first understand what it means to provide 
electric power service through investor-owned, state regulated utilities. 
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Constructing the Public Interest 
 
The public interest as an organizing concept for understanding the relationship 
between tangible policies and the values embedded in a society has a checkered past. 
Bozeman (2007) notes that during the mid-20th century, public administration scholars 
seeking to establish an empirical basis for the study of effective governance increasingly 
rejected the concept of “public interest theory” as unsuitable for scientific study. 
Referring to such work as the embodiment of individualistic values and rhetoric, these 
mid-century scholars argued the earlier work of political philosophers such as John 
Dewey as giving precedence to the contextual emergence of values as undermining the 
objective assessment of a state and its policies. While rejecting public interest theory, 
public administration theorists created a paradox; even as they spoke out in scholarly 
communities against the concept, it became ever increasingly a cornerstone of how 
governing bodies (legislators, regulators, courts) justified active exercises of state power 
through policymaking.  
Dewey and others, such as Richard Flathman, by contrast argued that 
fundamentally a study of the public interest began within the context (historical, political, 
ethical, moral) from which understandings of “the good” for a society emerge. Thus, as 
Flathman would argue, scholars of politics would do well to focus on the connection 
between a society’s values and its larger political projects (Flathman 1966: x): 
The student of politics must be aware that political life is value-laden, and it is his 
task to discover what the values are and to analyze their relationship to other 
facets of politics. But questions of value are not amenable to rational, 
transsubjective, scientific analysis, and it is no part of the student's professional to 
adjudicate between the values he discovers in political life. If this point of view is 
valid, it is valid not just for political study but for questions of value wherever 
they arise.  
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Choosing to give preference to certain values – be they freedom, entrepreneurialism, 
justice, or equality – within the context of analyzing the role of the public and its interests 
in the organization of societies represents a commitment to dubious methodological 
choices. In the context of mid-century public administration and political science 
research, it meant giving preference to authorized “shared” values of democratic 
governance and economic individualism vis-à-vis perceived impressions of non-western 
forms of governance. Political life, here in Flathman’s context meaning the systematized 
practices of democratic governance, are built upon more than broad philosophical 
commitments. They inhabit the ways individuals, engaging in a variety of behaviors and 
actions, construct their fundamental individual and shared impressions of what “good” 
governance should look like. 
For the purposes of studying values and the public interest in the context of 
electrification systems, Flathman’s normative point provides effective guidance for 
directing our attention towards a study of how certain values and sociotechnical system 
arrangements are co-produced as authorized expressions of a society’s interests. Firstly, 
we must situate our studies of the public interest within the appropriate historical, 
material, and political context in which they emerge. As studies of infrastructural 
sociotechnical systems have noted, a distinguishing feature of these systems is their 
obduracy. Infrastructures live on well beyond the lives of their creators, inflecting upon 
daily life in critical ways that shape how societies conceptualize the “good life.” Second, 
we must not assume a priori where political debates over the values a society shares 
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occur.1 Science and Technology Studies scholars have explicated this point well, as it 
pertains to the values that impinge on the production of scientific knowledge and the 
rational management of states (Mitchell 2002; Jasanoff 2007). Knowledge production, 
much like politics, does not live simply within a series of demarcated institutions; it 
inhabits the ways people live, work, and above all experience moments of social and 
technological “progress” (Marx 1987). It stands to reason that as we seek to understand 
the relationship between the collective values that represent our conceptualization of the 
good life, and the politically-authorized organization of sociotechnical systems we should 
keep in mind that our values inhabit the walls of our buildings as much as public utility 
commission hearing transcripts.  
To understand these values underpinning energy transitions, the purpose behind 
why they are regulated, and how they intersect with alternative values and sociotechnical 
systems, we must first understand what we mean by regulation in the public interest. 
Electrical utilities are a unique case in the regulation and transformation of large 
infrastructural systems; unlike railroads, which were forcibly regulated at the federal 
level through the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, the dominant electrical utility 
operators, many part of the family of companies established by Thomas Edison, sought 
                                                
1 It is in this respect my study differs from Clark’s (1987) examination of energy 
transitions government regulation over energy resource industries (coal, natural gas, 
petroleum) in the early 20th century. Where Clark situates appropriate policymaking 
within a preexisting structure of shared values (equity, justice, and liberty) I argue it is 
more appropriate for the values expressed by actors situated within such debates to 
emerge as a product of close analysis. As historians of knowledge and social order have 
noted time and again, to impose a temporally discordant system of values on the actions 
of others reduces the study of how societies organize themselves to a critique of the past 
in celebration of the long march of progress. 
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out state-level regulation. Under the auspices of functioning as “public service 
companies” these utilities, in particular Chicago’s Commonwealth Edison and its 
president, Samuel Insull, appealed to state governments, their shareholders, and the 
public in general that state-level regulated utilities given geographically bounded 
monopoly rights to provide power could best serve the greater public interest.  
Insull’s role as systems builder and chief executive of the United States’ first 
large electricity utility has drawn considerable attention from scholars of electrification 
policy and sociotechnical systems. As Thomas Edison’s personal secretary, Insull was 
party to much of the developments stemming from Menlo Park, including Edison’s first 
power plant, the central station plant on Pearl Street in New York, as well as the founding 
of General Electric and the Edison family of electrical utilities. Leaving General Electric 
in 1908 to become president of the Chicago Edison Company, he quickly became focused 
on building a comprehensive system of integrated light and power throughout the city. 
Hughes notes that unlike many of his contemporaries, Insull had the advantage of 
relatively weak local political powers in Chicago. Despite the system of largesse 
Aldermen utilized to maintain city-region specific control over electrical light company 
contracts, Insull was able to forge a utility that by 1921 produced 11 percent of all the 
commercial electrical power in the United States and extended throughout northern 
Illinois. Leveraging considerable statistical information concerning the load patterns and 
characteristics of their customers, Insull and Commonwealth Edison balanced various 
customer group loads to minimize power production variation throughout the day. In 
doing so, Insull would emphasize to his employees and other electric utility executives 
how the minimization of interest accrued on infrastructural investments (in particular 
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central power stations) was fundamentally linked to bringing in a diversity of power 
demand characteristics.  
While these characteristics of Insull’s role in establishing the electric power 
industry are well understood, how he constructed Commonwealth Edison into the largest 
power producer in the nation – and importantly how it fundamentally links to the value 
system underlying state-level regulation of electric power utilities—demands more 
attention. Hughes, for example, notes the role Insull played shaping public opinion about 
electric utilities and their regulation, but suggests that these activities were secondary to 
his primary role as a utility manager (Hughes 1983: 208). Insull functions for Hughes, as 
he does for many other students of his life and eventual fall from grace in 1934, as a 
paradigmatic “systems builder.” Insull in this narrative structure arrays capital, technical 
artifacts, scientific knowledge (statistics in particular), and state-level political support to 
design an efficient and financially productive utility company from the chaos of dozens 
of competitors. This tells us little about why he argued for this regulation as necessary 
and good for the public writ large. As I have outlined above, the values he espouses are 
equally as important as his technological and managerial feats; they underlie how he 
constructed the relationship between large infrastructural services “public service 
companies” and the financial, political, and technological resources needed to operate 
them.  
These situated values, and their relationship to the infrastructural system 
Commonwealth Edison built, fundamentally underpin how Insull, the State of Illinois, 
and a multitude of other utilities and state utility commissions constructed the role of the 
public interest as tool for adjudicating the role of electrification systems in American 
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society. To explicate these values and their coproduction with Commonwealth Edison’s 
sociotechnical system, I provide a close reading of how Insull through his public 
speeches framed why it was necessary for electricity utilities to be proactive in seeking 
regulation over their sector. My analysis focuses on his public speeches given between 
1894 and 1922, and published in a series of collected speeches and memoirs. In this 
respect, I follow Hays’ (1959) call for a sociological treatment of the patterns and 
experiences which drive individuals to construct and advocate for particular arrangements 
of society, technology, and economic activity in the “public interest.” Conservationists 
were more than idealistic servants of the public, and executives such as Insull more than 
paradigmatic industrialists committed to a model of scientific management.  
Insull’s calls for protecting the people who relied on and invested in 
Commonwealth Edison emphasized the collective responsibility utility managers had to 
those who they wished to enroll in the process of electrification. Managing in the “public 
interest,” and as a “public service company,” in this respect meant financial, 
technological, and political success of electrification systems fundamentally relied on a 
coproductive act where the value of electrification was found both in the cost-service 
relationship of electrification, but trust in the fact that electricity utilities could provide 
fundamental social benefits to improve human life that were only possible through 
monopolization. 
A Moral Utility – Insull and Constructing the Responsive Monopoly 
 
1880s and early 1890s Chicago was a city undergoing immense growth, and in 
doing so embodies many of the larger questions of the role of government in managing 
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and bestowing contracts upon “public service companies.” At its core, Chicagoans trusted 
the barons of industry that had turned a swampy outcropping of Lake Michigan and the 
Chicago River only slightly less than their own corrupt and conniving representatives. 
What separated these two dipoles of Chicago society was the former had risen to become 
established powerful agents of change in the city, while the other continually sought to 
re-center power in the hands of locally-situated aldermen. Early battles, such as Peoples 
Gas Light and Coke Company lobbying Mayor Harrison to deny a franchise to Chicago 
electricity pioneer Charles Brush leveraged questions of public safety and the specter of 
the 1883 fire to hold electrification at bay (Platt 1991: 43). As electric light and power 
systems continued to expand, questions shifted to the ethical character of such businesses, 
punctuated not least by ex-convict Yerkes’ rise to power as the master of all electric rail 
in Chicago. Chicagoans trusted the men in charge of these “public service corporations” 
and their amalgam of political supporters little (McDonald 2004: 83-4).   
By the time Samuel Insull stepped into the role of chief executive of Chicago 
Edison, there were 18 central station power plants in operation and dozens of individual 
consumers, electric light companies, and other various configurations (such as real estate 
developer J. Lewis Cochran’s illuminated suburb, Edgewater) through the city and 
surrounding area. Unlike his mentor, Thomas Edison, whom Insull had worked for in one 
capacity or another since 1881, Insull was entirely focused on exercising a vision of fiscal 
and technological responsibility on what was otherwise a fiscally limited company in an 
ever-increasingly crowded sociotechnical system. The formation of Chicago Edison into 
the Commonwealth Edison Company – now the core of what is Exelon – was an exercise 
in Insull shaping a vision of regulated and responsible utility management that, 
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paradoxically, sought to exclude politics from the management of public service 
companies by seeking to enroll local members of the public and state-level bureaucrats in 
establishing a regulated service enterprise system. 
Insull’s choice to advocate for, both as executive of Commonwealth and as 
president of the National Electric Light Association (NELA), state-based regulation by 
trained experts drew on his own philosophical beliefs as a member of the emerging 
managerial class concerned with the “scientific” management of organizations. Yet the 
nature of utility infrastructural systems, their constituent components, and importantly the 
different groups in society that draw on their services are critical elements of the larger 
technological (in the Hughes sense) and sociotechnical function of the system. Unlike the 
new managerial class of manufacturing facilities, those who were adherents to the 
principles of Taylor and Gilbreth, Insull and other utility operators interest in classifying 
and ordering the character and capabilities of society were concerned with defining the 
optimal “mix” of technical competence, social confidence, capital, and power 
consumption.  
Central power stations required significant up front capital investment and 
knowledge of electrical and mechanical systems to efficiently operate, yet as 
sociotechnical systems their growth relied on the system’s increased permeation of home, 
businesses, and government facilities. By extension, the confidence of members of the 
public, business community, and government officials became increasingly necessary. 
Manufacturing and performing public confidence extended from the rearrangement of 
state policies concerning the locus of utility regulation, shifting authority from cities to 
ultimately state regulatory agencies empowered under the Public Utilities Holding Act of 
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1934. Simultaneously, as Insull would argue, it was necessary for all members of the 
utility be they engaged in connecting new homes or operating increasingly more complex 
power generation technologies to engage in professional conduct commensurate with a 
corporation serving the public.  
In this respect, Insull’s Commonwealth Edison exhibited what late-20th century 
managerial theorist Peter Drucker (2006) would call the practices of an ‘innovative’ 
entrepreneurial organization. Rather than passively accept new technologies to marry 
with managerial practices, Commonwealth Edison directly sought to construct knowledge 
of the characteristics of their consumers, shape and respond to changes in their values 
concerning the role of electrification in social progress, and design market devices to 
transform individualized wants and needs into financial stability through economically-
based regulation.  
In the following sections, I outline how Insull imagined and designed a 
framework for regulation that turned social malaise at the role of government and 
monopoly companies in Chicago society into a vision of prosperity for the consumer, 
laborer, and capitalist through rational state-level regulation. As I show, regulating in the 
“public interest” in purely economistic terms was an exercise in purifying local politics 
from the necessarily rational pursuit of transforming “interest” in all of its senses – 
personal and organizational values, competing political groups, and interest accruing on 
capital intensive power production equipment – into classes of measurable and actionable 
variables for determining acceptable power cost rates. To speak then of public values 
being outside of the realm of power regulation is an oxymoron; it is in fact central to the 
concepts function as a technology of infrastructural systems governance. 
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Values and Regulation 
 
As actors within a given market (energy services) Commonwealth Edison 
constantly sought to position themselves between the constellation of consumers, 
politicians, and capitalist financiers to achieve stable and predictable returns on 
investments. Providing a service – and a capital intensive one at that – required different 
approaches to the relationship between perception of goods and services that demanded a 
stabilization of the quality of the financial exchanges and the distribution of power. It 
required thinking about the ways electrification systems as physical entities connecting 
producers and consumers through a growing infrastructure also linked customer values to 
the acquisition of favorable loans. Electric light producers depended heavily on large 
loans to purchase central station plant turbines, generators, and other technologically 
complex and expensive pieces of equipment. Running these pieces of equipment incurred 
a series of interlinked costs – the original loan itself, operations and maintenance of the 
plant, payroll, home installations, and importantly the interest on the capital equipment 
loan. Interest, as a particular technology of financing electrification equipment created 
links between how and when consumers used electricity, when the utility provided these 
services, and the cost of the service provided. Meters and utility rates were how 
customers experienced interest as early electric light utilities had negotiated pricing for 
electricity on a case-by-case basis and at a fixed “flat rate.” While effective for 
encouraging early adopters to electrify rather than continue to use pre-existing sources or 
build their own power facility (as business and individual homeowners both had), rates 
did not always align with customer use patterns observed at the meter. Classifying 
customer groups into knowable categories of power consumption (both total energy 
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usage and maximum power usage) provided critical information for understanding how 
each group related to the entire financial viability of the company.2 Capital equipment 
interest and customer class intersected at the point of utility rate structure. Overall each 
customer class utilized analogous grid “services” (production, transmission, metering); 
what differentiated them was how much power they used (Insull 1898: 40-41): 
For instance, take the two probably extreme classes of customers to whom the 
central-station company supplies electricity for lighting purposes. On the one 
hand, you have an office building whose tenants use artificial illumination for 
only a short space of time each day and only during the winter. On the other hand 
you have a basement customer whose use of your product averages nearly one-
half of the day of twenty four hours during the whole year. Your investment to 
take care of each of these customers is practically the same; therefore your total 
interest cost must be the same in both cases; but if you distribute this interest cost 
over the actual units consumed, you will find that the tenant of the office building 
costs you for interest per unit of energy sold many times more than does the 
occupant of the basement. There are of necessity as many different grades of 
customers between the two extremes I have mentioned as there are different 
classes of business and different characters of structures in which these businesses 
are conducted. Surely, if the cost of production varies according to the different 
conditions under which your customers use your product, it is but fair that the 
selling price per unit should vary correspondingly. 
 
During the mid 1890s most electric light utilities were serving relatively small territories, 
incurring interest on smaller loans for low efficiency, low power equipment. A given 
utility’s “load factor” – the total consumption of power produced – rarely crossed 40%. 
Insull, by contrast, oriented his business model towards incorporating ever larger and 
more efficient power generation equipment into the Commonwealth Edison network. 
Adopting some of the first turbine engines produced by General Electric, Commonwealth 
                                                
2 This was especially relevant when electric light customers primarily used the power for 
illumination. As other customer groups with differing needs (motive power for 
manufacturing) began to utilize central station power their new infrastructural needs and 
power demands would in turn transform. 
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Edison increased efficiency at the cost of loans significantly larger than the equipment 
purchased by competitors. Identifying power consumers, and large ones, became a top 
priority for the company, as was a rate structure that would encourage these new potential 
consumers to sign contracts. Financial tools such as rate structures played a crucial role in 
shaping the fortunes of Commonwealth Edison, and importantly for this study how its 
vision of public utility company relationship with the public would proceed (Insull 1910: 
149-150): 
It was not until the early nineties [1890s] that some of the managers of the large 
central-station properties of the country appreciated the fact that if they desired to 
place their business on the basis of a general public necessity it was necessary for 
them to rearrange their rates on such a plan as would give the long-time 
consumer, the man who used the central-station company's investment most 
steadily during the year, the lowest possible price; and the recognition of the 
necessity of meeting this condition may possibly have had as much to do with 
reducing operating costs and reducing interest and depreciation costs as have the 
wonderful work of the inventors and the marvelous skill of the engineers. 
 
Arthur Wright, who had developed a system of ratemaking in England based on a “two-
tiered” approach to pricing deeply influenced Insull’s thinking on this matter.3 Electric 
light classified and cost based on (1) the total energy consumption of the customer, and 
(2) the maximum power used by the customer at any point. In effect, the Wright 
ratemaking model decoupled the relative portion of daily operations costs (including fuel 
and personnel) directly linked to each kilowatt-hour of energy consumed from the interest 
associated with operating the necessary power equipment and infrastructure to supply the 
customer. Interest, following the physical infrastructure linking each customer class into 
                                                
3 At a dinner in honor of Wright and others, Insull would remark that “I do not think it is 
any exaggeration to say that Mr. Wright first taught us how to sell electricity” (Insull 
1911: 217). 
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the central power station represented an inexorable material link between the practices of 
the company as it pertained to acquiring capital for development and the services a 
customer could afford.4  
Decoupling energy consumption from the interest-power demand made it possible 
to speak of bringing the benefits of economies of scale into alignment with the perceived 
desires of customers to acquire low-cost illumination. As Harold Platt (1991, pp. 83-87) 
notes, it led Insull in his role as head of Commonwealth Edison and President of the 
National Electric Light Association to campaign vigorously for the potential benefits 
electrification for all could provide. Campaigns, however, are not a substitute for tangible 
action. Building a culture of mass consumption that was reflexive to other social values – 
not least of which was distrust in large corporations and local governments – required 
reorienting the positionality of utilities vis-à-vis local governments and the public writ 
large. 
Serving in the Public Interest 
 
Insull, the son of marginalized English Congregationalists and avowed 
temperance followers possessed a deep appreciation for the rational managerial 
techniques of his homeland and a desire to use electrification as a tool of social change 
(McDonald 2004: 10). Much in the keeping of other Progressive minded leaders of the 
early 20th century, Insull was deeply concerned with social malaise and inefficiency of 
resource use, not least of which was the capital of his consumers. Chicago and its system 
                                                
4 Neufeld (2000: 72) note an associated benefit of the Wright pricing scheme was it 
effectively made it more economic for manufactories to connect to the utility’s grid rather 
than develop their own power facilities.  
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of local political spoils had an immediate impact on his ability to grow 
Chicago/Commonwealth Edison, pushing him over his career to move from advocating 
for any responsible regulation (municipal or state), to speaking in favor of state-level 
regulation alone. A critical moment during the development of Insull’s views on 
regulation occurred during the “Home Rule” movement of 1914. Local politicians and 
citizens, seeking to reassert municipal power over key social and industrial sector issues 
progressive leaders had invested state and federal power in managing directly targeted the 
public service utilities as organizations that the City Council of Chicago should regulate. 
Preceding the creation of Illinois Public Service Commission in 1914, Insull emphasized 
the necessity of technically competent regulators who would maintain the financial 
stability of the state (Insull 1911a: 247): 
How are these industries [public service companies] regulated here? They are 
regulated in campaigns for the election of aldermen to the City Council, when you 
come down to the finality of the thing. It is not a question of a man's ability to 
deal with the technical subjects that come before him; it is a question on the one 
side of a man being able to deliver the greatest number of speeches to get the 
greatest number of votes, and, on the other side, of proclaiming that he is the only 
honest man in the community. It is this class of men who regulate $450,000,000 
of capital, 60 to 70 per cent of which is owned right in this community and 
commonwealth, whose business is vital to the success of the community, and 
whose constant flow of money into this community in the way of additional 
investment from year to year is a very important factor in the industrial enterprise 
of the city of Chicago.  
 
Elected city officials, bound to local interests and incapable of understanding the nuances 
of infrastructural systems management (in particular electricity utilities), lacked the 
commitment to large scale social transformation effective regulation demanded. As a 
“class” of actors whose value systems were decided at a profoundly local level vis-à-vis 
the state writ large, their influence through the oversight of tremendous capital 
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investments was disproportionate to their political and social responsibility.  
For Insull, this imbalance suggested such a “class” of actors in society were poor 
stewards of the possibilities electricity afforded. Chicagoans had experienced these 
possibilities during the 1893 Columbian Exposition. Nicknamed “The White City”, the 
exhibition center became a symbol for the model of progress through illumination and 
consumption. Insull, like other Chicagoans had the opportunity, as a senior executive 
with Edison/General Electric to be a player in making these possibilities real – however, 
his visions of the world made prosperous and healthy through electrification extended 
beyond urban boundaries. Musing on the opportunities a “wise system of production and 
distribution of energy” (Insull 1913: 402) built on monopoly electricity system could 
bring to Illinois and the Mississippi Valley, Insull drew on another popular image of 
prosperity and progress – idyllic and lush Arcadia – to outline a vision of manufacturing 
worker and yeoman farmer in harmony (Insull 1913: 396): 
But as this state and other surrounding states become studded with manufacturing 
establishments the necessity which compels the work-man to dwell in large 
centers of population, when living conditions are most unfavorable, will cease. He 
will be able to establish himself under conditions where he can get healthful 
environment for his family. Instead of living in overheated, ill-ventilated, small 
tenements of the big city he will have the opportunity to establish himself 
practically amid the desirable conditions that those living in the country ordinarily 
enjoy. Surely if this can be accomplished, if the living conditions of our people 
can be improved, if their children can be brought up under circumstances which 
give them the foundation of good health, which will give them the opportunity of 
association in our country schools with that portion of the population--the farming 
population--which is the very backbone of the country, it is reasonable to expect 
greater satisfaction on the part of the workmen with their conditions and better 
relationship, because of a closer community of interests with employers, and, in 
general, a better chance for the workman and his family. 
 
Suburban communities, such as Edgewater in Chicago, were exclusive enclaves of the 
city’s wealth and upper middle classes. Able to afford the comforts of almost countryside 
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living while leveraging electric rail transit to the city center, management had as Insull 
saw it become distanced from the conditions under which those they employed labored. 
Monopoly electrification, managed by utilities with sufficient transmission infrastructure 
and scale (geographically and in terms of power production) could enable opening such 
environments for workers as well, moving the center of manufacturing out of the city.  
Electrification on this scale demanded state-level regulation, as the interests of 
local politicians and the utilities they franchised – either in Chicago communities or in 
other localities – did not seek to nor could provide these benefits (Insull 1922: 31): 
My own personal experience [with municipal utilities] is that they go along, using 
their plants in their own little local territories, without making any effort toward 
the development of the region surrounding them. In fact, they are rather jealous of 
such development, if it is outside of the corporate limits. As a public local utility 
(and it matters not whether a utility is publicly or privately owned, it should be 
judged as a local utility) the municipal plant stands in the way of the progress of 
the community. 
 
Social and financial progress for the workmen, capitalist, and consumer alike necessitated 
the fiscal and technological demands of the city (where else was there enough of a 
concentration of labor and capital to consume the necessary amounts of power?) – yet 
these demands could not override the critical importance of economy of production. Nor 
would it make sense to do so, as Wright’s rate management system had shown it was 
possible to balance the opportunity for electrification to a variety of customers with the 
responsible and efficient management of financial and material resources. Customers 
were afforded opportunities for lower rates as appropriate for their use characteristics. 
Diversity in consumer classes and characteristics signaled systemic efficiency and the 
possibility of lower costs. Insull would show throughout his career charts explaining how 
diversity in customer classes cut down the difference between seasonally daily loads and 
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the system’s peak load (highest power use at any given moment during the year). 
Inclusiveness in customers using power across time (day, season, year) yielded lower 
rates for all.  
Managing these tremendous opportunities required a class of skilled 
administrators who would seek to regulate and govern “on a basis of what is 
economically fair, what is just to the user, the consumer, and what is just to the man who 
puts up the money, the capitalist” (Insull 1911c: 188). For Insull, these men were 
idealized in the form of British Board of Trade administrators who, executing 
Parliamentary legislation maintain public trust and financial stability for public service 
operator and user. Rational management under a system of competent technocrats 
typified Insull’s vision of an appropriate regulatory group (Insull 1913a: 442) 
I would very much rather operate under a low rate and know that that rate had the 
endorsement of some administrative state body, and know exactly where I stand, 
than to be harassed by, say, a board of aldermen, who are mainly governed by 
political considerations, whereas an administrative board, when it understands the 
business, if its members are honest men, gives us a fair return on the money we 
have invested, provided that money has been judiciously spent and provided that 
the business is judiciously run. 
 
The oversight of public service company management by administrators setting 
transparent rates and assessing for company financial viability suited Insull and his vision 
of public-utility relations. In a race to the bottom of rates, Insull’s “cost plus reasonable 
profit” (1898: 44-45) model of public regulation based on the Wright model of 
ratemaking gave a critical advantage, in terms of growing service area, to the company 
who could enroll the largest and most diverse number of customer classes. A public 
service electricity utility was, as he would argue, best organized to serve the public as a 
natural monopoly with demarcated territories, regulated under the auspices of a state-
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level regulator with technical knowledge and distance from the challenges of local 
politics. It would not be a political actor in the sense of earlier franchised utilities; 
purified through the process of public regulation, the electrical utility would serve the 
body politic directly. Nor would it be a monopoly in the sense of the large infrastructural 
corporations of the late 19th century. The utility was instead an agent of shaping the 
people’s wants and desires, reaching into the home and throughout the community to 
provide lowest possible cost power, while only asking for a limited profit margin and 
long-term financial stability. 
Social Values and Power 
 
"If our business is to be permanently successful; if we are to obtain and hold the 
good will of the communities in which we operate; if we are to be allowed by the 
governmental bodies having charge of such matters, whether legislative or 
administrative, to extend our monopolies -- we must defer to public opinion. I 
think that all our people should try to achieve the highest possible standing in the 
community in which they live. They should bear in mind that their personal 
conduct for good or ill is an addition to or subtraction from the good will which 
the public bears towards the business on which we are all dependent for our 
livelihood." (Insull 1912: 356) 
 
The values consumers bring to bear when considering how to consume energy, 
when to consume it, and what sources to use, are generally the foci of analysis when 
considering the intersection between individual consumers and the energy service 
provider. Studies of home and work energy consumption – both historical and 
contemporary – emphasize how power companies and the technologies they bring to bear 
directly influence these patterns of relation. In the case of Insull and Commonwealth 
Edison, much time has been devoted to explicating how his method of gathering 
statistical data from customers yielded the various “customer classes” – defined power 
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consumer types – still more or less in use today. Certainly Insull’s use of consumer data 
was unique within the context of public service utility managers in the other energy 
industries. Much of Insull’s pragmatic interest in this data can be explained through the 
concept of “load.” Power loads represent the aggregate power consumption within a 
given electrical system at a given moment in time. Enabled through the development of 
electric meters by Wright these meters and the data they provided utility managers an 
understand that their industry was fundamentally organized differently than other public 
service companies. Electricity utilities experience shifts in load demand on a much 
shorter timescale than other analogous energy sources such as gas. The inability to 
effectively respond to shifting electricity demand across the day can lead to limited 
available power (“brownouts”) or a complete loss to particular regions of a grid 
(“blackouts”). Electricity utilities in this sense are innately physically linked to their 
customers – knowing their behaviors meant knowing how to effectively manage the grid. 
For Insull, however, who had spent time during his tenure with Edison understanding 
customer wants and desires, his vision of an economically regulated utility required the 
utility to embrace a critical paradox. Freedom from local political manipulation and the 
ability to set stable rates and grow within a demarcated territory would necessitate 
coupling knowledge of the customer’s behaviors with an organization-wide commitment 
to fostering goodwill between power producer and power consumer. In effect, though 
Insull would routinely advocate for utility employees and executives to “keep out of 
politics all you possibly can” (Insull 1910a: 122) his success was made through situating 
Commonwealth Edison as a political actor more readily committed to the visions of 
progress his customers shared than their local representatives. 
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Achieving this relationship between community served and the utility would 
require a twofold process – both running against the predominant views of large 
manufacturing management. Traditional monopoly public service companies had 
dominated the landscape of Chicago, extending from gas supply to traction and long 
distance shipping via railroad. In essence, Chicago was a city unaccustomed to thinking 
much of service providers – a fact Insull was acutely aware of as he addressed his peer 
utility operators in Canada (Insull 1911b: 204): 
The old method of doing business was to assume that the public utility belonged 
to a class of overlords that could not possibly make a mistake. If the community 
in which it operated was not satisfied with its methods, why the people must just 
put up with those methods just the same. I care not how good may be the 
franchises under which you operate, how long may be the grants you have, so far 
as the engineering side of it is concerned, or how good may be your engineer and 
how perfect your plants, unless you can so conduct your business as to get the 
good will of the community in which you are working, you might as well shut up 
shop and move away. 
 
Operating an effective monopoly utility required being able to generate a form of 
reasonable financial stability for customers that performed – if not exhibited in material 
reality – a commitment to providing the service at the lowest possible price. Flying in the 
face of executive backlash to government regulatory interference, Insull challenged calls 
for a return to a zero-sum game commitment of unregulated free competition on the 
grounds that it was neither financially sound nor in the best interests of the company 
(Insull 1910a: 119): 
While as an abstract proposition I think it is very laudable for us to cheer the idea 
that we should go out and fight any curtailment of our liberty of action, as 
suggested by Mr. Dawes, yet, as a practical, everyday proposition, and as a 
necessity, we have to face the views of the various communities of the states in 
which we are engaged. We should bear in mind, above everything else in the 
operation of our business, that we cannot afford to place ourselves in opposition 
to public opinion. If we are to maintain values of the securities for which we are 
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responsible, and to increase those values, we should rather bend our energies to 
find some means of operating our business to meet the condition that will 
undoubtably[sic] confront us in most of the states, certainly the states in the 
Mississippi Valley. 
 
Insull was not opposed to the concept of large aggregations of capital, a point he had 
spoken on consistently since the late 1890s. However, within the context of a democratic 
polity, defending the limitless behaviors of public service corporations to do as they 
please was tantamount to supporting irrational and individualistic management of 
electrification resources. An electrification grid, he argued, achieved its best scales of 
economy when a variety of classes of customers drawing from large-scale high efficiency 
central station power plants balance the aggregate load across the day. Economies of 
scale were beneficial not only for the producer, but for the customer as well. Customers 
who consumed more were charged less on a per unit of energy consumed basis, while 
those who consumed less were charged more, but not as much as they would have been 
charged in an environment where the public service company had lower efficiency 
facilities and a more limited diversity of customers. Producers achieved a more even 
consumption of electricity throughout the day, and avoided the political turmoil that had 
ousted other energy tycoons of Chicago, such as Yerkes, from control of key services.  
In tandem with this call for economic management of utility resources and public 
good will, Insull called directly on another class of actors – managers and engineers – to 
exhibit the traits of the progressive class of technical experts in their interactions at all 
levels and in all contexts with society (Insull 1910b: 157): 
We central-station managers ought to look upon ourselves as semi-public officials 
and so conduct our affairs with the community as to give us the advantage of a 
reputation for absolutely fair and impartial dealing. We should preach the same 
doctrine to our subordinates and insist upon the same policy being carried out in 
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their dealings with the public. If such a course is pursued, we will not only be 
helping to improve the opinion of the community of corporations generally, but 
will be establishing our own business on so firm a basis as to add to the 
permanency of our investment and give promise of prosperity in the future. 
 
Aligned with the overarching principles of scientific management which inflect on 
Insull’s thoughts, his call to public leadership highlights the importance he put on 
generating good will between the corporation and the public through separating its 
activities from the realm of traditional politics. It was the job of the utility executive, 
employee, and investor, to be a teacher to the masses about the value of a regulated large-
scale monopoly utility. Much as Taylor (1915) would call for a more harmonious 
relationship between workmen and management – each to their own abilities – it was the 
job of the utility employee to provide honest information while the public need only 
provide its perspective on the quality of service they have received. The actual 
consumption patterns would be read from a meter.  
The Public and its Interests 
 
After World War I, Insull would leverage the massive growth of utility 
shareholders in the public would strengthen this “harmonious” relationship between 
utility and public values. As the intersection of capital equipment interest, ratemaking, 
and infrastructure linked power consumer’s visions of the opportunities electrification 
afforded to the financial viability of the company itself, the purchase of utility stock by 
residents throughout the state of Illinois made the utility both a servant of the public and 
it’s (in a limited sense) property. Utility employees had been encouraged to actively seek 
out and understand the public’s will as it intersected with the industry. As owners of the 
company customers were transmuted into political agents of the company’s rights (Insull 
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1922: 43-44): 
The second reason for putting into effect this plan [customer ownership] is the 
desire to influence public opinion. People have a very great respect for the 
property they own. Every man and every woman thinks that everybody except 
himself should pay a little more than his full share of taxation, for instance. It is a 
perfectly natural thing for every man to think that his house is the best along the 
block, the one he built and put his money in, and for a woman to think, if she is 
tasteful in her attire, that her bonnet is the best of those she sees at church; and it 
is equally natural for the man, or the woman, or the boy or girl, to think that his 
electric light and power company is all right, if he owns stock in that company. 
We have deliberately started to influence public opinion in that way and are 
succeeding very well.   
 
In the state of Illinois we have today 500,000 owners of utilities securities. If you 
figure only four to a family, that means nearly one-third of the population of the 
state, to say nothing of all the banks and trust companies that own utility 
securities. One-third of the population of the state are interested in these utilities 
receiving fair treatment at the hands of the people's representatives in the 
Legislature. 
 
Transmuting customer visions of an affordable and electrified future into the political and 
financial stability of its public service companies was a realization at a state-wide level of 
what he had argued tied Chicagoans and Commonwealth Edison together some ten years 
earlier (Insull 1911d: 186-7): 
If you figure five to a family, you will find that nearly ten per cent of the 
population of this large city is dependent for its daily bread upon the prosperity of 
the public-service corporations of this community. I therefore say that with these 
figures before us, considering also the enormous capital investment employed, the 
millions expended from year to year in improvements and extensions, the 
tremendous disbursements in wages (disbursements to labor exceeding, probably, 
the profit which capital receives for its money), we may realize that one of the 
most vital questions, one of the most serious questions, to a community like 
Chicago, is its relation with the public-service corporation. 
 
In effect, through linking individuals and other statewide institutions to the financial 
success of the utility, Insull sought to create political pressure through popular support in 
favor of policies friendly to his monopoly utility. Oppositional to the self-interested and 
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local-situated aldermen, municipal company, or tycoon, the utility was a form of property 
that could be constructed as shared in both the political, financial, and material sense. 
Flowing from power lines and through cash infusions via the sales of securities, 
customers and the utilities that served them became actors engaged in the building 
political alliances towards a culture of populist mass energy consumption.  
Regulation in the interests of the public thus served to make durable and 
formalize through standardized ratemaking practices, cost models, industry-government 
communications, and public relations a vision of mass energy consumption enabling the 
end to a variety of urban and rural ills. These ills were products of what Insull saw as 
irrational self-interest in defiance of the best principles of fiscal and technological 
management. A successful transformation of the energy public utility service system 
implied not only lower rates for all customer classes, it formalized Insull’s belief that a 
class of individuals competent in the operation of utilities were best suited to provide the 
public key values – competence, judiciousness, social responsibility, fairness, 
transparency, and honesty. It was these values the previous energy and motive power 
public service companies – natural gas and railroad in particular – had lacked.  
Conclusion 
 
If Insull’s vision of a regulated public utility behaving in the public interest seems 
fanciful, it seems worth noting his dramatic fall from grace upon the folding of his utility 
holding company after the 1929 Stock Market Crash did indicate the standards he and 
others embodied in campaigning for regulation carried heft. With the failure of Insull’s 
holding company, many of the Illinoisans who he so proudly noted would speak in favor 
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the utility’s (and by association the public’s) interests lost critical portions of their 
savings. Fleeing to Europe and eventually extradited in Turkey, Insull’s trial and eventual 
acquittal would both shatter the man and bring about the formalization of states as the 
locus of utility regulation. The Public Utility Companies Holding Act would force upon 
the geographical and administrative boundaries of states, enforcing the breakup of 
holding companies into individual utilities with the exception of where the companies 
utilized a common grid. Instilling effective regulation – combating the lack of 
transparency and judiciousness in ever more complex holding companies – was central to 
federal intervention in the regulation of utilities.5 
The transformation of America’s urban and rural illumination and motive power 
systems from natural gas and some remaining coal to that of electrification of the 
consumer embodied a vision of progress through transforming the values on which public 
service companies operated. The public interest as a framework for adjudicating truth 
claims in the space of utility regulation represents more than a call towards abstract 
values or self-interest. Following the material infrastructure of electrification, the fiscal 
mechanisms that dictate rate setting and investment potential, and embodying the 
complex morass we call visions of progress through electrification, the public interest in 
electrification policy represents the idea that those who provide a society’s key services 
are beholden to embody these values in the systems they operate. Dominic Boyer (2014) 
has hinted at the deep social and political consequences of power (in the political and 
electrical sense) flows through the walls those spaces the body politic designates both 
                                                
5 PUCHA was in effect from 1935 until 2005 when it was repealed as part of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 (United States Congress 2005).  
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“private” and “public.” Understanding how the public interest functions within the 
context of electrification regulation takes his argument one step further they demonstrate 
that acts such as ratemaking and establishing new cost model boundaries are a 
consequence of their positionality within the regulatory regime debates over the values a 
society embodies when and how it chooses to use electrical power.   
Insull’s vision of a responsible utility serving in the public interest was, at its core, 
directed towards speaking about individual customers in apartment flats and single-
family homes, but other than as investor and users of power they play little to no role in 
his argument. Reflecting on the population of early twentieth century Chicago, the lack of 
individuals and their experiences at the point of energy use becomes even more stark as 
we consider the deep socioeconomic divide between those engaged in the labor of 
Chicago’s industries – overwhelmingly uneducated and new to the country – and the 
leaders of business living in Edgewater. Insull’s vision may have been about Chicagoans 
and Illinoisans as a whole, but in essence most functioned as a population encountering 
electrification and its benefits in a hypothetical rather than real setting. 
Acting upon, in meaningful ways, the alignment between utility behavior and 
public values and perceptions needs to also walk into these spaces of lived experience, 
and understand what visions of progress and social order made possible through 
electrification. In the following chapter I follow this line of inquiry, examining how 
Phoenicians and those who seek to embody their private value systems – homebuilders – 




OH, GIVE ME A HOME, WHERE THE INNOVATIONS ROAM 
As I demonstrated in Chapter Four, Samuel Insull’s role as network builder was 
linked to how he shaped the purpose and outcome of electrification systems in shaping 
American turn of the century national identity. Americans were rational individuals, 
embedded in specific communities and beholden to serve their neighbors responsibly. 
They, so Insull argued, sought to provide their neighbors with the best services possible, 
and knew enough to entrust individuals deemed to be of good character to sort out the 
details. Alternative systems of large scale energy production and distribution could no 
longer provide these values – it was thus only logical that all energy should be put 
towards charting a path towards the “White City” that had once dazzled Illinoisans. To 
achieve this goal required a complete belief in the idea that a ‘regulated public utility’ 
was both possible and more importantly achievable through transitioning to large scale 
electrification use.  
Episodes of tremendous shifts in how individuals and states conceptualize 
identity, nationality, progress, and the “good life” represent the tremendous power 
sociotechnical system transitions have on modern life. They represent constitutional 
moments (Jasanoff 2003) – periods in space and time where the very fabric that underlies 
how a society understands and defines itself are opened up, interrogated, and 
reconfigured. Such questions of national identity extend beyond what sociotechnical 
regime theorists conceptualize as the “rules of the game” into the overarching social, 
political, economic, and cultural landscape of a society. Insull’s concerns, by extension, 
have as much to do with how to load balance Commonwealth Edison’s grid as they do 
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with charting a story of his company that situates it as an agent rather than enemy of 
social progress.  
Insull’s vision of social progress through electrification represents how larger 
conversations about national identity enter into conversation and inflect on particular 
interpretations of what is possible through sociotechnological transitions. National 
identity is not, however, the purview of actors such as Insull alone; all individuals within 
a society carry shared understandings of what constitutes community, family, and 
importantly for this chapter home. Homes represent important sites of energy use – in the 
United States 6 percent of total energy consumption occurs within residential properties 
(United States Energy Information Administration 2017). The technologies and social 
practices that shape how energy is used and conceptualized within the home strongly 
inflect how members of a society understand energy’s ‘social value’. Shove and Walker 
(2010) recognized that when contextualizing energy consumption, especially within 
residential settings, scholarship should recognize that individuals live within spaces 
replete with the energy technology choices of others. Those residing within a given 
domicile experience come to understand through daily practice what it means to use the 
refrigerator, turn on and off lights, and call a solar panel cleaning service. 
It is no accident more recent work at the intersection of social science and 
engineering has taken an interest in how forms of understanding the values latent in 
energy systems can be reshaped through various home energy management tools. In-
home devices (IHDs), such as the M-Power® box I described in the introduction, 
represent a particularly interesting expression of the idea that through redesigning how 
individuals experience energy systems in the home larger energy management changes 
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can be achieved. Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess (2010, 2013) studies of UK families 
testing “smart” energy monitors noted that while individuals responded early on to the 
new ‘moral economy’ of energy consumption made financially visible, other features 
such as total energy consumption did not factor into specific household practice changes. 
Moreover, users who had made changes to their energy consumption rarely continued 
these practices, reflecting a larger trend in IHD research that indicates simply knowing 
one’s energy consumption does not lead to permanent changes in daily activity.  
Despite the deep interest amongst energy scholars in the role new technologies of 
the home can play in shaping energy consumption patterns, little attention has been paid 
to how these transitions link to the larger purpose of the “home” within American social 
life and order. The ‘home’ as feminist scholars remind us is a “social edifice that 
embodies meanings, values, and attributes that reflect the differing experiences and 
beliefs of its builders” (Bowlby, Gregory, and McKie 1997: 347). Homes are spaces 
where dominant and transgressive relationships between families are performed outside 
the public sphere. In the United States, the home is a deeply personal space that possesses 
its own narrative of protection enshrined in legal codes and our collective sense of where 
the state does and does not belong.  
Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s (1983) classic study of gendered labor and technology in 
the American home attends in great detail to the intersection of energy transitions, 
technologies of the home, and the very idea of the home itself. As Cowan notes, the 
industrialization of the American home divided the organization and understanding of 
female and male labor. Home work, or housework as we refer to it now emerged from the 
commercialization of a variety of in-home tasks concurrently with the exit of men from 
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the house and into the larger market. The result of this simultaneous industrialization of 
American private and public life was a panoply of new technological artifacts and 
associated tasks that required first new sources of labor (hired) and, eventually, more 
technologies of home management. Ovens, lighting, and heat amongst other technologies 
promised to progressively reduce household labor while improving on domestic quality 
of life. Regardless, these technologies did little to destabilize the amount of work within 
the home; worse yet, the labor of the house became equivocated with the absence of 
laboring as American society centered on the exchange of capital as the primary modality 
of productivity.  
Through all of these transformations Cowan succinctly brings to the fore how 
powerful the idea of ‘the home’ is within American society (1983:149-50): 
When push comes to shove, most people will opt to increase the possibility of 
exercising their right to privacy and autonomy: so that they can sleep, eat, have 
sexual relations, discipline their children, clean their bodies and their clothes 
without interference; and so they can construct long-term emotional relationships 
with people of their own choosing. And when further push comes to shove, when 
decisions have to be made about spending limited funds, most people will still opt 
for privacy and autonomy over technical efficiency and community interest. 
 
Energy transitions intersecting at-home social relations and behaviors will invariably be 
transformed by the highly stable understandings of what home is embedded in American 
political, economic, and social life. Attending to how visions of what the home is and can 
be through specific transformations in domestic energy systems brings into focus these 
where proposed alternative ways of living with energy intersect dominant narratives 






Turning to the imagined domicile, this chapter examines how visions of home life 
possible through specific transformations in domestic energy systems articulate the 
social, political, and economic purpose of quintessential American single-family home. 
Unlike the early single-family homes of the twentieth century, however, the American 
landscape today is dominated by a small group of large-scale commercial home builders. 
Beazer, Pulte, Ashton Woods, and Meritage amongst others play a significant but 
understudied role in shaping how American families come to understand what makes a 
house a home and where energy systems fit within it.  
Drawing from a large-scale study of over 40 new home building sites across the 
Phoenix metropolitan area, I examine how over a dozen builders construct visions of 
alternative energy systems and practices through the design and marketing of model 
homes. Model homes represent deliberate exercises by corporate design staff to construct 
tractable visions of what home life could be like for idealized customers. As I 
demonstrate, not all builders explicitly market their visions of home life in terms of 
energy systems; however, those that do strongly frame visions of domestic labor and 
leisure in terms of energy management. How energy management systems shape labor 
and leisure for these builders depends on what market(s) they design homes for – single 
families or retired persons.  
Energy management technology research has paid little attention to generational 
understandings of energy and the home, yet as my work shows builders impart very 
different interpretations of the role of energy management in the home for older 
individuals and younger families. Builders oriented towards designing homes and 
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communities for retired/semi-retired individuals imagine energy management and 
alternative energy sources (such as rooftop photovoltaic solar) as a pathway for providing 
their customers tools for financial and temporal management. Those designing single-
family homes however see energy management and alternative technologies as part of a 
suite of innovations ready-made for home application. Weaved in between these two 
visions of what the home is and does is a common theme of the home as a space that 
produces social, political, and importantly economic value. Embedded in the walls and 
linked to the appliances are a variety of coded energy efficiency and energy management 
technologies that go beyond merely reproducing ideas of idealized families and family 
life; these homes also are designated as assemblages of materials, third-party energy 
management and production technologies, and building materials that do work on behalf 
of the family. For three key builders, Meritage Homes, Del Webb (a subsidiary of Pulte), 
and Robson Communities, the new home overcomes its inherent disadvantages as a space 
of non-productivity to emerge through novel technologies as a member of the family 
capable of improving life for inside its walls. 
Why Phoenix? 
 
Phoenix, Arizona represents a perfect intersection of commercial single-home 
visions with larger energy system transformations. Built on large-scale suburban 
development in the post-World War II era, the Valley of the Sun’s suburban landscape is 
a patchwork of communities stretching across sixty miles of the northern Sonoran Desert. 
Linked to massive tax incentives for builders and defense contractors alike, Phoenix’s 
suburban landscape screams “Americana” at its most peripheral areas where builders 
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craft their own “Mayberry” complete with wraparound porches and Georgian colonial 
styles amongst the Saguaro cacti. Complementing instantiations of Americana and the 
single-family home are equally as American visions of the community of tomorrow. 
Modern communities such as Eastmark in the eastern valley draw on the presence of 
Silicon Valley companies such as Apple, weaving their presence with the larger history 
of Phoenix being the place for modern homebuilding alongside streets aptly named 
Copernicus and Aileron.  
Methods and Data Collection 
 
One of the significant challenges Phoenix poses for studying the role new home 
build site models poses is the sheer size and scope of ongoing construction. The Phoenix 
metropolitan area consists of a population of approximately 4.5 million individuals 
spread out across a forty mile wide by sixty mile long stretch of valley, from the city of 
Buckeye in the west to Mesa and Queen Creek in the east. Figure 1 provides a general 




Figure 1: Map of Phoenix Metropolitan Area (Visit Phoenix 2017). 
Given the sheer speed at which new developments emerge in the Phoenix 
metropolitan area, my analysis of residential new home build sites began with 
preliminary web searches of local real estate development websites in three key valley 
communities – Mesa, Goodyear/Litchfield Park, and Buckeye. Each of these 
communities has grown significantly in the last decade, possess large amounts of open 
and inexpensive land, and are co-located with key freeways for accessing businesses 
across the valley. These initial searches generated a total of 117 construction sites with a 
total of 27 unique builders. To account for other builders operating in the valley, I 
conducted a broader search of new build sites across the Phoenix metropolitan area. This 
broader search generated nine new build sites with eight unique builders. 
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New home builders in Phoenix comprise some of the largest residential 
construction companies in the United States today. These builders, including D.R. 
Horton, Pulte, David Weekly and others rank amongst the top national builders on a 
revenue basis. Table 1 below outlines the industry rankings of each residential home 
builder in Phoenix included in the study.  Due to Phoenix’s size and continual growth 
over the last fifty years, a number of large national builders are currently building 
multiple communities across the valley. Other builders, such as Meritage Homes, have 
grown from “local” builders in the Phoenix metropolitan area to nationally-recognized 
housing brands throughout the Sun Belt states.   Phoenix’s housing market and seasonal 
residents from the upper Midwest and southern provinces of Canada also sparked 
financial interest on the part of international builders. Mattamy Homes, Canada’s largest 
single-family home builder, entered the Phoenix market during the early 2010s and is 
continuing to expand its presence throughout the valley through the development of 13 
communities across the Phoenix metropolitan area.
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TABLE 1 
ANNUAL REVENUE RANKINGS OF SURVEYED BUILDERS (Professional Builder 2017) 
Builder Ranking Builder Ranking  
Ashton Woods 18 Maracay Homes* N/R  
AV Homes 25 Mattamy Homes 32  
Beazer Homes 15 Meritage Homes Corp.* 9  
Bellago Homes* N/R Pinnacle West Homes* N/R  
Blandford Homes* N/R Porchlight Homes* N/R  
Cachet Homes* N/R Pulte Group, Inc.2 3  
Cal Atlantic Homes 4 MCD Holdings, Inc.3 12  
D.R. Horton, Inc. 1 Robson Communities, Inc.4* 67  
David Weekley Homes 14 Shea Homes 13  
Fulton Homes* 81 Taylor Morrison 8  
Gehan Homes 34 Toll Brothers 6  
Hovnanian Enterprises, Inc.1 10 Towne N/R  
KB Home 7 William Lyon Homes 17  
Lennar Corp. 2 William Ryan Homes 121  
LGI/Terrata Homes 24 Woodside Homes 27  
Mandalay Homes* N/R      
1 - Includes K Hovnanian 
 
2 - Includes Del Webb (55+ Communities Only) 
 
3 - Operates as Richmond American Homes 
 
4 - Active Adult (55+ Communities Only) 
 
* - Indicates Phoenix-Based Company 
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As part of my analysis of the new home build models, I collected information 
pertaining to the type of home (single family, detached; single family, attached; multi-
family), their geolocation, and the price range and square footage of their online listed 
home models. This provided informative context about the relative income levels of each 
community’s customer base and the concentration of new builds within specific parts of 
the valley. Figure 2 below was generated from a Google Fusion table documenting each 





Figure 2: Google Fusion Map of New Home Build Sites 
At each site, builders constructed between two and four model homes. In the most 
extreme cases builders designing all-inclusive communities, specifically those serving a 
55 or older community only (known as ‘active adult’ communities), builders construct 
entire model home neighborhoods with up to, in the case of Pebble Creek, a community 
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in Goodyear, AZ, 12 models arranged as a “village” (see Figure 3). Model home villages 
allow sales personnel to control the flow of individuals into the models, and optimize 
possible moments where sales personnel could engage customers in identifying their 
wants and needs. For some communities, sales personnel used golf carts to drive 
customers from the model village to homes under construction for existing customers or 
ones being built from the builder’s perspective to optimize quick sale (“spec homes”).   
 
 
Figure 3: Model Homes "Village" Map 
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Experiencing a model home from the perspective of individuals and families 
seeking a new single family residence requires mirroring the visual, tactile, and 
discursive experiences embedded in the sales process. Following Rose’s (2003) 
multimodal analysis of photographs in the construction of concepts of the ‘home,’ I 
entered each new home build experience through the lens of being a potential customer 
seeking a single-family home. Maintaining this frame of analysis was critical to enrolling 
sales personnel in the process of guiding me through the entire model home sales 
experience, including providing marketing documentation, asking potential customers to 
sign up for news alerts, and importantly the comfort and time necessary to go through 
each model home in detail. Alongside documentation provided by sales persons, I 
photographed any other marketing devices such as signage and pamphlets contained in 
and around model homes as well as collected any other materials intended for customer 
consumption. With some model home sites, builders designed immersive experiences 
where customers can “see” the construction options possible through their home designs. 
In these ‘learning centers,’ I recorded the experiences from the perspective of a customer 
entering and observing the experience. 
All data streams generated from each build site were digitized, tagged, and 
uploaded to a master Dropbox folder within subfolders for each city. Build sites were 
given a location number (LOC ###) based on their city of origin during the initial model 
home discovery phase. These location numbers were associated with subfolders within 
each city’s main Dropbox folder for easy access to site-specific information. 
It is worth noting at this point that new home communities are heavily shaped by 
builder’s perceptions their perceived customer base’s identity. Certainly the most 
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important factor weighing on the inclusion/exclusion of customers are the expected 
financial capacities of those who enter a neighborhood. Individuals and families who are 
capable of affording, for example, the $500,000 or more base price homes in Toll 
Brothers’ Vistancia community in Peoria are expected to not only have the ability to 
invest in homes well above the region’s average, but moreover want and desire luxury 
finishes of which they are both capable of articulating to a design team and paying for in 
total loan modifications. Of the communities studied, only those in Buckeye, Arizona, 
and specifically neighborhoods outside of the coveted Verrado community development, 
ranged below $200,000. These homes, built on repurposed agricultural land, both signify 
the distance to which middle income families must travel to acquire affordable single 
family housing, and the role of these new suburbs in separating lower income populations 
on already marginal lands. Other communities draw on similar lands at a higher price 
point, specifically the Estrella community south of Tolleson, AZ, but these are situated 
amongst the vistas to the southwest of the Estrella Mountains along the periphery of the 
Rainbow Valley and, by extension, the Gila River Indian Community.  
Another factor that plays into the demarcation of idealized customer populations 
falls along perceived family arrangements, and more specifically the presence of multi-
generational homes and non-heteronormative relationships. Of the communities 
surveyed, only those focused on 55 or older populations included design features that 
explicitly marketed homes where multiple generations – usually an older set of parents 
and their aging children – could live together with semi-demarcated spaces. Designs, 
however, focused on the separation of one of the two groups from the other, generally the 
older parents, who would be expected to reside in the home only part of the year. In terms 
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of intimiate relationship configurations, only Robson Communities’ models made any 
indication their homes were for forms of living other than heteronormative retired 
couples. Yet this instance – present in only one model – should not be taken as a 
deviation from the perception that homes are overwhelmingly for single-family 
heteronormative couples of varying degrees of financial ability. These factors play a 
significant role in how information is presented to customers, especially in terms of how 
visions of responsible environmental stewardship through effective home energy 
management are presented as the customer’s incumbent responsibility. 
Experiencing the Model Home 
 
The purchase of a suburban home through a builder during the development phase 
differs in many ways from building a custom home, purchasing a pre-build resale 
structure, or renting a domicile. Custom homes imply an in-depth negotiation between 
builder, architect, and homeowner where a variety of exterior and interior features will be 
designed and with the homeowner’s personal vision and financial constraints in mind. 
Resale homes, on the other hand, involve mediating expert parties (real estate agents) that 
identify homeowner wants and needs with the intent of finding properties that both meet 
homeowner requirements and help optimize the agents’ individual return on time 
invested in the sales process. Working with a large builder can involve elements of both 
custom and resale home sales experiences, but within a highly constrained number of 
possible design outcomes. At the most extreme, builders such as Terrata (LGI Homes) 
sell only homes they have designed and constructed with no specific customer(s) input in 
mind. Like Henry Ford’s famous adage, “You can have any color, so long as it’s black”, 
 119 
these builders define for the customer whose imagined house can become the 
homeowner’s ‘home.’  
Most builders, however, offer a variety of semi-custom structural and interior 
design options that are gradated based on price. These options can include pre-
determined exterior designs, interior space modifications, and various technology options 
including thermostats, kitchen appliances, and as I will discuss in the case of some 
builders, pre-installed rooftop photovoltaic systems. Not all options are available to the 
homebuyers as options can add significantly to the “base” price for a given house model. 
Homebuyers are thus forced when comparing two home builder’s options to consider 
what options are included, what options they desire, and the amount available to put 
forward for earnest money (to lock in a site) and the final down payment in conjunction 
with the mortgage. For example, at two single-family attached town home build sites in 
the small resort community of Litchfield Park, AZ, home buyers who are qualified for 
approximately $350,000 can either purchase a base model townhome through Cachet 
Homes or, alternatively, buy a significantly upgraded townhome of relatively the same 
size at a Mattamy Homes development (The Cove at Palm Valley North) nearby.  
How homebuyers make decisions about which builder and home design to go 
with begins through the process of entering the model home sales office. Usually situated 
within a converted garage space, the sales office serves as the obligatory passage point 
for customers seriously interested in purchasing a new home. Sales offices become a part 
of the new home spectacle where builders exhibit their brand’s identity, as well as gather 
critical information why their potential customers are seeking out a new home. Builders 
are of course interested in what structurally their customers want in a home, however, 
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these concerns fall secondary to the overall structure and pace of home life. Model sales 
offices serve in this way as a place for entering into and exchanging ideas about what the 
home means. Figure 4 shows how in the case of one builder, Meritage Homes, emphasis 
is put on structural, financial, and social factors such as distance from work, school 
quality, and household membership dynamics. Meritage also takes interest in how 
customers conceptualize the energy efficiency of their current domicile; I will address in 
more detail later in this chapter. For the moment, it is worth noting that, as a whole, 
builders like Meritage are equally as concerned with shaping/being shaped by their 
customers’ visions of home as they are by and design or engineering concerns.   
 
 
Figure 4: Example Customer Registration Form 
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Exiting the model home, the customer finds themselves on the proverbial and 
“literal” other side of a fenced zone between the model homes and the rest of the 
development. In typical single-family detached home builds, this involves a standard yard 
fence that prevents customers from entering individual models on their own volition. For 
large “model villages” in active adult communities, model homes are demarcated through 
a system of gates and walls that prevent customers and current residents from 
intermingling. Customers who have not yet purchased property and “joined” the 
community are thus kept separate from the actual homes and homeowners present – a fact 
that is reinforced as they turn away from the sales office and into the individual models.  
The exterior and interior design of model homes serves to enroll as many 
potential groups of customers in the builder’s vision of what the ideal home life consists 
of and serves to cultivate. Like museums, the model home is a testament to the “good 
life” in America at its fullest; exterior architectural choices hearken to classic hacienda, 
mid-century modern, and opulent Georgian colonial architectures. Lawns vary from well-
organized xeriscape spaces, to grass covered yards with uncovered water features that 
continue to operate well into Phoenix summer heat. For all but the wealthiest of 
customers, these options call more to what the builder imagines their future residents see 
home life as, rather than the financial realities of their individual cases.  
Inside, model homes continue to display visions of American home life and 
Americana culture materialized through structural and furnishing choices. Mid-century 
tables, waterfall edge kitchen islands, multiple bedrooms, and giant master bathrooms 
reflect the latest trends in home design (Figure 5) while maintaining that connection to 
the desert landscape aura that first found its way into the American imagination via 
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copies of Arizona Highways magazines (Needham 2014). The collective effect is to give 
the customer an uncanny sense of lived-in space; on one hand, there appears to be a 
family present, yet there are none of the markings of human habitation, a lack of 
disorganization intermixed with the sweet almost sterile scent of air fresheners. 
 
Figure 5: A Model Home Interior in Phoenix 
As a whole, the model home experience is akin to what Donna Haraway describes 
circulating amongst the objects of the American Museum of Natural History in New 
York (1984: 21): 
Behind every mounted animal, bronze sculpture, or photograph lies a profusion of 
objects and social interactions among people and other animals, which in the end 
can be recomposed to tell a biography embracing major themes for the 20th 
century United States. 
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Model homes do not possess the permanency of the museum exhibits, yet they still stand 
in for a multitude of commitments on the part of the builder as to who and what the home 
includes and excludes. All customers will at some level or another enter into the 
experience of seeing home life through the model home, though few have the capital 
necessary to afford the models themselves. This marriage of idealized home life with 
economic activity creates a material and social permanence to the home that public 
spaces lack. We may all “claim” to support at varying levels public spaces, but the 
private space of the home is for the American family an expression of their situatedness 
within the large political, social, and economic landscape of the nation writ large.  
What does this indicate about the purpose of expressions of energy use and 
technologies in the model home? Following the idea of model homes as capitalized 
museums, how technologies become represented through visual and discursive rhetoric in 
these spaces indicates the kinds of people suburban home builders imagine inhabiting 
their communities. When it comes to energy systems, the very act of showing customers 
where power lines, smart thermostats, and high quality insulation link questions of how a 
family can use its means to secure financing with throwing parties for friends, baking 
with grandparents, and having the peace of mind to know a home is secure.  
The following sections outline how builder’s expressions of social, economic, and 
environmental values possible through advanced in-home energy technologies articulate 
the role of energy transitions in the construction of home identities. Of the builders 
surveyed, three companies – Meritage Homes, Del Webb (a subsidiary of Pulte), and 
Robson Communities – constructed their visions of home life explicitly in terms of the 
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values advanced energy systems could generate towards transforming home life. What 
makes their design and marketing choices significantly different from their peers – even 
those who include mention of advanced energy technologies – is their emphasis on the 
home as a network of human activities and technologies that generate value. Meritage, 
Del Webb, and Robson customers are in this respect “made” rather than found. As I 
demonstrate below, builder model home design choices situate technological artifacts in 
conversation with infrastructural elements of house design to emphasize specific social, 
environmental, and economic values. Emerging from the model home experience, 
customers see saving money in high efficiency windows, diverting carbon emissions 
through spray-foam insulation, and generating more time for leisure with home energy 
management systems. Rather than finding a home that suits their incumbent values, the 
ideal customer emerges from the homebuying process seeking to, in the words of 
Meritage Homes, “live better, smarter, and healthier” (2017) than a family in a 
conventional resale home.  
Living Better – Private Values and Energy Technologies 
 
What do energy management technologies and yoga have to do with each other? 
In the context of PebbleCreek, a large Robson Communities active adult neighborhood in 
Goodyear, energy management and in-wall technology choices represent technological 
commitments to living the life of leisure promised during the mid-century in retirement. 
These commitments to alternative ways of living through energy management play out in 
the community’s Learning Center, a converted garage in one of a dozen models directly 
adjacent to the Pebble Creek sales center. A common feature amongst the three builders 
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surveyed in this chapter, Learning Centers serve a specific function in model home 
communities. Whereas the purpose of model homes is to give individuals spaces where 
they can imagine their visions of the good life through vaulted ceilings and quartz 
countertops, Learning Centers provide stylized environments to experience the 
infrastructural components of home design and management. They also serve as moments 
where corporate marketing can take front stage vis-à-vis the actual design features 
displayed in homes. Figure (6) shows a series of images from Learning Centers at 
PebbleCreek (left), Del Webb (center), and Meritage (right).  
 
Figure 6: Various Learning Center Exhibits 
Learning Centers are typically located in large unfinished spaces within model 
homes – either garages, large family rooms, or in the case of one Meritage build site 
interspersed throughout the house. Accessing the Learning Center requires passing 
through both the formal sales center space and the majority of public and spaces within a 
model home. For example, at Meritage’s Sedella community, customers were directed 
into the first model and through the dining and living room before entering the Learning 
Center in a converted garage. Entering each Learning Center, customers are encouraged 
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to walk across the threshold out of a home and into the building technologies exhibition. 
This process facilitates customers moving from the highly public spaces of the home 
progressively into the center of the space until, upon crossing a threshold, they go behind 
the proverbial walls to see what makes a builder’s house their hypothetical home.  
 
For Meritage, Del Webb, and Robson the learning centers are expressions of 
corporate values pertaining to the relationship between customer and builder. Figure (7) 
below shows the entrance of PebbleCreek’s Learning Center, a large “mural” like wall 
depicting the advantages of Robson-designed active adult living.  
 
Figure 7: PebbleCreek Learning Center Advertisement 
Value is at the center of the Learning Center narrative, linking what the home enables to 
how the home is designed and lived in. Customers seeking homes in an active adult 
community are, by Robson’s measure, interested in lives driven by the ability to do as 
much or as little out of the house as desired.  
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With a variety of ‘resort-style’ options for daily activities, life at PebbleCreek is 
meant to be about what you can do in retirement, rather than what you cannot. Achieving 
these desired social outcomes – playing golf with friends, taking up crafts, or having 
family visit requires resources and a space designed to make living rather than life 
possible. It requires more than bare minimum finances, and by extension PebbleCreek is 
designed in terms of homes to facilitate the efficient use of monetary resources. How this 
comes about has little to do with the actions of the hypothetical homeowner, as retirement 
should be as little about the management of self as possible! Rather, the house itself can 
become a tool of financial management. How this occurs is through the organization of 
specific technological choices pertaining to building materials and in-home energy 
management devices in conjunction with the external validation of energy professionals. 
Thus, as Figure (7) above indicates, leisure and design are married together through 
transforming the home from an energy and financial sink into a generator of unexpected 
(but not un-earned) resources.  
Across the Robson Learning Center are a series of physical exhibits, similar to the 
one depicted in Figure (7) above documenting how Robson design achieves this merger 
of construction and value creation. Each individual exhibit provides a variety of visual 
and tactile modes for experiencing Robson design choices. Figure (8) below shows one 
example, a ‘touch-screen’ series of simulated window panes comparing low-emissivity 
modern windows included in Robson designs and traditional vinyl sheathing windows. 
Behind each window is a lightbulb of ostensibly the same wattage and on each window 
pane printed is a place for placing a human hand. The intended effect is to use the sense 
of heat against bare skin to differentiate the traditional vinyl window that is hot to the 
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touch to a cooler new low emissivity window pane. Above this and other exhibits Robson 
uses a series of post-it styled images to depict how each technology both inside and part 
of the walls enables a suite of other ‘social’ goods. Replacing money spent on lost 
heating and cooling, Robson customers can redirect their energies to enjoying the 
multitude of potential hobbies and social activities available (Figure 8). Saved kilowatts 
become appetizers at the community restaurant, and minutes spent paying bills and 
managing an older home are now open for tee times at one of the community’s golf 
courses. Energy savings rather than use are the measure of untapped leisure at 
PebbleCreek, while the drudgery of corporate work and checklists (depicted by the many 
faux sticky notes) is a thing of the past. Others, specifically Environments for Living®, a 
third-party energy efficiency and health home inspection service, provide level of baked-
in support to make sure that even maintenance of home space is, at least for the first 
years, in the hands of others. Simply living in a Robson home generates leisure and value, 
not merely because of the builder’s unique characteristics, but because they are 




Figure 8: PebbleCreek Examples of Energy Marketing 
 
 
Talking to Solar Panels – Making Environmentally ‘Smart’ Customers 
 
Meritage and Del Webb differ from Robson and the remainder of their 
competitors in one key way; currently, they are the only builders in the Phoenix market 
that offers the possibility of integrating rooftop photovoltaic solar energy into the initial 
home construction. Like Robson, they have a strong interest in construction the model 
home and its learning center as a place where customers are brought into contact with a 
suite of social values embedded in walls and sockets. However, unlike Robson, they have 
an explicit interest in generating understanding amongst their constituents. Figure (9) 
depicts two examples of how Meritage and Del Webb situate one advanced technology–
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rooftop photovoltaic solar – as objects customers can both see, touch, and read/hear 
about.  
 
Figure 9: Examples of Photovoltaic Solar Panels in Learning Centers 
The model home exists between the family home as a space of public values 
exercised within the private realm and longstanding food, water, and energy 
infrastructural systems that flow in and out of spaces defined by government policies, 
pre-existing corporations, and previous residents. On one hand, the model home as I have 
suggested above is a space where the values of others – namely those of the company 
building homes – enter into the lives of new individuals. On the other, model homes are 
stylized representations of ideal living through a builder’s designs – be that in terms of 
appliance choices or insulation types.  
For the majority of builder’s surveyed, marketing techniques focused on 
emphasizing the ability to create comfortable homes that enable a family’s preexisting 
value systems. Meritage, Del Webb, and Robson are by contrast interested in creating 
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environments where customers either self-identify with new ways of living or can find 
themselves in a builder’s home through seeing the home in new terms. The latter is 
crucial for Meritage and Del Webb’s passive marketing of solar technologies for the 
home, as their intent is to create the ideal home buyer through experiencing and learning 
about the advantages novel energy technologies provide. Assuming potential 
homeowners will simply adapt to a new paradigm of living discounts the tremendous 
agency owners have in determining what they can or cannot include; however, the 
important element of these learning campaigns is they take learning about energy 
technologies and merge them with a passive study in the infrastructural dimensions of 
home economics.  
Take the case of Meritage’s photovoltaic power exhibit; in each of the learning 
center’s visited, the solar exhibit was present and generally displayed in a corner with 
limited prominence vis-à-vis the larger board given up to Meritage’s comprehensive 




Figure 10: Meritage Home Features Schematic 
Each solar exhibit includes three major pieces: a “real” solar panel, written text 
about the advantages of rooftop solar energy, and pamphlet materials from their third-
party solar supplier Sunpower. Couched in terms of energy independence through 
advanced technologies, Meritage plays on the individual home as a private space to 
situate solar as a natural extension of this access to privacy and self-control of home 
finances (Figure 11, see text below): 
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Figure 11: Meritage Solar Energy Exhibit 
If there’s ever been a solution for saving money on utility bills, it’s building your 
home with solar energy. After all, the more energy you make at home, the less 
you have to purchase from the utility company. The value of your savings will 
also continue to grow as time goes on and utility rates increase. In fact, a national 
solar provider proclaims that an average homeowner during a span of 30 years 
can produce twice the money in cost savings than what the average solar-energy 
system costs to purchase. Also, a U.S. government study showed that homes with 
solar energy increased the homeowner’s resale value significantly. 
 
Displayed on the wall underneath the heading “Advanced Solar Energy”, customers in 
the Meritage Learning Center discover through seeing and learning about solar for the 
first time how it can provide significant financial control over the value of a home both in 
the present and over large periods of time. With a national reputation for unstable real 
estate, situating advanced solar homes in Phoenix as stable in terms of total equity 
compared to their peers makes adopting photovoltaic energy financially sensible and 
technologically progressive. It is appropriate, then, Meritage mirrors Robson’s use of the 
sticky note social values – energy technologies exchange from Figure (8) with ‘fact’ 




Figure 12: Meritage Energy Facts 
Throughout the Meritage Learning Centers observed in Phoenix the builder consistently 
linked learning about energy use – carbon emissions, utility bills, insulation, and home 
energy management – in terms of the responsible management of home resources. Figure 
(13) represents a common diagram found in home kitchens depicting the advantages of a 
Meritage home. Investing in a Meritage home implies committing to a series of coded 
intelligent or “smart” in the company’s own language choices about energy and its larger 
environmental and economic impacts both at home and throughout the world. A Meritage 
home is as depicted below as smart as cutting carbon emissions at power plants, reducing 
transportation emissions (a critical issue in Phoenix), or re-planting forests.  
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Figure 13: Meritage Environmental Marketing 
Del Webb follows a similar pattern for linking customers to specific home design 
advantages in terms of financial wellbeing. However, they also emphasize the role of the 
homeowner as a community member responsible for the long-term sustainability of the 
world. This differs slightly from Meritage’s vision of energy efficiency and 
environmental protection education in learning centers: where Meritage states buying a 
home from them generates these values, Del Webb actively situates the homeowner’s 
environmental values within the community borders. On the exterior of the learning 
center model, Del Webb (Figure 14) openly displays the company’s official logo for its 
‘green’/environmentally friendly programs, putting energy and the environment literally 
on the walls of its ‘model’ community.  
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Figure 14: DelWebb Green Built Model Home 
Stepping into the main entryway, Del Webb carries the open themes of 
conservation and resource management along the floors and into the entryway where a 
large hole in the ceiling prominently displays the advantages of properly sealed and 
insulated ceilings. Continuing on through the public spaces of the home and into the 
learning center the images of advanced technologies and energy management systems are 
put against a canvas of tranquil images of greenery and adults of the appropriate age 
group enjoying the outdoors (Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15: Greenbuilt Learning Center 
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Whereas Meritage emphasized the role of advanced energy systems in terms of saving 
and generating revenue first, Del Webb describes rooftop photovoltaic solar as a tool for 
creating positive environmental impact while simultaneously levelling mid to long-term 
home expenses. Some benefits of solar listed in the learning center include “Clean”, 
“Renewable Energy”, “Lower utility bills”, “25-year limited warranty solar power 
output”, and “NO homeowner maintenance”. Energy and financial savings figure 
prominently within the discourse of going green by retiring through Del Webb, but the 
emphasis is always on how these technological choices generate positive environmental 
impacts throughout the life of the homeowner and the home.  
The Home that Generates Values 
 
Before turning to the implications of energy technologies at the center of model 
home narratives, it is worth reflecting on the impact electrification had on the American 
home. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries scholars, theologians, and 
politicians alike situated the design of American homes at the center of a narrative of the 
idealized moral and democratic society. How one built a home and who lived in it were 
by extension a deeply private expression of larger public values. Furthermore, the 
suburban home in particular was an expression of the need to generate a communion with 
nature – a call for the vision of Arcadia against the malignant ills of city life. As 
electrification became more common in households of the suburban middle and upper-
middle class, home designs shifted accordingly to more and more open floorplans, 
allowing for the spread of light throughout spaces (Nye 1992: 255). Accompanying the 
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“opening” of space was an extension of the pace of industrialized life into the home, with 
the home, as Cowan noted, ossifying as a site of resource consumption.  
Meritage, Del Webb, and Robson communities and model home designs continue 
to echo these commitments to illumination and space immersed in nature (Figure 16). 
Contemporary home designs in Phoenix maximize the entry of light into open spaces, 
paradoxically encouraging increased thermal transmission while simultaneously 
employing multi-zoned air conditioning. Model homes are clean, orderly spaces, 
hearkening to mid-century architectural and interior design choices synonymous with the 
heyday of Phoenix development.  
 
Figure 16: Robson Model Floorplan 
Seen through this lens the model homes and learning centers of Meritage, Del Webb, and 
Robson are a continuation of the suburban home as central to the American vision of 
individualism and democracy in an idyllic land. Each builder is fundamentally concerned 
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with the individual family and its role in the social, environmental, and economic fabric 
of the nation. The single-family homeowner’s choices to seek out lives at the periphery of 
urban landscapes, behind walls and secured gates, are indicative of the larger patterning 
of securitized suburban spaces. It seems fitting, then, that some of the largest 
homebuilding in the valley today is taking place underneath the flight paths of Luke Air 
Force Base’s F-22 and F-35 aircraft.  
Taken from this perspective, each builder’s choice to incorporate advanced 
energy technologies as part of the marketing of the home extends upon the celebration of 
electrification technology in the home that accompanied the emergence of electricity as 
the primary mode of powering homemaking activities. Following plugs from the 
refrigerator through walls and the circuit breaker back to the inverter and solar panels, we 
see how learning centers move the frame of reference concerning energy technologies in 
the home away from individual artifacts towards systemic and infrastructural networks of 
electrons and information.  
Customers learn to think about homes as an assemblage of various materials, 
technologies, and individual choices for gathering and arraying information. From the 
perspective of scholars and activists interested in materializing energy practices these 
centers do a tremendous job making it clear to customers how material choices link 
abstract values attached to power bills to the individual choices family members make. 
Like a science museum of the home, visitors to the learning center feel heat, hear the 
outdoors through insulated walls, and see air blowing through lower grade insulations. 
The ideal model home, like a properly designed museum is also a hermetically sealed 
facility situated in nature, but not within it, in the sense the outer world can enter. 
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Adjacent to these exhibits a variety of third-party provided technologies promise to 
manage water use, keep track of thermostats, and of course provide energy in ‘lieu’ of the 
local utility. Wrapped in stucco and faux wood exteriors the home takes on the 
characteristics of living in a technologically-driven future without the traumatizing 
experience of modernist design aesthetics. One can live like the Jetsons, but one does not 
have to exchange the comfort of craftsman or hacienda styles for metal and glass. 
Through becoming ‘learned’ customers, individuals are made aware how specific 
societal values – progress in the case of Meritage, and Del Webb and comfort and 
individualism for Robson – are made real through their personal choices for the home. It 
is impossible to exit a Meritage model home without considering the role innovation 
plays in the home buying process. The idea of being innovative through energy 
technologies is so central to the company’s business model that the company chose to 
stencil the phrase “Location. Location. Location. Innovation.” (Figure 17) on the door 
their Sedella – Almiera (higher-end homes) sales office.  
 
Figure 17: Meritage Innovation Slogan 
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Innovation is both a place and a state of mind for Meritage. Like early and mid-century 
Euroamerican families seeking to ‘flee’ urban decay and corruption, Meritage places 
energy efficient home living as part of a flight from the decadence and disorder of 
traditional suburban homebuilding, to a place where a well-educated population living 
through technological advances can escape the failures of humankind.  
Del Webb takes this narrative of societal material and environmental suburban 
decadence to a further extreme – it is incumbent upon those who live in an active adult 
community create a form of living that creates the least impact on future generations 
possible. Comfort is necessary, but through comfort retired couples can generate other 
values – health, wellbeing, and independence. At Sun City Festival, the Del Webb 
community surveyed in this study, the point was made more clear by the fact residents 
lived in semi-isolation surrounded on all sides by open desert beyond the edge of the 
Phoenix metropolitan area. Sun City Festival was by no means marketed as a utopia in 
the sense of the Shakers or the Oneida community, yet it is an inescapable fact that all 
aspects of the Del Webb model home experience were couched in terms of comfort and 
social responsibility to others through the responsible – as opposed to early – use of 
advanced energy technologies.  
Between these two models, Robson’s PebbleCreek exhibits a commitment to 
using specific building materials and energy management technologies to create a 
community of leisure. Robson community members have ‘done their duty’ in the sense 
they have served as productive members of society. Retirement, by contrast, is about 
enjoying the fruits of labor denied throughout middle life. Managerial tasks, such as 
utility bills and home maintenance, can be brought under the control of Robson 
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customers via the use of rooftop solar sources or third party energy use assessors. Golf, 
yoga, and communing with others – in essence socializing – is the role of retirement, a 
role energy management technologies facilitates.  
The Home that Works Itself 
 
Robson homes, like those of Meritage and to a lesser extent Del Webb, ‘do work’ 
in the sense the responsibility for managing home resources is ideally pushed off to the 
home management system. Turning the idea of reducing or eliminating the labor of 
homemakers on its head, builders who emphasized advanced energy technologies as part 
of their model home marketing strategies spoke a great deal about designing homes that 
generate economic value. No builder was more clear about this than Meritage, whose 
marketing directly links the act of purchasing a Meritage home with beginning a virtuous 
circle between homeowner financial resources and the home’s continued habitation 
(Meritage Homes 2016): 
We believe every family deserves a home built better. And were passionate about 
engineering an energy-efficient home, that gets better the longer its lived in 
because of the life it allows your family to lead. A home that keeps the kids just as 
cozy in the loft, as they are in the living room. And helps your entire family 
breathe easier. A home that saves up to 50% on utility bills, so you can host 
bigger barbeques, have more date nights, and do more living. We won’t rest until 
a home that allows you to live better, smarter, and healthier is the new standard, 
the new American Dream. So, we’ll keep working to innovate brilliantly, design 
thoughtfully, and execute flawlessly. 
 
Positing the home can in fact improve in quality and productivity over its life cycle 
contradicts the purposeful creation of suburban landscapes as places of mass 
consumption and waste moving ever outwards from city centers. At a more localized 
level, the idea of a home that generates value by producing new found financial resources 
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by optimizing expenses goes well beyond the conceptualization of the home as site of 
productivity – the home itself is productive.  
We must take a moment to consider the implications of this vision of home-
homeowner co-existence. Throughout much of the twentieth century, reformers of a 
variety of backgrounds have sought to emulate industrial production within the home 
setting whilst promising to reduce the ills of laborious and repetitive labor. These visions 
of home life and homemaking both rejected the house as a site of family-based 
production of goods and the total mechanization of private spaces. In the late twentieth 
century environmentalists and government agencies took this further, creating a suite of 
programs and campaigns, most notably the decades old Energy Star® program from the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, to optimize the responsible use of 
energy and financial resources. To some extent, the marketing campaigns of Meritage, 
Del Webb, and Robson build on these narratives of efficient resource use against the 
social, environmental, and economic ills of materialism.  
Yet what each builder proposes, and especially Meritage, is deeply unlike the 
crass optimization of resources. A home that generates values in and of itself implies that 
the infrastructures of living are capable of being productive sites within society. When 
these builders pose a home to the customer, they are posing a way of living where the 
spaces of living have agency as newly found members of the family. ‘Smarter’ homes 
thus imply more than the integration of information communication technologies; rather 
the constitution of home spaces, like factories of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, take on the characteristic of being material appendages of a society seeking ways 
to create new forms of economic generation within the ecological constraints of the 
 144 
Anthropocene. We (residents of these suburban spaces) have optimized the efficiency of 
ourselves as agents in the home to the extent we wish to do so – it is now incumbent upon 
us to create homes that take on the burdens of generating health, welfare, and comfort. 
Read one way this is but a mere continuation of the mechanization of the home 
into the “digital” age—a new venture into finding ways to squeeze out productivity 
through machines in the search for leisure. Achieving this through a variety of third party 
provided technologies that manage on the part of the homeowner thus could be seen as a 
neoliberalization of the home. As noted by Ong (2006: 3): “Neoliberalism can also be 
conceptualized as a new relationship between government and knowledge through which 
governing activities are recast as nonpolitical and non-ideological problems that need 
technical solutions.” The home is certainly a site of governance between spaces that are 
consider private and public, between consumption and production, and between the self 
and the other. Meritage, Robson, and Del Webb would in this respect be facilitators of a 
new corporate managed life driven defined by the continue intercession of various 
managerial techniques masquerading as ambivalent technical innovations. American 
customers by extension are exchanging agency through financial mechanisms – most 
notably the ever larger and larger home mortgages common across the county – for the 
promise of a life defined by what they can do with newly found excess capital rather than 
what they must design for their own needs. They are niche actors proposing a not-so-new 
vision of home life that, especially based on Meritage’s quick ascendance to the top of 
major domestic home builders, quickly become the norm of how Americans understand 
the relationship between self, home, and energy management technologies. 
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I would posit, however, that this definition is limited in terms of its relationship to 
how key visions of social life and order such as the single-family home play out against 
the backdrop of impending environmental change. First, to speak of the retreat of the 
state in home life implies the question of what is private and what is public has not 
remained in flux throughout the existence of the United States. We quote de Tocqueville 
when speaking of the home today as much as then for the sheer purpose that the same 
questions continue to circulate about defining familial agency and space. Meritage, to 
continue the example, does not direct our attention as all builders do to the idea of an 
“American Dream” because it is a convenience of marketing. They are fully committed to 
the idea that an alternative vision of the home is necessary for family thriving in the 
twenty-first century. Robson and Del Webb may not be concerned with family in the 
same sense, but both design for visions of the “good life.” Del Webb takes this one step 
further, seeking to create communities of responsibility where intergenerational questions 
of environmental justice play out in their design centers.  
From the perspective of addressing the design of future ways of living, we cannot 
escape the power model homes and their associated mass produced neighborhoods have 
on the American social, material, and political landscape. Andrew Needham reminds us 
that Phoenix became a city of banking and defense industry interests through the creation 
of suburban political spaces – the question we must now ask is what other kinds of daily 
associations can we create through alternative visions of suburban life. These will play 
out as much in neighborhood board meetings assessing solar installations as they will in 
the model home and sales offices across the street. Engaging at both points, and in the 
design committees of master-planned neighborhood developers like Robson and Del 
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Webb are crucial for determining where energy systems and home design imaginaries fit 
into the American future. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: A MODERN BUSYTOWN 
In this dissertation, I have sought to explicate the role collective imagination plays 
in shaping how social and political values become articulated within the context of 
specific transformations of energy systems. By doing so my intent is to demonstrate the 
importance of looking at the interstitial spaces between the rules that govern how 
individuals and communities understand their role(s) in the operation and maintenance of 
modern technological life and order. Somewhere between the larger cultural milieu 
through which innovations emerge and the individual policies, daily practices, and 
material accoutrements of our energized lives exists a constellation of spaces where we 
exchange ideas about who we are and whose world(s) we live within.  
These aspects of the construction of scientific facts and technological artifacts 
have long been situated within the context of cultural studies of energy science and 
technology. As a result, scholarship has long regarded these features to be important to 
understanding how modernity is shaped and expressed in the ‘hard stuff’ of political 
power. Yet little attention has been paid within the larger intellectual community 
concerned with energy innovations as to how societies translate new visions of social life 
and order into material and political transformations of large sociotechnical systems. 
Chapter Three tackled this question through answering how post-World War II 
politicians, businessmen, and bureaucrats saw the role of the United States as a bringer of 
global order through the reimagining of energy resource management. As those 
individuals articulated in the 1952 document, Resources for Freedom, American and 
global security was a question of seeing disparate energy resource flows long directed by 
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individual companies, sometimes in the service of particular states, as a comprehensive 
system.  
Through this comprehensive system of energy and resource flows across global 
space, it was possible to see questions of economic prosperity and strength at home as a 
question of the American citizenry’s collective responsibility to shape their own actions 
and the actions of others towards maximizing the efficiency of energy resource 
production and consumption. If the world before World War II was one of multiple 
powers vying for territory and materials on a planetary scale, then it would seem building 
a world of collective prosperity would require a heliocentric model of global energy order 
with the United States as the literal furnace of consumption and economic development. 
To speak of energy was and is still very much a question of speaking about collectively 
held value systems, about what things we include and exclude as energy-related, and how 
we code technologies as innovative or regressive. 
Chapter Three set the stage for examining energy systems as questions of political 
values translated into the re-imagining and operation of large electrification and fuels 
processes. There was however little attention paid to how political values focused at 
energy system transformations become fixed within the organizational superstructure of 
how these new systems operate vis-à-vis their predecessors. To address this question, 
Chapter Four turned away from the transnational scale to focus our attention on a familiar 
character and setting in the history of energy transitions in the United States: Samuel 
Insull and the development of Commonwealth Edison in early twentieth century Chicago. 
Reexamining a territory undertaken by Hughes in Networks of Power my analysis turns 
away from Insull’s business practices associated with the physical development of the 
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power company towards the ways Insull situated Commonwealth Edison as a vision of 
what energy service providers could and should do for their communities. Advocating for 
a vision of energy systems regulated by states in service of the ‘public interest’ Insull 
situated Commonwealth Edison and its precursors as agents seeking to create balance 
between various customer classes in the service of providing the maximum financial 
security for its investors at the lowest cost for its customers. Chicago and later the State 
of Illinois write large, so Insull argued, was comprised of individual families seeking a 
morally upright and fiscally responsible partner managed and overseen by a class men 
who envisioned personal and professional success in terms of stable and reasoned 
growth. Regulation and the creation of demarcated territories made it possible in Insull’s 
eyes to create a form of natural monopoly that should and could expand to reshape the 
maximum amount of lives in its territory possible. These individuals would, through 
electrification in the home and the creation of new forms of work in rural communities, 
increase their health and wellbeing.  
The regulated and territorially demarcated electricity provider was and in many 
parts of the United States still is the dominant form large sociotechnical system 
individuals experience electrical energy through, both at home and work. It is a common 
experience of daily life, one with a shared system of rules for using electricity and norms 
for how we expect to interface with larger regulated electrification companies. Situated 
between Nye’s vision of Muncie and Hughes understanding of Insull’s role in the 
emergence of electrification my analysis of how Insull sees the role of an electrification 
company within the larger political and social milieu of Progressive Era Chicago builds 
on the transnational discussion of energy security in Chapter three to show how through 
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studying these spaces between cultural narratives and managerial practices we can 
understand how specific sociotechnical transitions become ensconced in our collective 
understanding of our energy-consumption focused world.  
Few individuals today are not familiar with the monthly electricity bill or the idea 
of a meter reader – both objects and actions that like Scarry’s energized Busytown share 
a common ancestry with Insull’s vision of the electrification of society. Chapter Five 
followed these understandings and material systems further from the centers of energy 
systems design and management towards the very spaces Insull imagined electrification 
shaping: the homes of individual families in suburban and exurban communities. Starting 
from the perspective of home energy transformations as a key site for the emergence of 
new energy system understandings and operation in the twenty-first century I shifted 
away from questions of national policy and systems operation to examine how a critical 
space, the home, is being shaped through the reimagining where and how energy fits into 
daily life and order.  
Focusing our attention on one key metropolitan landscape of contemporary mass 
energy consumption – Phoenix, Arizona – and the role of suburban home building in 
shaping regional energy practices I examined how new home builders in the metropolitan 
area articulate energy use and management in the context of what the home is and does 
for a family. Phoenix was built on the creation of spaces for individual energy 
consumption along an ever-expanding single-family home suburban periphery across the 
northern Sonoran Desert. By extension the city and its residents have been fundamentally 
concerned with energy systems operation and maintenance in the home both from the 
perspective of generating and transmitting enough energy to create comfortable living 
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spaces but also in terms of how to maximize comfort and wellbeing. As I show certain 
builders in the ‘Valley of the Sun’ – Meritage Homes, Del Webb, and Robson 
Communities – are fundamentally concerned with the situating the new family home 
within the context of how it manages energy on behalf of the family. Through a variety of 
marketing techniques and the creation of spaces for learning about energy practices and 
technologies in the home these builders opened up the walls of daily energy use to show 
the possibilities alternative home energy system configurations pose for families. The 
home as a site of financial resource consumption in the name of comfort and health can 
through the incorporation of new building materials, energy management technologies, 
and individual energy production via photovoltaic solar become an assemblage of 
technologies and physical spaces that produce social and economic value for the family. 
A ‘home that produces values’ eschews both the role of the family as managers of the 
home and the home as a site of non-participation in markets as it can actively generate 
new sources of revenue either through saving existing money or transforming the home 
into a place of energy production.  
A Modern Busytown 
 
Each instantiation of an energy system – be that at the transnational, regional, or 
local scale – explored in this dissertation is an expression of how individuals engaged in 
designing energy futures interpret the role of new sociotechnical system configurations in 
the larger narrative of who Americans are and what makes their forms of living and 
working ideal and unique. Like Scarry’s Busytown these visions of energy systems and 
daily life begin the process for making alternative technological configurations of daily 
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life sensible in the eyes of those who invariably experience its material and political 
effects. Few of us spend much time, if any, considering why utilities invest greatly in 
their public images, nor do we enter gas stations with questions of American empire and 
investment in oil producing countries’ technological development. 
Imagine if we did, though, how would we see our high-energy world? For the 
residents of the many new home communities studied in Chapter Five across the western 
Phoenix metropolitan area the bucolic Busytown would be replaced with the master-
planned community of Verrado where a multiplicity of builders vies for families to invest 
in their vision of an energy-efficient home in a re-imagined ‘Americana’ landscape.  
 
Figure 18: Verrado Community Website (DMB White Tank LLC 2017) 
Surrounding this new landscape instead of secondary roads and rail lines would 
be a series of interlocking interstates prepped to serve an imagined future where 
indigenous communities’ lands are intermingled with retirement communities and an 
emergent biotechnology industry. Planes fly above, but they are as often commercial jets 
as they are fighter-interceptor aircraft on a takeoff pattern from Luke Air Force Base to 
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the east. To the west and throughout the community power is supplied by a variety of 
sources brought in from across the state – nuclear from Palo Verde Nuclear Generating 
Station, solar from large plants to the east and south, as well as from the roofs of homes 
within the community itself; Busytown’s coal-fired power plant and associated mine are 
less than a footnote in this new book, isolated hundreds of miles away situated on another 
indigenous communities (in this case the Navajo Nation).  
I provide this quick summary of a ‘modern’ Busytown to highlight the challenges 
that emerge when scholars of technological transitions focus too much attention on the 
‘rules of the game’ of systems, rather than how these link to their larger social and 
political meanings. None of the elements described above are reflective of how 
individuals see the implications of the three transition moments examined in this 
dissertation; yet, it is an inescapable fact that the hybridized sociotechnical systems and 
landscapes humans inhabit are fundamentally inflected by how individuals, 
organizations, and communities understand their ‘networks of power’ in the greater 
narrative of American social life and order. To this end, one conclusion from this 
dissertation is that as we begin to shift from studying transitions to actively seeking 
intercession on their outcomes equal attention should be paid to emergent niche 
technological artifacts as to how these are situated and propagate existent visions of 
living, working, and interfacing with other societies. Like in the case of new homes in 
Chapter Five, our questions should be both about what technologies are entering the 
home as they are about how these new configurations of domestic sociotechnical systems 
become uncanny representation of latent and romanticized visions of American life.  
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In this respect, the current study of imaginaries and sociotechnical transitions has 
privileged an analysis of the ‘rules of the game,’ and in particular those ensconced in 
explicit acts of policy, in what otherwise should be a study of the patterning of how 
individuals and communities make sense of their sociotechnical worlds. Energy security 
in the post-World War II United States can be seen through various acts of global energy 
systems management ranging from policies such as the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s involvement in Egypt and Iran. Similarly, Insull’s 
Commonwealth Edison can, and often is, reduced down to the creation of regulatory 
bodies – public utility commissions – and the Public Utilities Holding Act of 1934. These 
laws and acts of state-led aggression stem from a series of conversations amongst actors 
engaged in defining though action what constitutes the appropriate scope of action to 
achieve goals.  
But how do we define the scope under which goals are constrained? It is here that 
I have posited, and demonstrated through the three case studies included in this project, 
that imaginaries serve as a technology of focusing larger cultural norms and values in 
towards defining the acceptable boundaries of interactions between individuals, large 
sociotechnical systems, and the people who manage them. Since each case study could 
and does encompass a wide swath of shifting political, social, and cultural values within 
American society, I focused on one key place of modulation within the larger milieu of 
how Americans defined what it meant to live in a verdant body politic. As a whole these 
case studies cut across a number of fields of study and topics of interest to scholars of 
imagination and social order – the public/private space divide, globalization and 
postcolonial order, progressive era politics, and energy policy – to name a few. 
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Imaginaries are in this respect a highly functional and useful analytical frame for 
examining the complex and intertwined social and technological issues that individuals 
and societies confront daily; and it is here that the body of work, to date, has failed to 
seriously entertain the possibility for imaginaries in the study of sociotechnical change. 
On the front of imaginaries research, studies represent segmented analyses of isolated or 
at best semi-linked events, where the essence of analysis is to explicate how actors 
engaged in the exercises of state power define why power should be exercised in certain 
ways over others. Imaginaries, the complex systems of remembering and forgetting social 
groups use to create a stable understanding of daily life may be tools of power, but this is 
not an explicit reason to avoid discussing how systems of power are made rational and 
nonpolitical.  
By focusing my analysis on the subjects through which specific sociotechnical 
transitions are couched as rational and nonpolitical, I have sought to demonstrate 
categories as significant or insignificant to the larger dynamics of energy systems change 
– from security and global resources to what it means to make a ‘home’—become 
windows through which we can observe and document the making of what members of a 
society consider to be the appropriate management of daily life. Few of us, for example, 
think in a truly deep and rich way daily about what it means for security to carry a strong 
moral valence linked to efficiency and control of technoscience. But, it is an inescapable 
fact that as individuals encounter moments of deviation – from blackouts to the recent 
Cambridge Analytica misuses of personal data – they strongly identify similar traits as 
those from the Resources for Freedom reports in the management their daily lives and 
identities.  
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Transitions are shaped and formed by the collective sensibilities that permeate 
systems and discourses of origin into ever wider groups. To return to another pertinent 
example from this study, the spaces and scales of regulated electrification did not emerge 
from federal-level policy actions, nor from niche actors engaged in providing new 
services, but from the co-productive effects generated as individuals both saw and 
understood the possibilities for energy in the home and at work in terms of an 
electrification system. Transitions research, much like the imaginaries work described 
above, appears to have lost some of these larger historical and cultural dynamics in the 
process of translating work from historians of technology into a framework for guiding 
policy action. The choice makes sense, as the focus of these efforts surrounding 
transitions management are instrumental in intent. By centering attention on particular 
cultural dynamics surrounding three energy transitions – security, the public interest, and 
the home – my hope is like the earliest works in the sociology of technology tradition, 
SCOT chief amongst them, to bring attention to the idea that sociotechnical transitions 
are anything but about the arrangement of artifacts alone.  
Building a system of rural automobile use, like electrifying Chicago, share many 
similar cultural resources pertaining to the role of mobility and efficiency in early 20th 
century American life. Both were not mere cases of manipulating existing artifacts and 
their use, but complex moments where aspects of daily life and the idea of what it meant 
to be productive and to play changed for multiple groups in society. Centering my 
analysis of how transitions are shaped by landscape forces around the imaginings of 
relevant social groups and within demarcated case studies, serves to both ground the idea 
of a sociotechnical landscape – something that I have noted still is quite abstract in 
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reference to a given transition – and recognize the power of imagination beyond the 
individual works of actors. Imagination is not the purview of the inventor in isolation – 
the very idea of a single person’s creative capacities occurring in lieu of a larger social 
and cultural milieu is antithetical to the idea of a sociology of technology. Transitions 
research by extension would and as I have demonstrated does benefit from a careful 
return to the social and cultural contexts of sociotechnical change, but understood as less 
a product of larger shifting and amorphous forces and more a product of focused efforts 
to rethink specific kinds of daily experiences in new terms.  
One unanswered question pertaining to the role of imagined technological futures 
and the propagation of dominant forms of social life and order is that, despite the growing 
body of literature on what imagination and imaginaries do as techniques of social and 
political change, we understand little about how individuals and communities develop 
shared understandings of the role of transitions in society. If, as proponents of a 
sociological perspective on the production of scientific knowledge and technology 
suggest the co-production of knowledge and social order is a social and political activity 
then where do individuals develop the cognitive schemata that shape the links between 
science, technology, and society?  
At first pass the easy answer is to say that is a highly complex process through 
which individuals are normalized to a given culture’s daily practices, sense of self and 
other, and constellation of material objects and associated meanings. Certainly this is in 
keeping with the vast majority of studies of technology and societies, but it says little 
about, for example, how a particular type of insulation within a home becomes a question 
of generating social and economic values through energy management. It does little to 
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answer critical questions like why do individuals engaged in advanced technology fields 
like those that inhabit Verrado, seek to live in and amongst new energy-efficient and 
solar powered homes within a homage to classic Americana? Furthermore, as we look 
forward to how future generations will see the place of energy and energy transitions 
within the larger American landscape, current studies of energy transitions do little to 
intercede in the processes through which individuals develop a sense of how 
understanding and utilizing technology is a complex social process. 
Initial work aimed at understanding imaginings of ongoing energy transitions 
identifies that as we seek to look at the gaps between local commitments to change and 
national trends the scale at which we examine these questions needs to be reconsidered 
(J. H. Tidwell and Tidwell 2018). To date scholarship examining imaginaries and 
transitions provides valuable insights into local, national, and transnational conversations 
pertaining to bioenergy systems, photovoltaics, and the reorganization of global energy 
markets. What remains is an effective approach for (1) linking these instantiations of 
transition together and (2) leveraging larger models of the norms and values surrounding 
energy transitions to create new spaces for discussing what future energy systems should 
achieve. The first point requires that we think carefully about the organization of research 
that can address in meaningful ways sociotechnical transitions at a scale commensurate to 
the systems at hand.  
To the extent new spaces can be created for these conversation, an understudied 
and enacted space exists at the intersection of sociotechnical transitions, imaginaries, and 
engagements with primary and secondary education. Roth and Lee (2004) proposed 
during the late 1990s that STS scholarship should consider the role of constructing 
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scientific literacy within classroom spaces in the process of developing an informed and 
engaged citizenry. Speaking of what we now otherwise call ‘active learning’ their 
framework included the following tenets (Roth and Lee 2004: 264):  
First, scientific literacy is a property of collective situations and characterizes 
interactions irreducible to characteristics of individuals. Second, science is not a 
single normative framework for rationality but merely one of many resources that 
people can draw on in everyday collective decision-making processes. Third, it 
makes more sense to organize learning environments that allow students to 
become knowledgeable by participating in and contributing to the life of their 
own community, which has the potential to lead to lifelong participation and 
learning. 
 
Since Roth and others involved in the constructivist movement in educational theory 
posited these ideas a growing body of literature and engagement in formal and informal 
science education has continued to push the boundaries of how students understand 
questions of nanotechnology, sustainability, and other critical topics for twenty-first 
century life. Yet, even within these various studies little attention has been paid to 
engaging in creating spaces for discussion and understanding of the co-production of 
technoscientific knowledge and the ordering of communities. The closest attempts at this 
are certainly the various works binned under the citizen science movement(s) and by no 
means am I disparaging their important work; however, it is an inescapable fact that 
within the context of thinking about future generations and their understanding(s) of the 
world the formal classroom environment is a dominant space for the structuration of 
learning how to learn and understand modernity and its place in the larger story of the 
human built world. 
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics classrooms are in particular 
critical spaces for intervention on two important fronts. First, for many students who will 
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eventually go on to play various roles in the shaping of new technological artifacts and 
systems they will pass through these spaces on their way through the formal education 
process. In these spaces students develop an understanding of what counts as STEM 
reasoning and what does not, as well as a personal sense of the cultural norms and values 
associated with being a participant in the creation of scientific knowledge and 
technologies. Who is or can assimilate to these spaces is a key challenge noted by 
scholars of race, gender, and STEM education today, and it leads to my second point: 
STEM classrooms, especially at the secondary education level, are one of the few 
examples of a true obligatory passage point for individuals and their ability to be 
considered valid participants in examining the societal dimensions of science and 
technology. It is no wonder that scholars addressing questions of race and gender equality 
in STEM fields have consistently pointed to the cultural dimensions surrounding STEM 
education practices as a critical limiting factor in the inclusion and exclusion of groups 
from society. These forms of implicit and explicit exclusion have direct impacts on who 
interprets the history of American society in the context of scientific and technological 
change, as well as how these cultural dimensions are inflected on the creation of newly 
configured forms of living and working.  
These factors present an interesting challenge for scholars focused on the role 
imagination plays in technological transitions. On one hand the consequences of 
imagination on the shaping of technological systems occurs at scales well beyond the 
individual and their respective community; transitions are transitions explicitly because 
of the growing levels of impact they have as older systems are subsumed or transformed 
to adhere to the new paradigm. Yet individuals, not abstract assemblages of humans and 
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technologies shape the world(s) we inhabit – to take any other perspective on the role of 
humans in technological transitions absolves both we the scholar and those we study 
from taking responsibility for the future of communities and the world writ large. To date 
the body of work on imagination and imaginaries has been decidedly hush on the material 
implications of their work despite the fact that much of it speaks at least in abstract to the 
importance of these visions of idealized social life and order in daily life.  
So, let us for the moment consider what it would mean to take the study of the 
stories we tell about scientific and technological progress made real through policies or 
material objects into these educational sites of meaning-making? Who would we 
interface with, and to what extent would we incorporate our ideas into the shaping of 
STEM pedagogy? I cannot speak for the entire field, but from my perspective this 
intervention would begin with we scholars making a rather unexpected move – we rather 
than our ideas must move into these spaces and engage in the difficult grassroots work 
and scholarship of imagining a different type of STEM experience. Students and we alike 
must join in the experience of being within the communities – intellectual, social, 
physical – and begin a dialogue and practice of thinking about how learning about STEM 
topics can simultaneously facilitate the development of students’ ability to reflexively 
contemplate their own worlds in terms of specific concepts. By opening up the black box 
of learning and challenging students to understand STEM explicitly in terms of the 
communities they inhabit imaginaries scholarship may both develop a richer 
understanding of how larger cultural and social norms are inflected on particular 
technological and scientific endeavors, but also what possibilities await us in the pursuit 
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